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Disciplining Governance in Africa 
A comparison of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Insti-
tutional Assessment and the African Union’s African Peer 
Review Mechanism 
 
 Abstract 
 
 
 
This study examines the promotion of governance in the African Conti-
nent. It compares the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) of the World Bank to the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) of the African Union. These governance assessments represent 
differing conceptualizations of governance, particularly reflected in their 
content and approach.  This study therefore aimed to critically examine 
the manner in which the CPIA and APRM discipline governance stand-
ards on the African continent. The study answered the following princi-
pal research questions: how do the content, process and outcome of the 
CPIA and APRM support or challenge the good governance agenda; its 
relation to aid, and what does this mean in the context of power relations 
of the World Bank and the African Union? As the research focused par-
ticularly on governance conceptualization, it focused within the CPIA on 
Cluster D: Public Sector Management and Institutions and within the 
APRM on Theme A: Democracy and Political Governance. The research 
methodically grounded the discourse and praxis on good governance by 
relying on the analytical framework provided through governmentality 
theory and the application of this framework to development policies 
through the concept of developmentality.  
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In order to answer the research question, the study probed five sup-
porting sub-questions. The first sub-question asked: how are governance 
standards given shape in the content and design of CPIA and APRM? 
The main aim of the question was to describe the ways in which the con-
tent and design of the CPIA and APRM promote the adoption of gov-
ernance standards in African countries. The analysis showed that gov-
ernance standards are given shape in the content and design of the CPIA 
and APRM. The CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good 
governance that reflect the norm that (good) governance is central to 
sustainable development and to aid effectiveness. As such, CPIA is de-
signed as a form of indirect rule of the World Bank over aid recipients. 
This comprises a productive power as the World Bank generates 
knowledge on the performance of the aid recipient and uses the Bank’s 
performance-based allocation system as a discursive practice to incentiv-
ise proper conduct. Similarly, the APRM content comprises African dis-
cursive frames on good governance that considers a more political oper-
ationalization of governance and incorporates African standards as 
reference. However, the APRM is designed as a form of counter rule 
against external influences on the African development agenda. This de-
sign reflects a form of resistance as it uses similar language, frames, 
methods and discursive spaces as that of the donors to present a counter 
approach and method to promoting governance.  
 
An investigation of the application of CPIA and APRM assessments 
through a case study of Ethiopia deepened the investigation. The second 
research question hence asked: how have CPIA and APRM assessment 
processes been conducted in Ethiopia? While the first question set forth 
the design of the assessment processes, this question focused on their 
empirical application by describing and analysing the processes whereby 
the CPIA and APRM assessments have been undertaken in Ethiopia. 
The analysis informed that CPIA is a technology of surveillance of the 
World Bank that assessed adherence to the good governance norm and 
generated knowledge on the conduct of Ethiopia. The CPIA monitored 
the conduct of Ethiopia by assessing its adherence and deviance to gov-
ernance standards regarding public sector management and institutions. 
Furthermore, the knowledge generated from the assessment formally 
informed development finance allocation provided by the International 
Development Association of the World Bank. The analysis of the appli-
 Abstract xvii 
 
cation of the APRM assessment in Ethiopia showed that the process 
monitored Ethiopia’s adherence to African governance norms and gen-
erated knowledge on its policies and practices. However, the Ethiopian 
government controlled the assessment process and dismissed the find-
ings of the report in regards to the theme Democracy and Political Gov-
ernance. Therefore, the analysis concluded that the inter- and intra-
discipline mechanisms of the APRM were rather weak.  
 
The third research question departed from this assessment and asked: 
how have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of 
related governance standards in Ethiopia?  This question broadly probed 
the outcomes of the assessment process and more in detail how the as-
sessment has promoted its governance standards. In relation to the 
CPIA, the analysis showed that the translation of the Bank’s knowledge 
to power over the aid recipient was ineffective as the Bank did not make 
the appropriate link between norm, performance and punish-
ment/reward. In particular, the analysis showed that the CPIA is only 
one factor determining Bank development allocations and a multitude of 
internal and external factors informed the final country allocation. As a 
result of this, the CPIA process did not discipline the government to ad-
here to its policy standards. Similarly, the outcomes in the case of the 
APRM were also limited and did not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its 
governance standards. Inter and intra-state disciplining of government 
was weak as the horizontal peer pressures were limited in persuading the 
government to accept the governance standards and vertical societal 
pressures were limited due to the restrictive state structures.  
 
The fourth research question focused on the salient observations 
from the case study of Ethiopia and replicated this to three secondary 
case study analyses of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. In particular, the 
fourth question focused its analysis on: similar or different dynamics in-
fluencing the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana and 
Nigeria? In relation to the CPIA, the analysis explained that (similar to 
the case of Ethiopia) the translation of knowledge to power over the aid 
recipients was ineffective as the Bank did not make the appropriate link 
between norm, performance and punishment/reward. The case studies 
furthermore showed that dynamics regarding the ability to effectively 
absorb development finance and the relative level of economic devel-
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opment and national income also influenced these aid allocation pro-
cesses of the World Bank. In relation to the APRM, the analysis showed 
that the process (similar to the case of Ethiopia) did not discipline Gha-
na, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards due to weak 
inter and intra disciplining mechanisms. Inter-state disciplining was weak 
as the peer review process primarily functioned to give internal and ex-
ternal political legitimacy to the review process and outcomes. Intra-state 
disciplining was weak as the APRM domestic processes operated within 
the confines of established state-society engagements and did not alter 
these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for 
non-state actors. 
 
Building on these insights, the fifth research question focused the 
analysis on: what strategic considerations inform the functions the CPIA 
and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union? The 
analysis zoomed in on the strategic considerations of the World Bank 
and the African Union that influenced the application of the CPIA and 
APRM, and aimed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
their functions and operation. The analysis showed that the CPIA func-
tioned formally to increase aid effectiveness but informally operated as a 
tool of the Bank to increase its geopolitical influence in aid recipients. In 
the case of the APRM, the analysis suggested that while the APRM for-
mally functioned to strengthen governance in the content, it informally 
supported member states’ wishes to increase their political legitimacy. 
This disjuncture between the discourse and practice of the Bank on the 
one hand and the African Union, on the other hand could be explained 
by understanding these assessments as instruments that serve to normal-
ize and legitimize existing dynamics, structures and practices that govern 
the power relations between these actors.  
 
The overall findings of the research suggest that while the content of 
the CPIA and APRM support the good governance agenda, the process-
es and outcomes are actually in disjunction to this discourse and does 
not influence aid allocation processes. The findings of this study suggest 
that this is because the processes and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM 
are used as instruments of the World Bank and the African Union to 
normalize, legitimize and reproduce development structures that govern 
the power dynamics between the West and the Bank on the one hand, 
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and the African Union and its member states on the other hand. By rely-
ing on the developmentality framework it is possible to view this parody 
as being logically connected.  
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Het disciplineren van goed openbaar bestuur in Afrika 
Een vergelijking tussen de ‘Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment’ van de Wereldbank en de ‘African Peer Review 
Mechanism’ van de Afrikaanse Unie 
 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de manier waarop goed openbaar bestuur 
wordt gedisciplineerd in het Afrikaanse continent. Het onderzoek maakt 
een vergelijking tussen de ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment' 
(CPIA) van de Wereldbank en de 'African Peer Review Mechanism' 
(APRM) van de Afrikaanse Unie. Deze beoordelingsmethoden weerspie-
gelen verschillende benaderingen omtrent het bevorderen van goed 
openbaar bestuur in ontwikkelingslanden. Deze studie heeft derhalve tot 
doel om kritisch te onderzoeken op welke manieren CPIA en APRM 
normen omtrent het openbaar bestuur disciplineren in het Afrikaanse 
continent. De studie onderzocht de volgende hoofdvragen: hoe bevorde-
ren de inhoud, proces en uitkomsten van CPIA en APRM goed open-
baar bestuur;  wat is de relatie tot ontwikkelingshulp en wat betekenen 
deze uitkomsten voor de machtsverhoudingen tussen de Wereldbank en 
de Afrikaanse Unie. Dit onderzoek is specifiek gericht op normen in re-
latie tot het openbaar bestuur en derhalve focust de analyse zich binnen 
CPIA op Cluster D: ‘Public Sector Management and Institutions’ en 
binnen APRM op Thema A: ‘Democracy and Political Governance’. Het 
onderzoek baseert de analyse over de theorie en praktijk van goed open-
baar bestuur op het theoretisch kader van 'governmentality' en de speci-
fieke toepassing van deze literatuur in het veld van ontwikkelingsbeleid 
middels het concept van 'developmentality'.  
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Het onderzoek is verder gestructureerd door middel van ondersteu-
nende deelvragen. De eerste deelvraag stelt de vraag: hoe zijn normen 
met betrekking tot het openbaar bestuur vormgegeven in de inhoud en 
het beoordelingsontwerp van CPIA en APRM? Het hoofddoel van de 
vraag is om te beschrijven hoe de inhoud en het beoordelingsontwerp 
van CPIA en APRM normen gericht op het openbaar bestuur bevorde-
ren in Afrikaanse landen. Uit de analyse komt naar voren dat normen 
over het openbaar bestuur vorm worden gegeven in beide de inhoud en 
het ontwerp van CPIA en APRM. CPIA inhoud bevat discursieve kaders 
over openbaar bestuur die de norm weerspiegelen dat (goed) openbaar 
bestuur centraal is voor duurzame ontwikkeling en tevens dient om de 
effectiviteit van ontwikkelingshulp bevorderen. Als zodanig is CPIA 
ontworpen als een vorm van indirecte macht van de Wereldbank over 
hulpontvangers. De Wereldbank gebruikt de kennis over de prestaties 
van hulpontvangers als de basis voor besluitvorming over hulpallocaties 
en zodoende stimuleert dat ontwikkelingslanden de nodige verbeteringen 
te maken in het bestuur.  In tegenstelling, APRM inhoud omvat Afri-
kaanse discursieve kaders omtrent goed openbaar bestuur en de operati-
onalisering is meer gericht op politieke aspecten hiervan en hanteert ook 
Afrikaanse normen als referentie hiervoor. APRM is echter ontworpen 
als een vorm van tegenmacht tegen externe invloeden op de Afrikaanse 
ontwikkelingsagenda. Dit is een vorm van weerstand aangezien het 
soortgelijke discursieve kaders en werkwijzen gebruikt als die van de do-
nors om een alternatieve methode voor het bevorderen van bestuur te 
bevorderen.  
 
Het onderzoek naar de toepassing van CPIA en APRM is vormgege-
ven middels een casestudie over Ethiopië. De tweede deelvraag stelt der-
halve de vraag: hoe zijn CPIA en APRM beoordelingsprocessen in Ethi-
opië toegepast? Terwijl de eerste vraag het ontwerp van de 
beoordelingsprocessen uiteenzet, richt deze vraag zich op hun empiri-
sche toepassing door het beschrijven en analyseren van de processen 
waarop CPIA en APRM beoordelingen in Ethiopië zijn uitgevoerd. Uit 
de analyse blijkt dat CPIA een instrument van toezicht is van de Wereld-
bank die de naleving van normen omtrent goed openbaar bestuur be-
oordeelt en daarmee kennis opdoet over de bestuursprestatie van Ethio-
pië. CPIA onderzoekt deze prestatie door te analyseren in hoeverre 
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normen omtrent openbaar bestuur worden nageleefd in de overheidssec-
tor en haar instituties. Informatie die voortvloeit uit deze beoordeling 
wordt gebruikt als basis voor besluitvorming over hulpallocaties verstrekt 
door de ‘International Development Association’ (IDA) van de Wereld-
bank. Uit de analyse van de toepassing van APRM in Ethiopië blijkt dat 
het proces de Ethiopische naleving van de Afrikaanse openbaar be-
stuursnormen heeft gecontroleerd en specifiek kennis opleverde over 
beleid en bestuurspraktijken. Echter, de Ethiopische overheid domineer-
de en controleerde het beoordelingsproces en verwierp de bevindingen 
van het rapport met betrekking tot het thema ‘Democracy and Political 
Governance’. Op basis van dit inzicht concludeert de analyse dat de in-
ter- en intra-staat disciplinerende mechanismen van APRM tamelijk 
zwak waren. 
 
 De derde deelvraag bouwt verder op deze bevindingen en stelt de 
vraag: hoe hebben CPIA en APRM gerelateerde openbaar bestuursnor-
men bevordert in Ethiopië? Deze vraag onderzocht meer in het alge-
meen welke uitkomsten voortvloeide uit het beoordelingsproces en meer 
specifiek of normen omtrent goed openbaar bestuur waren bevorderd. 
Uit de analyse blijkt dat binnen CPIA  de vertaling van de kennis van de 
Wereldbank tot indirecte macht over de hulpontvanger ondoeltreffend 
was omdat de Bank geen goede koppeling maakte tussen norm, prestatie 
en straf of beloning. In het bijzonder bleek uit de analyse dat CPIA 
slechts één factor was die de toekenning van de allocatie van financiële 
ontwikkelingshulp bepaalde. Naast de CPIA score van de Wereldbank 
beïnvloedde een groot aantal interne en externe factoren de uiteindelijke 
financiële allocatie van hulp. Als gevolg daarvan heeft het CPIA proces 
de Ethiopische overheid niet kunnen beïnvloeden om zich te houden 
aan de bestuur beleidsnormen. Eveneens waren de uitkomsten in het 
geval van APRM gelimiteerd en de Ethiopische overheid was niet gesti-
muleerd om zich te houden aan de openbaar bestuursnormen. Het inter-
staat disciplineren van de overheid was zwak, omdat de horizontale 
groepsdrukken uitgeoefend door de andere APRM landen beperkt waren 
om de overheid te overtuigen om de openbaar bestuursnormen te accep-
teren. Het intra-staat disciplineren van de overheid was zwak omdat de 
nodige maatschappelijke druk niet kon worden uitgeoefend door de re-
strictieve staatsmaatschappelijke verhoudingen in Ethiopia.  
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De vierde deelvraag concentreert zich op de meest relevante waarne-
mingen uit het casusonderzoek over Ethiopië en repliceert dit naar drie 
secundaire casestudy analyses over Rwanda, Nigeria en Ghana. De vierde 
deelvraag focust zich specifiek op de vraag: of soortgelijke of andere dy-
namieken invloed hadden op de toepassing van CPIA en APRM in 
Rwanda, Ghana en Nigeria? In de context van CPIA liet de analyse zien 
dat (net als in Ethiopië) de vertaling van kennis over bestuursprestatie 
naar macht over de hulpontvangers ondoeltreffend was om beleidsver-
anderingen te bevorderen, omdat de Wereldbank geen directie relatie 
maakte tussen norm, prestatie en straf of beloning. Uit de casestudies 
bleek verder dat de dynamiek ten aanzien van de mogelijkheid om ont-
wikkelingsfinanciering effectief te gebruiken en het relatieve niveau van 
economische ontwikkeling en nationaal inkomen ook deze hulpverde-
lingsprocessen van de Wereldbank beïnvloedde. In relatie tot APRM 
bleek uit de analyse dat het proces (net als in Ethiopië) Ghana, Nigeria 
en Rwanda niet had beïnvloed om zich te houden aan de beleidsnormen, 
mede door zwakke inter-en intra staat disciplinaire mechanismen. Inter-
staat disciplinaire mechanismen waren zwak doordat groepsdruk proces-
sen voornamelijk tot doel hadden om interne en externe politieke legiti-
miteit te geven aan het beoordelingsproces en de uitkomsten. Intra-staat 
disciplinaire mechanismen waren zwak, omdat de processen van maat-
schappelijke druk uitoefenen op de overheid binnen de contouren van de 
gevestigde structuren tussen de staat en het maatschappelijk middenveld 
opereerde en deze niet veranderde door een participatieve aanpak en een 
controlerende rol voor niet-gouvernementele actoren te verplichten.  
 
Op basis van deze inzichten onderzocht de vijfde deelvraag: welke 
strategische overwegingen bepalen de functies die CPIA en APRM heb-
ben voor de Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie? De analyse zet uit welke 
strategische overwegingen de toepassing van CPIA en APRM bepaalt 
voor de Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie. Uit de analyse bleek dat 
CPIA formeel tot doel had om de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingshulp te 
verbeteren maar informeel een instrument was voor de Wereldbank om 
de geopolitieke positie en invloed over hulpontvangers te vergroten. In 
de context van APRM liet de analyse zien dat terwijl de APRM formeel 
tot doel had om het openbaar bestuur in Afrika te versterken - het even-
eens informeel een mechanisme was om de politieke legitimiteit van de 
lidstaten van de Afrikaanse Unie te vergroten. Dit verschil tussen ener-
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zijds de theorie en anderzijds de praktijk van deze beoordelingsprocessen 
van het openbaar bestuur kan worden verklaard door deze beoordelin-
gen te zien als instrumenten die dienen om bestaande dynamieken, struc-
turen en praktijken te normaliseren evenals het legitimeren van de 
machtsrelaties tussen Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie.  
 
Deze bevindingen van het onderzoek suggereren dat, terwijl de in-
houd van CPIA en APRM de politieke agenda van goede openbaar be-
stuursnormen ondersteunen; de processen en uitkomsten eigenlijk af-
breuk doen aan dit ontwikkelingsdebat en geen invloed hebben op de 
toewijzing van hulpverlening. De bevindingen van deze studie geven een 
indicatie dat dit komt doordat de processen en uitkomsten van CPIA en 
APRM worden gebruikt als instrumenten van de Wereldbank en de Afri-
kaanse Unie om ontwikkelingshulp te normaliseren, legitimeren en als 
zodanig de dynamiek tussen het Westen en de Wereldbank enerzijds en 
de Afrikaanse Unie en haar lidstaten anderzijds verder te reproduceren.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Governance, development and Africa 
Governance matters for development. This assertion forms the back-
bone of current international efforts to promote socio-economic devel-
opment in developing countries, and is central to the focus of this study, 
the African continent. International organisations such as the United Na-
tions assert that partnerships with and for the continent are needed to 
address the current state of governance in Africa. Through continued 
international cooperation and engagement, a good governance agenda 
furthering socio-economic development can be promoted (United Na-
tions 2016). The need to reform governance in Africa is further empha-
sised in the World Bank’s World Development Report for 2017 on Gov-
ernance and the Law, wherein the importance of governance frameworks 
for designing interventions in support of socio-economic development is 
articulated (World Bank 2016a).  
 
The title of this dissertation is inspired by the work of Rita Abraham-
sen on ‘disciplining democracy in Africa’, which critically examines the 
pursuit of democracy and good governance by the World Bank and 
Western donors in Africa (Abrahamsen 2000). In examining the applica-
tion of the good governance agenda on the continent, this study elabo-
rates on the discourses of governance in international development. In 
identifying the different stages in the formulation of the governance dis-
course, a central focus of this research is the current favoured approach 
of aid selectivity, whereby ‘good’ governance is a condition for the re-
ceipt of development assistance. This approach is examined by specifi-
cally focusing on one of the most prominent and influential examples of 
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aid selectivity for the continent, namely the Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank. Through this mechanism 
the World Bank assesses (governance) performance and need, and allo-
cates resources to developing countries across the globe accordingly. In 
particular, the CPIA measures the conduciveness of a country’s policy 
and institutional framework to ensure the effective utilisation of scarce 
development resources (World Bank 2016b). The mechanism is intended 
to create incentives to contribute to improved governance and sustaina-
ble development in developing countries (Arndt 2008: 283). 
 
Discourses on and approaches to promoting good governance not 
only emanate from the West. An African articulation of the need for 
good governance as related to socio-economic development is for exam-
ple also advocated in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD). Adopted by African leaders in 2001, this framework was in-
spired by the wish to further sustain democratic processes on the conti-
nent and simultaneously shape economic policies to harness sustainable 
development. The partnership envisions a prosperous continent that can 
interact with the West on equal terms, and articulates what democracy 
and governance mean to its citizens and governments. This vision of de-
velopment in Africa is anchored in the view that weak governance im-
pedes socio-economic development and hence should be a concern for 
all African governments (NEPAD 2001). This to be achieved through 
the African Peer Review Mechanism, meant to contribute to the govern-
ance agenda across the continent by ‘identifying weaknesses, setting 
benchmarks and monitoring progress in meeting them’ (Busia 2010: 31–
32). 
 
As of February 2017, 36 African countries have acceded to the 
APRM: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Djibou-
ti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanza-
nia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. Seventeen of these countries 
have completed the full country review process (Gruzd 2016). This 
“home-grown” initiative, with its vision of transforming the governance 
of the continent by relying on peer learning and pressure, provides an 
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interesting approach to addressing governance-related challenges. This 
mechanism differs significantly from Western mechanisms such as that 
of the CPIA in strengthening governance processes, and the APRM pro-
vides an African articulation of democracy and good governance con-
trasting with Western conceptions of governance. 
 
Following the observation of differences in African and Western con-
ceptions of and avenues for attaining good governance, this study aims 
to critically examine the manner in which the CPIA and APRM disci-
pline governance standards on the African continent. An investigation 
and comparison of these two governance assessments is merited: both 
play a key strategic role in the promotion of governance on the conti-
nent, but the applications of the assessments differ significantly, and they 
are further influenced by strategic considerations of the World Bank and 
African Union, respectively. The study hence seeks to answer the follow-
ing principal research questions: how do the content, process and out-
come of the CPIA and APRM support or challenge the good governance 
agenda: its relation to aid, and what does this mean in the context of 
power relations of the World Bank and the African Union? This study 
seeks to contribute to development theory and policy by creating a more 
comprehensive understanding of the CPIA and APRM as mechanisms 
for furthering good governance agendas underpinned by different con-
ceptions of governance. Moreover, it presents a theory-driven analysis of 
external interventions in existing governance arrangements, particularly 
in developing countries.  
 
In order to answer this research question, the study probes five sup-
porting sub-questions. The first sub-question asks: how are governance 
standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and 
APRM? The main aim of the question is to describe the ways in which 
the content and design of the CPIA and APRM promote the adoption of 
governance standards in African countries. An investigation of the appli-
cation of CPIA and APRM assessments through a case study of Ethiopia 
deepens this investigation. The second sub-question hence asks: how 
have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethio-
pia? While the first question set forth the design of the assessment pro-
cesses, this question focuses on their empirical application by describing 
and analysing the processes whereby CPIA and APRM assessments have 
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been undertaken in Ethiopia. In particular, the analysis aims to unpack 
the manner in which the assessments are given shape in physical con-
texts by reflecting on the application of the different stages of the as-
sessment process through the perspective of the actors involved. The 
third sub-question departs from this assessment and asks: how have 
CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related gov-
ernance standards in Ethiopia? This question broadly examines the out-
comes of the assessment process and provides a more detailed picture of 
how the assessment has promoted their governance standards. The 
fourth sub-question focuses on the salient observations from the case 
study investigation of Ethiopia and replicates this to three secondary case 
study analyses of Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ghana. In particular, the fourth 
question focuses the analysis on: whether similar or different dynamics 
influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana, 
and Nigeria? Building on these insights, the fifth sub-question focuses 
the analysis on: which strategic considerations inform the functions that 
the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Un-
ion? The analysis zooms in on the strategic considerations of the World 
Bank and the African Union that influence the application of the CPIA 
and APRM, and aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of their functions and operation.  
 
1.2 Research design 
1.2.1 Research strategy  
The CPIA and APRM are prominent and important governance assess-
ments influencing the governance discourse and practice on the conti-
nent. In order to facilitate an in-depth understanding of their operation 
(including their content, processes, outcomes, and contextual considera-
tions influencing these), this study builds up the story of the CPIA and 
APRM through the five sub-questions and ultimately provides an answer 
to the main research question. This study furthermore relies on the em-
pirical investigation of CPIA and APRM applications in African coun-
tries. The multiple case study approach further supports this examination 
of the various causal relations observed (for instance between content, 
process and outcomes), and promotes an understanding of these pro-
cesses in particular country contexts (Yin 2009: 20). Focusing on multi-
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ple cases also creates an opportunity to distil lessons and considerations 
that are relevant for the entire continent – the scope of these governance 
assessments (Gerring 2006: 86).  
 
1.2.2 Case selection 
The case selection strategy is informed by the relative dimensions of the-
oretical interest within the CPIA and APRM, and on their characterisa-
tion within the population of interest (Gerring and Seawright 2008: 296). 
The population of the study comprises fourteen1 African countries that 
have undergone CPIA and APRM assessments, namely Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The content, 
processes and outcomes of the respective assessments inform the rele-
vant theoretical dimensions to be examined for each governance assess-
ment. In the case of the CPIA, a critical feature influencing the assess-
ment is the concept of aid dependency. Since the assessment is utilised 
to determine access to World Bank development funds, it is pertinent to 
consider aid dependency dynamics and considerations influencing the 
engagement between the Bank and aid recipients. In the case of the 
APRM, the main feature influencing the assessment process and out-
come is the participatory framework present in a country. As the assess-
ment is a country-driven process involving different segments of society 
in its application, it is necessary to include dynamics related to state-
society relations. Indeed, CPIA processes may be more complex in coun-
tries with moderate or low levels of aid dependency, and APRM pro-
cesses may be more complex in countries with more restrictive participa-
tory frameworks.  
 
While this study comprises a multiple case design, it distinguishes be-
tween primary and secondary cases, which are informed by and selected 
based on dynamics related to aid dependency and participatory frame-
works. By focusing on different cases, the research combines the bene-
fits of a more elaborate in-depth investigation of a single case study de-
sign, and by replicating these findings to secondary country case study 
investigations (secondary cases) it also allows for an understanding of the 
findings in relation to different country contexts, thereby synthesising 
across cases. With this in mind, countries where the CPIA and APRM 
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are applied can be organised based on aid dependency dynamics and par-
ticipatory state-society relations. Aid dependency dynamics are opera-
tionalised specifically through the measure of net Official Development 
Assistance as a percentage of gross national income and participatory 
state society relations are operationalised through the measure of voice 
and accountability2 of the World Governance Indicators for the year 
2014.  
Figure 1.1 
Aid dependency as percentage of Gross National Income of the case study 
population 
 
Source: (World Bank 2016c). 
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Figure 1.2  
Voice and accountability scores of the case study population 
 
Source: (WGI 2016). 
 
The fourteen CPIA and APRM countries display different character-
istics in relation to aid dependency and voice and accountability as the 
respective dimensions of interest. This allows for the identification of 
cases that may provide a more challenging country context in which 
CPIA and APRM processes take place. These more complex country 
contexts provide a fuller understanding of the contexts in which CPIA 
and APRM assessments are applied, as they deviate from the “good” 
governance norm promoted through both mechanisms. In this regard, 
the study seeks to explain deviations in relation to the content upon 
which these assessments are based, and can possibly generate surprising 
outcomes in relation to the dimensions of interest. Following this logic, 
the most appropriate case would be a country with relative low levels of 
voice and accountability and low levels of aid dependency. Based on this, 
the study zooms in on Nigeria and Ghana, the two countries that have 
the lowest levels of aid dependency, and on Ethiopia and Rwanda, which 
have the lowest voice and accountability scores (countries indicated in 
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the analysis of the primary case on a country that comes closest to this 
description. It is with this in mind that the primary case for critically ex-
amining the application of the CPIA and APRM is the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia.  
 
Ethiopia is characterised by moderate levels of aid dependency, with 
net official development assistance as a percentage of Gross National 
Income, and gross capital formation at 6.5% and 17%, respectively 
(World Bank 2016c). In addition, low levels of voice and accountability 
are reflected through the presence of a restrictive governance environ-
ment, with the ruling party controlling 100% of the seats in parliament 
and the presence of restrictive civil society law governing the interactions 
between state and society. Moreover, Ethiopia is also an interesting case 
as, in contrast to other African countries, it has an established domestic 
governance structure, and its first engagement with external actors in the 
context of aid was as a sovereign state. Consequently, the government of 
Ethiopia engages with external actors on more equal grounds, and rely-
ing on its own development agenda further strengthens their position 
vis-à-vis the donors. However, having had no colonial experience and 
relatively limited trading relations, the state apparatus is less used to en-
gaging with external actors, resulting in a more closed approach and per-
ceived unwillingness to engage with, for instance, donors. In contrast, 
other African countries started receiving aid following independence, 
and many African countries have weak domestic political and bureau-
cratic structures (Furtado and Smith 2007: 1). Ethiopia is hence an inter-
esting case for examining the application of the CPIA and APRM, as it 
can bring to the fore the various dynamics that may constrain the appli-
cation of the respective governance assessments. It is this critical investi-
gation that could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
content, process and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM. Furthermore, 
Addis Ababa is also the political capital of Africa, hosting the African 
Union and the headquarters of many international and African organisa-
tions. Certainly, Ethiopia provides an interesting case both for theoretical 
and practical reasons.  
 
The replication logic for more rigorous case study selection underpins 
the selection of the three other country case studies. Using this logic, one 
country is chosen to mimic literal replication (expecting similar results), 
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and two countries are selected to mimic theoretical replication (expecting 
contrasting results for anticipated reasons) (Yin 2009: 54). Based on the 
findings from the aid dependency and voice and accountability scores, 
the following case studies are most appropriate to replicate the findings 
from the primary case study of Ethiopia: 
• Ethiopia, as the primary case study, is characterised by moderate 
aid dependency and low voice and accountability;  
• Rwanda (literal replication) is characterised by high aid depend-
ency and low voice and accountability;  
• Nigeria (theoretical replication) is characterised by low aid de-
pendency and low voice and accountability; and  
• Ghana (theoretical replication) is characterised by low aid de-
pendency and high voice and accountability.  
 
These four countries form the units of analysis, with a specific focus 
on the aspects of the assessments engaging with democracy, governance, 
public management, and institutions.   
 
1.2.3 Data collection and analysis 
The data collection for the analysis of the five sub-questions is based on 
three key principles: triangulating multiple sources of data; creating a case 
study database; and maintaining a chain of evidence3 (Yin 2009: 54). In 
particular, semi-structured interviews and document analysis as two 
methods for qualitative data collection informed the findings of the 
study. The utilisation of these two methods of data collection allows the 
study to reflect on the content of the two mechanisms and for the re-
search to relate this reflection to the empirical investigation of processes 
and outcomes related to the assessments. The empirical data informing 
the analysis of all the five sub-questions is based on document analysis. 
The document analysis focused on the collection and analysis of docu-
ments relevant to the content, process and outcome of the CPIA and 
APRM, as well as on the strategic functions these mechanisms fulfil for 
the World Bank and the African Union. In particular, the following doc-
uments were collected and analysed: 
10 INTRODUCTION 
 
• Literature and policy documents on CPIA and APRM content 
and functions produced by the World Bank, the African Union, 
and other institutions (informed sub-questions one and five); 
• CPIA Reports and APRM Country Review Reports, the National 
Plan of Action (NPoA) including the progress report (where 
available), and CPIA and APRM implementation reports pre-
pared by continental actors focused on Ethiopia (informed sub-
questions two and three); and 
• CPIA Reports and APRM Country Review Reports, the National 
Plan of Action (NPoA) including the progress report (where 
available), and CPIA and APRM implementation reports pre-
pared by continental actors and focused on Rwanda, Nigeria and 
Ghana (informed sub-question four). 
 
The document analysis provided crucial information on the CPIA and 
APRM and was useful in that documents provided broad coverage of the 
topics of interest and could be analysed repeatedly (Yin 2009: 54). 
 
The empirical data informing the analysis of sub-questions two, three 
and five is also informed by the findings emanating from semi-structured 
interviews conducted between June and September 2015 in Addis Aba-
ba, Ethiopia. Interview questions were developed for three types of re-
spondents, namely individuals involved in the CPIA, individuals involved 
in the APRM, and academics and practitioners working in the areas of 
governance-promotion in Africa. Interviews with the first two groups of 
respondents supported the analysis of sub-questions two and three, 
whereas interviews with the latter respondents supported the analysis of 
sub-question five. 
 
In the case of CPIA, interviews were conducted with individuals 
working at the World Bank and involved in the preparation of Ethiopia’s 
CPIA (both in Addis Ababa and Washington, D.C.). The interviews were 
conducted with the World Bank staff only, as the CPIA is an external 
country assessment and therefore no interviews were conducted with 
counterparts on the side of the Ethiopian government. The main objec-
tive of these interviews was to understand the process of preparing the 
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CPIA from the perspective of the World Bank. The findings informed 
the evidence of sub-questions two and three.   
 
In contrast, in the APRM process the government assumed a leading 
role, and interviews were conducted with actors involved in the various 
stages of the review process in the preparation of Ethiopia’s APRM re-
port (as mentioned in the Country Review Report).  The main objective 
of the interviews was to capture and understand the process and out-
comes of the preparation of the mechanism from the perspective of the 
various actors involved, including governmental actors. The findings in-
formed the evidence of sub-questions two and three.   
 
The last group of interviewees provided key insights into the strategic 
considerations informing the utility of the CPIA and APRM for the 
World Bank and the African Union and informed the evidence used to 
answer the fifth sub-question engaging with governance frameworks. 
Interviews were conducted with academics and practitioners working in 
the areas of governance-promotion in Africa (practitioners working at 
regional and research institutions such as the United Nations, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, the African Union, and at think tanks focusing on 
governance), as well as with academics in the field of political science. 
The experts and academics engaged with these topics based on their pro-
fessional empirical experiences, providing an understanding of the over-
arching mechanisms in which these governance assessments operate. 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face, via Skype, or via email. A de-
tailed description of the list of interviewees and interview questions is 
included in Annexes I and II.  
 
The analytical strategy of the study is based on the development and 
application of theoretical propositions (Yin 2003: 111-112). These prop-
ositions are informed by the theoretical framework and guide the analysis 
of the evidence collected in the study by supporting the explanation of 
relevant dynamics pertaining to the themes addressed in the five sub-
questions. The propositions tie in the various concepts discussed in the 
theoretical framework: good governance, conditionality and selectivity 
and coercion, donor-aid recipient dynamics, aid allocation, and nation 
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branding. In addition, the propositions relate to more analytical concepts 
related to governmentality and developmentality such as indirect rule, 
conduct and “conduct of conduct”, productive power, surveillance 
(monitoring), discipline, self-rule  - optimisation – governance and re-
sponsibilisation, punishment, norms and normalisation, resistance, as 
well as the intersection between knowledge and power. These dynamics 
are analysed using pattern-matching techniques, thereby creating a link 
between the propositions and the empirical data by comparing empirical-
ly observed patterns with predicted or theoretical patterns (Yin 2014: 
143). Cross-case analysis techniques whereby each country case study is 
analysed separately and the findings thereafter are synthesised across the 
country case studies further support this process for sub-question four in 
particular (Yin 2003: 111-112). The research design is visualised in figure 
1.3.  
Figure 1.3 
Research design 
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The internal and external validity of the research is upheld by the reli-
ance on the propositions informed by the literature review (Yin 2009: 
54). Furthermore, multiple cases are analysed, which leads to a better 
understanding of the major concepts and their relations. Construct valid-
ity of this research is upheld through the use of multiple sources of data 
collection and the maintenance of a chain of evidence. To this end, doc-
ument analysis and interviews are used as complementary strategies to 
gather empirical data. The combined use of a document analysis and in-
terviews increases validity as it enables the gathering of more empirical 
data relevant to the analysis of the cases. The validity of the interviews is 
upheld by interviewing different organisations involved in CPIA and 
APRM processes. In addition, the interview reports were shared with all 
respondents for comments to ascertain that each interview report accu-
rately reflected the interview content. The validity of the document anal-
ysis is upheld by using different sources of written data. The case study 
database further supports the reliability of the study (Yin 2009: 54).  
 
1.2.4 Research limitations and ethical considerations 
The first limitation of the research relates to the accessibility of key doc-
uments on CPIA and APRM processes. Secondly, due to the sensitive 
(political) nature of the study, a tape recorder was not used during the 
interviews. To counter this, the researcher focused on developing a good 
record of the interview and also shared and crosschecked the final inter-
view report with all interviewees. Thirdly, the research was highly de-
pendent on the ability to access CPIA and APRM informants and their 
willingness to contribute to the study. Indeed, it proved complicated to 
access these key experts, as these processes indirectly engage with the 
performance of the Ethiopian government, which is a highly sensitive 
topic.  
 
Several ethical considerations were made in the conduct of the study. 
The most important ethical consideration relates to the topic of this re-
search, which is politically sensitive. Hence, this situation required a deli-
cate approach to the data collection. When a respondent was ap-
proached, the topic and scope of the research was discussed and the 
respondent was assured of anonymity. This supported not only the will-
ingness of respondents to participate, but also facilitated an open con-
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versation with respondents, with reduced fear of repercussions that may 
result from the publication of the study.  
1.3 Organisation of the thesis 
The study is further organised as follows: Chapter two comprises the 
theoretical framework and provides an analytical lens and framework 
that supports the analysis of the CPIA and APRM. It presents an over-
view of development policy and modalities promoting governance in 
developing countries and places this discourse and praxis on governance 
in an analytical context by relying on the concept of developmentality. 
Chapters three to seven are the empirical chapters and discuss the find-
ings of the research organised by the five research sub-questions. Chap-
ter three provides an empirical account of the content and design of the 
CPIA and APRM and analyses how these promote the adoption of gov-
ernance standards; chapter four provides an empirical account of the ap-
plication process of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia and specifically 
scrutinises how the respective assessments have been undertaken; chap-
ter five puts forth an empirical account of the outcomes of the CPIA 
and APRM in Ethiopia and focuses on the manner in which the assess-
ments have promoted governance standards; chapter six replicates these 
findings to the cases of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana and analyses the 
dynamics that influenced the application of the CPIA and APRM; and 
chapter seven analyses the strategic considerations that inform the func-
tions of the CPIA and APRM for the World Bank and the African Un-
ion, respectively. Finally, chapter eight presents the emerging findings 
and theoretical reflections.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 As of April 2016. 
2 Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance). 
3 The principles of data collection as described by (Yin 2003) support the estab-
lishment of construct validity and reliability of the case study evidence. Triangula-
tion supports the development of ‘converging lines of inquiry’, thereby allowing 
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researchers to investigate the case from various angles. The case study database 
comprises the data and the report of the researcher, and, hence, is kept separate, 
allowing the raw data to be accessible for review. Maintaining a chain of evidence 
further increases the reliability of the case study investigation, allowing an external 
observer to trace the various steps taken, i.e. from research questions to theory 
and analysis and finally to conclusions, thereby allowing the derivation of evi-
dence (Yin 2003: 97, 98, 101, 105). 
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2 Governance and Development 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical lens and framework for the analysis 
of the CPIA and APRM and presents an overview of development poli-
cies and modalities for promoting governance in developing countries. 
The chapter places the discourse on and praxis of governance in an ana-
lytical context by relying on the concept of developmentality. It firstly 
presents an overview of the role of governance in international devel-
opment by highlighting how it has been applied in past and present de-
velopment practice, and proceeds to provide a definition of good gov-
ernance. The chapter then focuses on past and current modalities 
embraced in promoting governance in developing countries. In doing so, 
the chapter specifically elaborates on the modalities of aid conditionality 
and selectivity. It proceeds to contextualise these official policies by ana-
lysing the determinants of development assistance and particularly how 
other factors besides good governance may influence aid flows to devel-
oping countries. The chapter analytically grounds the discourse on and 
practice of good governance by relying on the analytical framework pro-
vided through governmentality theory, illustrating how the good govern-
ance narrative may be understood as a discursive technique to normalise 
thinking around this topic (Abrahamsen 2004: 1459). This frame of 
thinking has been extended and applied particularly to development poli-
cies through the concept of ‘developmentality’ (Lie 2015a). By relying on 
the concept of developmentality, the chapter presents propositions relat-
ed to the CPIA and APRM for each of the five sub-questions, thereby 
providing the basis for an empirical analysis of these assessments.  
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2.2 Governance and development  
2.2.1 The role of governance in development 
The discourse on development has dominated relations between rich and 
poor countries following the end of the Second World War. This dis-
course rests on the construction of the global North as “developed” and, 
subsequently, the global South as “underdeveloped” and, hence, “devel-
oping”. This binary classification of countries as either developed or de-
veloping has redefined global power structures and over time has 
evolved into a ‘mode of thinking and a source of practices’ justifying the 
engagement of developed countries in developing countries (Escobar 
1988: 429-430). The latest conceptualisation of development strategies 
focuses on governance and synthesises various strands of literature, ex-
plaining the relative roles of the state and the economy in developing 
countries.  
 
 Broadly speaking, it is possible to distinguish different phases of aca-
demic thought on governance. Initially, the focus in the literature on 
governance was on the technocratic means to improve state and gov-
ernment systems and on providing a legal framework for market-based 
development. Thereafter development thinking emphasised the process 
of development, stressing a greater role for citizens and the state in de-
velopment planning. The current and third phase of thinking is influ-
enced by an emphasis on the importance of power and politics in shap-
ing development, and on the role of governance programmes in this 
regard (Hout and Robison 2009: 2-3). Although the concept of govern-
ance has stood central to development policies for the past three dec-
ades, its relation to development remains contested. A number of eco-
nomic and political theories posit that the link between governance and 
socio-economic development is evident. Conversely, it has been pro-
posed that economic development, instead of governance, promotes the 
establishment of good institutions (Dijkstra 2013: 9, 14). 
 
While the concept of (good) governance has been a central focus in 
development theory, it remains a contentious concept, and its definition 
is still imprecise. Often, two aspects of governance - namely, the manner 
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in which public authority is accessed and exercised – are highlighted 
(Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 166). Consequently, good governance is 
often viewed as an objective tool for improving public financial man-
agement, and is applied in the context of the promotion of political re-
forms and the inclusion of stakeholders (Hydén 2011: 5). Despite various 
definitions of good governance, the concept is related to ‘providing effi-
cient public and private management for markets’ (Hout and Robison 
2009: 4). Indeed, governance in its application as concept is concerned 
with efficient public administration, the rule of law, and regulation of the 
market. The good governance agenda can be located within neoliberal 
discourses on the role of the state and markets, and in attempts to create 
authority outside politics and traditional public administration. Further-
more, actors such as civil society organisations are drawn into the pro-
cess through ‘participation and inclusion’, thereby bypassing more tradi-
tional actors such as the parliament and political parties (Hout and 
Robison 2009: 4).  
 
2.2.2 The Washington Consensus  
The first and second oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, and the thereupon 
following macroeconomic crises in Latin America, Asia and Africa, in-
formed a line of thinking in development promoting economic reform 
and the reduction of the role of the state in the economy (Kanbur 2000: 
40-41). This school of thought was particularly influenced by neo-
classical economics, which emphasised the value and impact market pro-
cesses have for enabling economic development (Fine 2001: 132-135 as 
cited in Hout 2007: 11). This theoretical perspective focused particularly 
on the advocacy of market deregulation, grounded in supply-side eco-
nomics. The logic behind this perspective was that economic reforms 
could result in faster output of growth and rising real incomes by stabilis-
ing the macro-economy and by adjusting the markets to operate more 
efficiently (Taylor 1997: 147). These concepts were operationalised in the 
Washington Consensus, which reflected the idea that Southern govern-
ments should reform their policies by focusing on macroeconomic sta-
bility, open markets, and the liberalisation of domestic products and 
markets through privatisation and regulation (Gore 2000: 789-790). Wil-
liamson (1993) codified these as ten general prescriptions and referred to 
them as ‘the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious econo-
mists’ (as cited in Gore 2000: 790).  
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The World Bank (and the International Monetary Fund) followed this 
approach with the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme and stabilisation packages in developing countries. The Pro-
gramme included a loan of convertible currency, which was given to 
states on the condition that economic reforms would be implemented, 
with the final aim of stabilising growth by moving away from a negative 
balance of payment (Riddell 1997: 1299-1300). Through two stages of 
reform, namely stabilisation and adjustment, the policies were intended 
to transform economic structures and institutions. This strategy replaced 
the previous state-led development paradigm and addressed economic 
stagnation by promoting market economies under downsized govern-
ments (Leftwich 1993: 607). The following measures were the most 
commonly implemented: the devaluation of currency; the liberalisation 
of trade; the reduction of the role of the government; the elimination of 
subsidies; and increases in primary exports (Riddell 1997: 1299-1300).  
 
An essential part of structural adjustment programmes was concerned 
with the performance of the state and the removal of incentives for rent-
seeking and corruption (Khan n.d.: 109). While reforms were often im-
plemented through broader alliances established within governments and 
between political elites, this process resulted in opportunities for rent-
seeking behaviour. The privatisation of large state monopolies for in-
stance created an opportunity for privileged oligarchies to appropriate 
public resources. In relation to property rights, it provided an opportuni-
ty for entrepreneurs to claim state and community assets, such as land 
rights where titles were not clear. In addition, opening up economies to 
global markets also increased the ability of private interests to access fi-
nancial flows and investors. Moreover, these neoliberal models of mana-
gerial authority also legitimised authoritarian rule, as the focus was placed 
on economic efficiency and the protection of markets from checks and 
balances provided through the parliament (Robison 2009: 17).  
 
Such processes assumed various forms in developing countries, and 
particularly in Africa where, for instance, this agenda contributed to the 
consolidation of a ‘new political class that reproduces itself through ne-
oliberal clientelism’ (Harrison 2006: 109). The adjustments had quite un-
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expected political impacts, as the reform process required changing the 
status quo in society. Established interests and groups were impacted, 
creating new winners and losers. Paradoxically, international financial 
institutions had to engage in policy dialogues on the implementation of 
economic reform packages. Indeed, actors that stood to “lose” from the-
se reforms could wield their influence to negatively impact the pro-
grammes. It became clear that the implementation of reforms required 
strong political commitment and bureaucratic capacities. As a result, in-
ternational financial institutions became more aware of the importance 
of political factors for influencing development programmes and of the 
salience of a strong and relatively autonomous state for implementing 
relevant reforms (Leftwich 1993: 607).  
 
The positive results of these polices were limited as recessions and 
slow growth followed in many countries that adopted the prescriptions 
(Khan n.d.: 109). These experiences with structural adjustment borrow-
ing alongside a change in the international context resulting from the 
collapse of communist regimes, the rise of pro-democracy movements in 
the developing world, and the resurgence of neoliberalism in the West, 
gave rise to different ideas regarding factors influencing development 
outcomes (Leftwich 1993: 606).  
 
2.2.3 The Post-Washington Consensus  
The relevance of neo-classical economic analyses for development has 
been the subject of debate since the end of the 1980s. Several non-neo-
classical approaches supported the reorientation of development theories 
away from focusing solely on markets. For instance, institutional eco-
nomics emphasises the role of institutions and forms of governance in 
development (Hout 2007: 12). In particular, the work of Douglass North 
on new institutional economics addressed the “rules of the game” in in-
stitutions and development and showed how these processes influence 
development trajectories. At the same time, the literature on East Asian 
tigers showed that the state could be a catalyst for development but that 
there is no single model of state action that could generate beneficial de-
velopmental outcomes. This informed the understanding that what actu-
ally mattered was the quality and performance of the state, particularly as 
reflected by its state institutions for development (Grindle 2010: 4).  
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In addition, information-theoretic economics stressed the role of 
governments in addressing various market failures (Hout 2007: 12). The 
latter perspective, particularly advocated by economist Joseph Stiglitz, 
saw market failures as a consequence of unequal access to information 
for different economic actors. The importance of government interven-
tions in the market economy was incorporated in the “post-Washington 
Consensus”, which embodied the regulatory role of the state in devel-
opment (Hout 2007: 14-16). Although characterised as a “post” consen-
sus, scholars have argued that neo-classical economists still view the 
market as the main vehicle for development, but stress that institutional 
mechanisms are necessary for the proper functioning of markets (Hout 
2007: 16). Rational choice political economists furthermore argue that it 
could be logical for coalitions to work together to make raids on the 
state, rather than to establish collective goods in support of the econo-
my. These understandings informed the need to focus attention on sup-
port for more structured programmes for institutional change (Hout and 
Robison 2009: 3).  
 
In order to address these issues, it was proposed that enlightened 
technocrats, who operate above the demands of politics and vested in-
terests, lead and implement reforms. These technocrats could then neu-
tralise distributional coalitions by altering institutional incentives (Hout 
and Robison 2009: 4). Institutions can be viewed as constellations of in-
centive structures, and the belief remains that the behaviour of politi-
cians could be altered by incentives built into institutional reforms 
(Hutchison e.a. 2014: 25). However, also strategies relying on the inclu-
sion of technocrats were unable to address the poor regulation of mar-
kets. It is here where ideas of good governance came to the fore by cre-
ating an authority that operates outside of politics and traditional 
administration. It would incorporate individuals directly into market pro-
cesses through programmes of participation, ownership and inclusion, 
thereby bypassing politics and established coalitions (Hout and Robison 
2009: 4). 
 
 This line of thinking focused on political actors by viewing them 
through the lens of rational choice theory. New Public Management 
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provided the theoretical base of thinking and entailed a preference for 
market-orientated approaches to government practices. Institutionalism 
focuses the attention on the role of the state as a ‘market complementing 
institution’ (Harrison 2005: 245). This new thinking also emphasises that 
development theory and practice should address institutional, human, 
social, as well as physical aspects, referring to services such as water, en-
ergy and transport. In addition, attention should be paid to microeco-
nomic elements, embodied in growth and productivity in agriculture and 
services – key to long-term poverty reduction (World Bank 2003: 8).  
 
Influenced by these various perspectives on governance, the World 
Bank initiated a new approach to development in 1998, embodied in the 
Comprehensive Development Framework. The framework emphasises 
the roles of all development actors (government, multilateral and bilat-
eral donors, civil society and the private sector) in poverty reduction and 
sustainable development. In particular, it stresses the notion that devel-
opment requires a long-term and holistic development framework – it 
should be results-orientated as well as country-owned, through a coun-
try-led partnership (World Bank 2003: 8). This approach provided the 
conceptual underpinnings for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(which became the pinnacle of the Comprehensive Development 
Framework) and fed into global initiatives such as the Millennium De-
velopment Goals and the Monterrey Consensus (World Bank 2003: ix). 
Whereas the latter two initiatives supported the notion that aid levels 
should be increased and directed towards the reduction of poverty, it is 
the former initiative that provided the framework for increasing aid ef-
fectiveness. In particular, developing countries that wished to access the 
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and concessional 
lending provided by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund had to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The strategy 
paper was to be developed based on a country-driven process, and its 
content was to be grounded in a comprehensive, result-orientated and 
long-term approach to poverty reduction. Moreover, it was meant to 
support a partnership approach by involving relevant domestic actors 
and by facilitating more coordinated support of development partners. 
The latter partnership approach was also intended to facilitate the transi-
tion of project to programme aid through, for instance, the provision of 
budget support (Dijkstra 2015: 2).  
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The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the Accra 
Agenda for Action of 2008 built on these ideas (OECD 2008: 1). The 
Paris Declaration affirmed that ‘partner countries exercise effective lead-
ership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate 
development actions’ (OECD 2008: 3).  In the same vein, the Accra 
Agenda aimed to accelerate and deepen the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration (OECD 2008: 14). It was expected that the commitment to 
increasing aid levels, alongside the application of these new principles in 
supporting development, would result in poverty reduction and, in par-
ticular, in the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (Dijks-
tra 2015: 3).  
 
2.3 Modalities of promoting governance 
2.3.1 Aid conditionality  
The promotion of governance has taken centre stage as the objective of 
development assistance and is also a means for achieving better results 
related to development assistance. Based on this understanding, donors 
are increasingly relying on the outcomes of governance assessments as 
the basis for the provision of development assistance (Hoebink 2006: 
133). Scholars have attributed this latter development to various global 
challenges and changes. Broadly speaking, these changes relate to the 
end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism, and the push for democ-
racy in the developing world. During the Cold War, aid policies were 
heavily influenced by geo-political considerations as Western and East-
ern nations supported different developing countries, and some South-
ern nations strategically played into these dynamics in order to increase 
financial support to them. The end of the Cold War halted this devel-
opment as Russia limited its financial support to developing countries to 
stabilise its economic development. Western nations followed this ap-
proach by reducing, reallocating or cancelling financial and political sup-
port for regimes labelled authoritarian (Abrahamsen 1997: 130). This 
strategy also helped the West to justify a reduction in the share of devel-
opment assistance allocated to Africa, as there was now stronger compe-
tition among countries for development assistance. Indeed, it provided a 
‘morally comfortable rationale for a basically self-interested policy to 
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abandon the continent and leave Africans to their own devices' (Abra-
hamsen 1997: 131).  
 
Donors have been making aid conditional upon the implementation 
of specific policies for the last thirty years (Dijkstra 2002: 307). The so-
called first- generation conditionality focused on the implementation of 
economic policies (e.g. the Structural Adjustment Programme). Political 
conditionality (or second-generation conditionality) refers to the use of 
‘punitive measures by foreign governments and international donor or-
ganisations to promote certain political objectives, such as good govern-
ance and democracy in recipient countries’ (Tjonneland 1998: 186). No-
table is the use of political conditionalities comprising a package of terms 
that is ‘achievable through aid negotiations and what is regarded as legit-
imate in terms of breaching the sanctity of national sovereignty’ (Baylies 
1995: 321). In cross-conditionality, donors make funds available based 
on the existence of agreements with other organisations (e.g. the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund). The integration of policies focused on poverty 
reduction into conditionality packages may be labelled as third-
generation conditionality (Dijkstra 2002: 308-309).  
 
But there are also paradoxes associated with the practice of aid condi-
tionality. Firstly, it is possible to question why aid recipients should re-
quire incentives to implement policies that are beneficial for the country. 
Secondly, while donors provide aid tied to the implementation of partic-
ular policies, this may simultaneously create a moral hazard on the side 
of the recipients (as the provision of aid creates a disincentive to imple-
ment reforms). Thirdly, by setting conditions for the provision of aid, 
donors actually contradict the content of these policies that are supposed 
to focus on supporting processes of democratisation. Indeed, by setting 
conditions for aid, donors limit national sovereignty and, consequently, 
democratic decision-making processes (Dijkstra 2002: 309-310).  
 
2.3.2 Aid selectivity  
From 2000 onwards, the current development paradigm has undergone a 
shift from aid conditionality to selectivity. This shift is informed by the 
outcomes of various reassessments of development assistance in the 
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1990s prompting the need for increasing aid effectiveness. In particular, 
three dynamics can be distinguished, namely the lack of focus on poverty 
reduction in the 1980s and early 1990s, previous forms of development 
assistance that did not accommodate the preferences of developing 
countries, and the realisation that political conditionalities were only 
partly effective due to principal-agent problems affecting donor-recipient 
interactions (Hout 2007: 22-23). The effectiveness discourse embraced 
by development actors resonated well with the New Public Management 
approach to development, providing renewed legitimacy of development 
assistance by focusing on targets and mechanisms of delivery, and by 
paying more attention to the policy framework of aid recipients (Hout 
2007: 4-5). Consequently, development agencies faced with difficulties 
started to favour a strategy in which good governance is seen as a pre-
requisite for aid. 
 
This discourse on selectivity, wherein the consideration of prior ac-
tions in allocating aid was advocated, became more formalised in the late 
1990s, heavily supported by the World Bank and promoted to other 
agencies (Van Waeyenberge 2009: 795). Research by World Bank econ-
omists Burnside and Dollar (1997 and 2004) and Burnside and Pritchett 
(1998) was critical in this debate (Hout 2007: 19). The research illustrated 
that aid is effective (in terms of higher growth) only in the presence of 
“good” policies and that ‘aid does not lead to good policies’ (Burnside 
and Dollar 1997: 3-4). Collier and Dollar (1999) further extended these 
findings by observing that aid has no impact on growth unless provided 
in a good policy environment. These conclusions hence informed the 
need for allocating aid to countries with an appropriate policy framework 
in place (Van Waeyenberge 2009: 795).  
 
Currently, donors base decisions concerning development assistance 
on the quality of political governance in recipient countries (Arndt 2009: 
68). In’airat (2014) also observes that donors give preferential treatment 
to countries with good governance (p. 63). In making such decisions, 
governance assessments and their outcomes are critical for donors, not 
only because they provide an overview of the political and economic 
landscape of a country, but also because they are able to provide inputs 
useful for aid selectivity. In this regard, Collier (2005) notes the follow-
ing: 
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If ex ante conditionality works as an incentive, then selectivity is bound to 
work as an incentive because it has all the incentive effects of ex ante plus 
no credibility problems. Ex ante conditionality is now so contaminated by 
the credibility problem that the only way we get an incentive effect is with 
ex post conditionality (that is, with selectivity). If one is keen to get incen-
tive effects from aid, then ex post conditionality is the only hope (p. 115-
116).  
 
2.3.3 Conditionality and selectivity as forms of coercion 
Conditioning aid (be it through straightforward conditionality or ex post-
conditionality/selectivity) is expected to stimulate reform in aid recipient 
countries. Conditionality particularly aims to incentivise and induce gov-
ernments to implement reforms. Furthermore, providing aid only to 
countries with a specific policy environment is considered to enhance aid 
effectiveness and can in turn also act as a stimulant to further improve 
governance frameworks (Collier et al. 1997: 1400-1401). For instance, aid 
selectivity is informed by the supposition that countries with better gov-
ernance frameworks are better equipped to absorb aid. This would hence 
act as an incentive for promoting governance reforms in specific coun-
tries (Doornbos 2001: 102-103). Moreover, conditionality provides do-
nors with the opportunity to specify how aid should be expended. How-
ever, aid may result in negative actions by providing governments with a 
disincentive for cancelling certain policies. Moreover, conditionality may 
act as a signal to other donors that the respective government is commit-
ted to policy reform (Collier et al. 1997: 1400-1401).  
 
The process through which conditionality and aid selectivity aims to 
induce change in recipient countries can be viewed as an instrument of 
pressure. In this sense, aid is used as leverage for the promotion of spe-
cific objectives or agendas in recipient countries. The coercive nature of 
these modalities that rely on (dis)incentives for engaging in particular 
behaviour is hence highlighted (Stokke 1995: 11-12). By focusing on the 
concept of coercion, it is possible to explain how ‘outside coercive scru-
tiny, evaluation and regulation’ can pressure aid recipients to conform to 
governance standards (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004: 285). Aid recipi-
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ents may diffuse external pressures by changing practices to reflect pro-
cesses and structures that are deemed legitimate, resulting in isomorphic 
transformation (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004: 285-286). This process 
of institutional isomorphic change follows coercive formal and informal 
pressures exerted by organisations that aid recipients are dependent on, 
and by cultural expectations of society at large. These pressures on aid 
recipients may be experienced as ‘force, as persuasion, or as invitations 
to join in collusion’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). 
 
Dynamics of donor-aid recipient relationships and power differentials 
influence the nature of pressures exercised through conditionality and 
aid selectivity (Frerks 2006: 19). An important characteristic of this ap-
proach is related to the asymmetrical aid dependence relationship be-
tween donor and aid recipient. In this regard, donors are cognisant of the 
reliance of developing countries on development aid and use aid as fi-
nancial leverage (Bo ̈rzel and Hackenesch 2013: 540). Countries that 
heavily depend on aid may assent to pressure and may consequently seek 
to improve their governance frameworks in an attempt to secure aid 
(Dijkstra 2015: 5). However, Borchgrevink (2008) suggests that, where 
directly imposed conditions threaten regime survival, aid conditionality 
could actually result in strong resistance on the side of the recipient, as 
conditions could increase risks and threaten the survival of the regime. 
Therefore, it may be better to refer to regime aid dependency (p. 217). In 
summary, while aid dependence relationships are asymmetrical, both do-
nors and aid recipients possess forms of leverage, capacity and resources 
that can be utilised (Frerks 2006: 19-20). It is therefore proposed that 
processes through which aid outcomes are established can be viewed as a 
negotiation between donors and aid recipients, instead of as the one-
sided channelling of aid. In these negotiations, both aid recipients and 
donors possess different forms of capital, which are determined by eco-
nomic, political and institutional conditions, as well as by ideological fac-
tors (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 6-7). 
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2.4 Determinants of aid allocation 
2.4.1 Good governance as an input to aid allocations 
It is expected that the new commitment of donors to aid selectivity 
based on the outcomes of assessments will result in aid provision to de-
veloping countries with sound governance records. A substantial body of 
literature has ensued, aimed at explaining observed aid allocations, evalu-
ating aid allocations in light of various normative criteria, and examining 
the levels of aid specific recipients should receive through a focus on 
inter-recipient allocations (Harrigan and Wang 2011: 1282). While the 
determinants of aid allocation have been the subject of many quantitative 
analyses, the findings remain inconclusive (Winters and Martinez 2015: 
516). For instance, In’airat (2014) finds that donors give preferential 
treatment to countries with good governance records (p. 67). However, 
in another study of major donors (the United States, Canada, France, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and multilateral organisations), Harri-
gan and Wang (2011) find that the donors were responsive to the policy 
environment of aid recipients, but that some donors were less concerned 
with favourable policy environments. In particular, Harrigan and Wang 
(2011) argue that the United States focuses more on its own interests, 
reflected for example in its emphasis on geo-political links with recipient 
countries (p. 1290-1291). 
 
2.4.2 Other factors influencing aid allocations 
This illuminates another dimension of aid allocation: although the formal 
objectives of conditionality and selectivity aim to provide incentives and 
pressures for governance reform, other factors also influence aid alloca-
tion decisions. What could assist in explaining these dynamics is a focus 
on normative and political goals of conditionality and aid selectivity. In-
deed, although these techniques and the aspiration for good governance 
are perpetuated as technical solutions for harnessing development, their 
construction is value-laden, influenced by socio-economic and political 
interests, and cannot be separated from the identity and interests of 
those promoting such solutions. It is for instance critical to highlight the 
influence of states providing the majority of financial resources for aid 
on the agenda of the Bretton Wood Institutions (the Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund). An example of this could be the rise of ne-
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oliberalism in the United States, Britain and Germany in the early 1980s. 
In addition, the good governance agenda holds within it ideological pref-
erences of what constitutes “the good society”, underpinned by liberal 
principles. Such normative agendas only can be considered neutral to a 
government who already has accepted these principles. Intimately linked 
to such agendas is a broader global agenda promoting a liberal world 
economy, and development programmes supporting the opening up of 
national economies to international capital, thereby actively aiming to 
maintain the hegemonic world order (Abrahamsen 1997: 144-146). 
 
Harrison similarly observes that the World Bank is rooted firmly in 
Western culture, influencing the liberal worldview and impacting the 
Bank’s engagements with developing countries (Harrison 2005: 242). 
Similarly, Doornbos (2001) asserts that donor interventionism works  
“towards the establishment of new global-institutional patterns of ‘he-
gemony’, through a ‘disciplining’ … including the governance of ‘self’, of 
state, policy structures in individual countries, to conform to the norms 
set by the global institutions’ (p.96). If the good governance agenda 
would be adopted it would provide another avenue through which insti-
tutional globalisation can be furthered (Ibid), thereby revealing the inter-
connectedness of African states and the political forces in the global dis-
course on governance  (Abrahamsen 2000: 1). It moreover sheds light on 
the need to view “development” strategies as a form of discourse giving 
rise to mechanisms of domination over the global South (Escobar 1984: 
384). 
 
By discussing these perspectives, it is possible to view development 
aid as a vehicle for the promotion of foreign policy objectives. These 
foreign policy objectives comprise geo-strategic interests, security inter-
ests, and other special bilateral ties (economic, political or strategic) that 
may override more formal aid selectivity criteria (Bo ̈rzel and Hackenesch 
2013: 540, Alesina and Dollar 2000: 33). A prominent example is the 
manner in which the United States and its allies have wielded develop-
ment aid as an instrument in the War on Terror. This process of ‘securit-
isation’ of aid shows how aid is rendered subservient to security-related 
and political interests linked to the counter-terrorist agendas of donor 
countries (Frerks 2006: 7-8). Alesina and Dollar (2000) note that  
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We find considerable evidence that the pattern of aid giving is dictated by 
political and strategic considerations. An inefficient, economically closed, 
mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its for-
mer colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar 
level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony (p. 
33). 
 
Hence, governance assessments such as the CPIA and APRM and 
their outcomes provide an important input for decision-making related 
to development assistance. This conditional link creates an asymmetrical 
power relationship between donors and aid recipients. However, aid se-
lectivity is more than a mere technical tool. The political objectives un-
derlying it explain how aid is used not only to incorporate developing 
countries into the liberal world order, but also to promote foreign policy 
objectives. It is therefore important to focus specifically on the apparent 
disjuncture between assessments and the discourse on and practice of 
achieving good governance, on conditionality and selectivity, and on aid 
allocation. These aspects of aid provision are scrutinised by relying on 
the work of Foucault on governmentality. Moreover, this study focuses 
on the adaptation of this concept of governmentality to the field of de-
velopment theory and practice by relying on the work of Lie on devel-
opmentality.  
 
2.5 Governmentality  
2.5.1 Introducing governmentality  
The French philosopher Michel Foucault delivered thirteen annual lec-
tures at the College de France in Paris between 1970 and 1984. The 1978 
and 1979 lecture series, titled “Security, territory and population” and 
“The birth of Biopolitics”, respectively, gained particular prominence 
and scholarly interest. In these lectures, Foucault explored a novel re-
search theme of governmental rationality (Gordon 1999: 1) that he called 
“governmentality”. The concept of governmentality quickly became a 
valuable tool for understanding power and rule related to the state and 
society, and has been taken up within a wide array of fields, such as 
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crime, education, housing, local government and public service reform, 
social welfare and social work (McKee 2009: 465-466). Foucault’s work 
on governmentality also featured heavily in post-colonial literatures and 
academic fields, and in theories such as political theory, literary criticism 
and historiography. Governmentality provides critical insights into the 
field of development studies, for instance through the interrogation of 
governmental rationalities linked to development in the post-colonial era 
(Mezzadra et al. 2013: 1). By viewing development as a product of dis-
courses related to development, it is further possible to shed light on the 
workings of power and knowledge, thereby allowing for a critical exami-
nation of policies and practices. This reinterpretation of development as 
discourse reveals the various systematic ways in which Western countries 
manage and control developing countries and in effect create and per-
petuate the notion of the “Third World”. A governmentality analysis 
pays particular attention to the historical conditions giving rise to specific 
discourses on development and the inherent structures and relations of 
power and knowledge that result from the practice of governmentality 
(Escobar 1984: 384).  
 
In his book “Discipline and Punish”, Foucault explains a particular 
kind of political analysis called the “microphysics of power”. This analy-
sis is informed by the interrogation of disciplinary techniques forming 
part of the modern penitentiary prison. By using this analogy, Foucault 
suggested that it was possible to understand aspects of modern society 
by reconstructing “techniques of power” that controlled the behaviour 
of citizens. The analyses used to study techniques of power, applied to 
for instance prisoners, could also be applied in the study of techniques 
used to govern society at large (Gordon 1999: 3-4). Indeed, Foucault ex-
plained the concept of governmentality in three ways: firstly, as the exer-
cise of a very specific but complex form of power that targets the popu-
lation; secondly, as the development of government as a form of power 
resulting in governmental apparatuses and capacities for appropriate ac-
tions; and, thirdly, as the result of a process in which the state of justice 
is transformed into the administrative state, thereby becoming increas-
ingly governmentalised (Foucault 1991: 102-103). According to Foucault, 
governmentality emerged from and is based on models of Christian pas-
toralism, as well as on diplomatic and military techniques embraced with-
in the Treaty of Westphalia and on instruments related to the “art of 
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government” and, particularly, the 18th and 19th Century conceptualisa-
tion of policing (Foucault 1991: 104).  
 
Governmentality elaborates a modern form of power characterised by 
pastoral care and by normalisation and consensus techniques. This form 
of power is termed “productive power”, working through knowledge 
and discursive practices in constraining actions (Abrahamsen 2004: 
1458–1459. It refers to the mentalities of those in government and their 
views of rule (Merlingen 2011: 150), and conceptualises this power as 
‘the encounter between the techniques of domination exercised over 
others, and the techniques of the self’ (Foucault 2004: 655 as cited in 
Schwak 2016: 430). Through these techniques, citizens adhere and con-
form to state domination and transform their behaviour to adhere to the 
perceived state of “normalcy” and norms (Schwak 2016: 430). 
 
An important aspect of governmentality regards power relations, 
which Foucault explains through the concept of “conduct”. Conduct 
refers to the guiding and leading of citizens based on mechanisms of co-
ercion, and to behaving within ‘an open field of possibilities’ (Foucault 
1982: 789). In particular, this concerns a modality of power that engages 
with the manner in which the ‘subject governs itself – i.e. the conduct of 
conduct’ (Lie 2006: 13). Foucault provides this alternative conceptualisa-
tion of power, which is conceived as relational. He describes this power 
as operating through various sites and levels, flowing in multiple direc-
tions as opposed (or complementary) to a mechanism of control over 
subordinate classes, and as providing spaces for resistance (Stoddart 
2007: 204-205). This conceptualisation of power further is supported by 
the concept of “biopower”, a form of power or politics over members of 
a population. Foucault connected the concept of biopower to the theme 
of government, arguing that governments are engaging with the particu-
lars of individual behaviour, and that, consequently, citizens are using 
this same practice and engagement for political counter-responses. The 
study of governmental practices hence also sheds light on forms of re-
sistance by the population (Gordon 1999: 4-5).  
 
In order to study power relations, Foucault proposes the establish-
ment of a number of foci: A establishing a number of points, namely, the 
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system of differentiations that permits actions based on the actions of 
others (relationships of power result in differentiations, for example in 
terms of legal position, traditions, and status); the type of objectives pur-
sued by those acting upon the actions of others; the means through 
which power relations are established; forms of institutionalisation; and 
degrees of rationalisation (Foucault 1982: 792). Foucault asserted that, 
during the 18th and 19th Century, states assumed control of power, and 
that these power relations progressively have been governmentalised. In 
other words, such power relations have been extended, centralised and 
rationalised through and within the framework of state institutions (Fou-
cault 1982: 793).  
 
2.5.2 Governmental technologies 
Governmental technologies comprise mechanisms, procedures, instru-
ments and other technologies through which conduct is shaped in order 
to achieve certain objectives (Lemke 2011: 49-50). The exercise of power 
within government is rationalised through the use of specific techniques 
such as the delineation of concepts, the specification of borders and ob-
jects, as well as through the provision of arguments and justifications. 
These techniques offer governments strategies to address problems and 
stimulate “appropriate” behaviour (Lemke 2011: 44). In particular, gov-
ernmentality allows for the identification of political rationalities linked 
to strategies and programmes (Cotoi 2011: 116). A political rationality 
specifies which appropriate standards should be attained and the road 
ahead to achieve these standards. These political rationalities are stand-
alone systems of meanings, operating at a higher level than perspectives 
and intentions of actors. Within these systems of meanings, there are 
problematisations of threats and opportunities. Power operates based on 
these rationalities, problematisations and translations, and is structured 
by experts (Merlingen 2011: 152-153), allowing political elites to manage 
the various affairs of a territory and its population, and to allocate 
spheres of action to different authorities (Rose 1996 as cited in Cotoi 
2011: 116).  
The concept of governmentality explains how citizens are made com-
plicit in their own governance through the constraint of their behaviour 
by consistent monitoring of conduct and assessments of deviance from 
standards (Merlingen 2011: 152). These standards of appropriate behav-
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iour are conceptualised as norms and play a critical role in modern pow-
er. According to Taylor (2009) ‘[t]he norm establishes what is normal’. 
Techniques of normation and normalization in turn function to ‘make 
normal’ ’ (p. 52). Power is “sedimented” through this process in which 
norms are seen as natural. When norms are considered natural, they in 
turn promote conformity with other norms held at individual and socie-
tal levels. Through this process, it is possible to distinguish between the 
“normal” and the “abnormal” and consequently to intervene to ensure 
conformity, thereby effectively reducing the opportunity to present op-
posing views (Taylor 2009: 53). Taylor (2009) furthermore argues that 
 
On the one hand, [the state intervenes] within both individual bodies and 
populations in order to bring them into conformity with particular social 
norms. On the other hand, in doing so such techniques perpetuate the 
power relations that the norm founds and legitimizes by reproducing 
norms within the sociopolitical landscape to the point that they come to 
be seen not as produced at all but simply as natural and necessary (p. 52).  
 
Disciplined conduct is then achieved by training citizens to adhere to 
particular routines, surveying their behaviour, and punishing them for 
deviating from the norm. This discipline is not focused on creating obe-
dience, but rather on the ‘self-optimisation of subjects through individual 
liberty and freedom of choice’ (Dean 1999: 19-20 as cited in Lo ̈wenheim 
2008: 258). Through constant surveillance, the necessary “knowledge” is 
created to be able to classify citizens according to their (non-) conformi-
ty, and normalising judgements further illuminate the power dynamics of 
these engagements (Paternek 1987: 108). This also shows how power 
and knowledge influence and shape normalisation and how, even with-
out surveillance and discipline, power is exerted through this process of 
normalisation (Briscoe 2008: 17). Citizens in turn are framed both as re-
sponsible for not conforming to the norm and for improving their future 
behaviour. Hence, through surveillance citizens are held responsible for 
their own conduct (Lo ̈wenheim 2008: 259). In other words, a citizen be-
comes the ‘principle of his own subjection’ (as cited in Mokuolu 2013: 
54). The state on the other hand assumes the role of facilitator and mon-
itors the behaviour of citizens through this form of indirect rule (Lie 
2006: 14-15).  
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2.6 Developmentality 
2.6.1 Introducing developmentality 
The concept of governmentality provides a corresponding framework 
for understanding forms of control and governing as well as modes of 
thought. It is possible to rationalise power by providing meanings and 
definitions of problems and by identifying instruments to address said 
problems. The concept also provides a lens for viewing the way in which 
states can be subjected to self-control in the same way that modern indi-
vidual citizens are subjected to self-control within states. This exercise of 
control can be applied to the conduct of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
to describe the exercise of indirect control in international relations, gov-
erning at distance in an unrepressed manner, and holding developing 
countries responsible for the conduct of their own affairs (Anders 2005: 
39). The concept of governmentality helps us understand these transi-
tions from direct to more indirect rule aimed at shaping state behaviour 
and action in a particular direction (Lie 2015a: 27). These dynamics are 
encapsulated in the concept of “developmentality”, which explains how 
new forms of governing and being governed are entrenched within offi-
cial development discourses. Developmentality is thereby defined as a 
form of governmentality (Lie 2015b: 724).  
 
Lie coined and first employed the term developmentality in 2002 (see 
Lie 2004). At that time, the term had only been applied in the field of 
child psychology. Since then, there has been a proliferation of applica-
tions of governmentality in the context of development studies and spe-
cific references to developmentality have also been made (for instance, 
Ilcan and Phillips 2010 apply the concept of “developmentalities” in ana-
lysing the Millennium Development Goals). However, Lie uses devel-
opmentality to describe and analyse the new aid architecture and focuses 
on the practices of development – in contrast to the more top-down 
perspective of development embraced in development literature that uti-
lises a governmentality perspective (Lie 2015a: 1-2).  
 
Developmentality draws on the particularities of governmentality 
analyses within the development sector and on donor and recipient insti-
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tutions’ explicit intent to reform inherently asymmetrical aid relations. 
The developmentality perspective moreover helps disengage this associa-
tion with the state and state power, while retaining key features to ana-
lyse similar governance dynamics and mechanisms within the develop-
ment sector (Lie 2015b: 724). It describes the new aid architecture as a 
form of indirect rule that focuses on complicity through techniques of 
self-discipline. This involves altering mentalities in significant ways, 
hence the term developmentality (Lie 2015a: 29). It concerns the devel-
opment of a discourse with a knowledge structure, and with both a con-
ceptual and institutional apparatuses influencing social life through vari-
ous strategies (Ferguson 1990 as cited in Cotoi 2011: 120). Thus, this 
mode of power inscribes a logic of unconscious self-governance within 
the frame of the governors and in this case, donor mentality (Lie 2015b: 
724-725). This power is productive as it operates ‘through self-reflecting, 
conscious development actors, representing forms of action and rela-
tions of power that aim to guide and shape (rather than force, control or 
dominate) the action of others’ (Lie 2015b: 725).  
 
Developmentality is linked to the rationalised practices embraced by 
the global development apparatus informing a particular type of 
knowledge formation as part of the new aid architecture, and shaping the 
conduct of actors through reciprocal partnerships. This is reflected both 
in the current development narrative of good governance, as well as in 
the development modalities embracing partnerships and participation. 
However, developmentality provides an analytical understanding of the 
suggestion that, contrary to the understanding that countries are in the 
driver’s seat of development, in actuality donors are applying new forms 
of governance and discipline by retaining control through shaping the 
conduct of aid recipients (Lie 2015b: 734-735). This relates to the over-
arching concept of governmentality wherein Foucault perceived power 
as expressed through dominance, discipline and governmentality (Lie 
2015a: 244).  
 
The overall aim of donors (or governors) is for recipient countries to 
accept their (good governance) policies. Lie suggests that the language 
utilised to achieve this aim presents the recipient as free, but that this 
freedom is limited to the discursive frames of donors. Developing coun-
tries are granted freedom in the development of country strategies (i.e. 
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ownership) and simultaneously are expected to self-govern to attain the-
se set standards. Furthermore, countries are expected to perform and are 
held accountable through various governance techniques. Freedom then 
becomes the manner in which countries absorb and adhere to the men-
talities of the donors (or governors) and eventually becomes a means of 
rule. States become self-disciplined agents enlisted and made responsible 
for their own development. In this regard, the new aid architecture 
through its focus on governance amounts to developmentality.  
 
A number of statements here qualify this argument. Firstly, states are 
made responsible for their own development (through applications of 
the concept of ownership). Secondly, this self-governance is both a 
means to and end of the good governance agenda and is intended to 
shape behaviour in line with its principles. Thirdly, states are monitored 
from a distance through instruments and assessments measuring, moni-
toring and reporting performance. Fourthly, aid disbursement is based 
on the performance assessment of a client/developing country, and can 
be explained by referring to concepts such as surveillance, punishment, 
and reward. These actions all show the relational aspect of power, which 
makes it crucial to move beyond discourse analysis of donor rhetoric to 
closely scrutinise the manner in which these surveillance tools are ap-
plied. To be sure, developmentality is not a machine of disciplinary pow-
er as, in fact, recipients possess power and can resist. Hence, by viewing 
governance assessments as contributing to the creation and perpetuation 
of developmentality, it is possible to understand how governance stand-
ards are disciplined, and how aid recipients may drive resistance (Lie 
2015a: 30-34). 
 
2.6.2 Promoting governance as a technique of developmentality 
Good governance is promoted as a global ‘modality of state rule’ (Zanot-
ti 2005: 466) whereby the push for good governance orients policies to-
ward institutional reforms, promotes mechanisms of efficient administra-
tion within states, and promotes international and national monitoring 
instruments to stimulate performance. It engages with reluctant govern-
ments by enlisting disciplinary instruments (Zanotti 2005: 466). Instru-
ments such as the monitoring and auditing of performance support pro-
cesses of standardisation and individualisation at the end of aid 
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recipients. Standardisation refers to the common goals of institutional 
reform, and this process is individualising in regarding tools for the self-
improvement of countries (Zanotti 2005: 473).  
 
As noted before, two processes are simultaneously occurring. On the 
one hand, states have assumed ownership in creating their own strategies 
for development (i.e. the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and there-
fore have space and responsibility for self-governance. On the other 
hand, this space is curtailed due to the limitation of strategies to a certain 
realm of approved governance contexts (Lie 2015a: 28). Aid recipients 
are inscribed to follow a particular mentality of development and as a 
result exercise self-control – a process that can be described as an ‘indi-
rect mechanism of surveillance’ exerted by donors (Lie 2006: 16). This is 
evident when analysing the production and simultaneous regulation of 
freedom, the production of accountability and regulation of empower-
ment of developing countries by bringing in states as responsible agents, 
and constraining this within set standards of conduct (Abrahamsen 2004: 
1463).  
 
Developmentality thus emerges not only as a direct effect of the new 
aid architecture with its increased emphasis on ownership of country de-
velopment strategies and aid effectiveness, but is also an explicit goal in 
development strategies enacted by donors (Lie 2015a: 239-240). Lie 
(2006) states that ‘governmentality in the aid sector is both an effect of 
how aid relations are organised and an explicit intention on donor part 
through disseminating the same system of governance through the good 
governance paradigm. Hence, developmentality’ (pp. 15-16). The explicit 
intent of state formation to lead to developmentality can be observed by 
regarding governance as both the form of institutional setup and good 
governance as the characterisation of governance systems (Lie 2015a: 
68). Although developmentality is an indirect form of power, it is more 
intrusive and profound, operating through recipient countries. This is 
where it resonates as a form of productive power, influencing the behav-
iours of actors who have been made responsible for development, but 
simultaneously remain accountable to donors for self-governance and 
the implementation of own development strategies (Lie 2015a: 242).   
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Developmentality relates to the production of this conducive envi-
ronment – an environment wherein governance frameworks are condu-
cive to the receipt of donor policies (Lie 2015b: 726). Several techniques 
are deployed to exercise this form of power, including more explicit 
tools such as conditionality and other, more implicit mechanisms of con-
trol such as pushing for aid recipient accountability towards the donors 
and applying checks and balances systems. A critical instrument related 
to this is the undertaking of donor audits (Lie 2006: 16). Such audits or 
assessments comprise a range of tools meant to assess the state of gov-
ernance in a particular country (OECD/DAC 2008: 1). Assessments are 
instruments of productive power as they engender states to respond to 
performative conditioning, thereby improving country performance 
(Abrahamsen 2004: 1463).  
 
Changes in the aid architecture have given rise to new forms of power 
modalities reflected in donor-aid recipient relations, and in modalities 
governing access to development assistance reflected particularly in aid 
selectivity (Lie 2006: 12). Indeed, the aid architecture transitioned in con-
tent and modality from structural adjustment policies and conditionality 
to a comprehensive development framework (and the application of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) and aid selectivity. As Lie notes,  
 
World Bank’s new management and planning regime under the umbrella 
of Comprehensive Development Framework makes government the re-
sponsible part of Bank-driven intentions as the government produced 
poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) makes government responsible for 
whatever proposed despite it – when following the policy trails and trajec-
tories – is the Bank that indirectly defines policy and directly chooses 
which of the government proposed policies to support (Lie 2006: 15). 
 
Thus, states have been granted more freedom, but these freedoms 
have been curtailed in order to adhere to the principles of the new aid 
architecture. Indeed, coercive conditionality is not needed when states 
have accepted the dominant ideas of the new aid architecture (Lie 2015a: 
26). Developmentality and selectivity therefore distinguish themselves 
from each another, with the latter focusing development efforts on 
countries with an already-existing conducive policy environment and, 
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hence, without need for conditionality, whereas the former refers to the 
production of these conducive environments. Lie states that, ‘[a]s such, 
developmentality is a productive power contingent on influencing the 
actions of others who are then made responsible for governing and de-
veloping themselves’ (Lie 2015b: 726). Selectivity conditions recipients to 
accept good governance principles whilst excluding non-performers 
from development aid, acting almost as a conditionality technique. Free-
dom thus makes states complicit in their self-rule. The good governance 
agenda maintains and reproduces hierarchies and power relations by 
framing aid recipients as in need of good governance, thereby legitimis-
ing the prescription of its policy choices (Abrahamsen 2000: ix-x). 
 
These powerful global normative standards influence the manner in 
which governments adapt and attempt to brand their countries to adhere 
to this normalisation of good governance (Schwak 2016: 428). Indeed, 
nation branding is understood as ‘a form of cultural policy (as “display”) 
that means to unify the nation-state and uphold the symbolic legitimacy 
of a particular social order’ (Varga 2013: 14). This process allows for the 
(re)legitimisation of the nation state as an anchor of identity (Varga 2013: 
2) and provides an explanation of how nations seek to reconstitute 
themselves through ideology and praxis (Kaneva 2011: 118). An obvious 
display and identity that aid recipients may aim to showcase is adherence 
to international standards of governance (as a result of normalisation). 
These are reflected in inter-state dynamics influencing the need for de-
veloping countries to adhere to the ideology of the dominant develop-
ment agenda. However, this international display of good governance 
may not necessarily translate into practice domestically (intra-state), in 
other words actual adherence to what is considered as a good govern-
ance framework, while agency and forms of resistance by the govern-
ment further influence these processes.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter provides an over-
view of the recent evolution of development approaches, marked by a 
shift in focus on and modality through which development cooperation 
is delivered. In terms of focus, good governance is viewed as providing 
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the necessary prerequisite environment through which countries can 
achieve sustainable development. While initially good governance was 
seen an outcome of development aid efforts, it is currently also viewed 
as the necessary “ingredient” for increasing aid effectiveness. As such, 
donors provide development assistance more selectively, and particularly 
on the basis of whether or not aid recipient countries possess good gov-
ernance frameworks. This selectivity principle is a clear break from the 
past, when development cooperation was based on attaching conditions 
to aid. Hence, good governance has become both an input to and out-
come of effective development aid.  
 
While aid selectivity is propagated as a technical tool for improving 
the effectiveness of development assistance, it also operates as a political 
instrument for donor pressure. As aid recipients are dependent on de-
velopment assistance, the selectivity principle generates coercive pres-
sures on aid recipients to conform to the good governance norm. These 
pressures are influenced by donor-recipient relationships and power dif-
ferentials dynamics. To be sure, development aid in itself is an important 
vehicle for the promotion of foreign policy objectives. In order to shed 
more light on this apparent disjuncture between the discourse surround-
ing and practice of governance assessments, conditionality and selectivi-
ty, and aid allocation, the theoretical framework used for this study relies 
on governmentality theory and its adaptation to the development sector, 
as captured in the concept of developmentality. 
 
Governmentality theory provides a theoretical lens for understanding 
transitions from direct to more indirect modes of rule that aim to shape 
and guide the behaviour of citizens (Lie 2015a: 27). The governmentality 
framework focusing on the interaction between the state and citizens 
also has been applied successfully by Lie in the context of the develop-
ment sector to explain how donors apply new forms of governance and 
discipline to shape the conduct of aid recipients. Developmentality draws 
on the particularities of a governmentality analysis within the develop-
ment sector and on donor and recipient institutions’ explicit intent to 
overhaul inherently asymmetrical aid relations (Lie 2015b: 724). It posi-
tions donor and aid recipient relationships in a context of ownership and 
partnership within development cooperation. However, the framework 
also shows how governments are disciplined on the appropriate content 
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of development through the use of various techniques of rationalisation, 
including governance assessments. Governance assessments provide a 
tool for surveillance and the outcome of the respective assessment is an 
input to aid selectivity criteria, thereby punishing or rewarding aid recipi-
ents for good behaviour. This prompts aid recipients to exercise self-
control and to accept the donor’s framework of thinking.  
 
These frameworks of thinking inform the empirical analysis of the 
CPIA and APRM. More specifically, the analysis relies solely on the de-
velopmentality analytical lens and combines this with critical conceptual 
insights provided by governmentality, such as indirect rule; conduct and 
‘conduct of conduct’; productive power; surveillance (monitoring); disci-
pline; self-rule (self-optimisation and self-governance) and responsibilisa-
tion; punishment; norms and normalisation; resistance; as well as the in-
tersection between knowledge and power. In order to facilitate this 
approach, the analysis is guided by theoretical propositions that are 
based on the developmentality lens and concepts from governmentality 
and supports the explanation of relevant dynamics pertaining to the 
themes addressed in each of the five sub-questions. These also tie in with 
other concepts discussed in the theoretical framework, such as good 
governance, conditionality and selectivity and coercion, donor-aid recipi-
ent dynamics, political determinants of aid allocation (the strategic func-
tion of aid), and nation branding. 
 
Sub-question one: How are governance standards given shape in the 
content and design of the CPIA and APRM? 
1a: CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance; 
1b: The CPIA is designed to serve as a form of indirect rule of the 
World Bank over its aid recipients (productive power); 
1c: APRM content comprises African discursive frames on good 
governance; and 
1d: The APRM is designed to serve a form of counter-rule (re-
sistance) against external influences on the African development 
agenda.  
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Sub-question two: How have CPIA and APRM assessment processes 
been conducted in Ethiopia?  
2a: The CPIA is technology of surveillance (auditing/monitoring) 
that assesses adherence to the good governance norm and generates 
knowledge on aid recipient conduct; and 
2b: The APRM is a voluntary monitoring mechanism that assesses 
adherence to African governance norms and generates knowledge on 
policies and practices of African countries. 
 
Sub-question three: How have CPIA and APRM applications influenced 
the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia?  
3a: CPIA knowledge is translated into power over aid recipients by 
punishing or rewarding behaviour deviating from the good govern-
ance norms (performative conditioning, discipline) through devel-
opment finance and based on the selectivity principle (relational 
power reflected through donor-aid recipient dynamics and power 
differentials influence this, particularly aid dependency); 
3b: The CPIA is an instrument of productive power that operates 
through aid recipients and engenders self-rule and optimisation (the 
responsibilisation of aid recipients) and results in the normalisation 
of good governance;  
3c: The APRM challenges external development strategies and coer-
cive financial pressures exerted by donors by relying on the devel-
opment of domestic country strategies of development (influenced 
by intra-state discipline dynamics, particularly domestic participatory 
framework); and  
3d: The APRM represents continental institutional isomorphic 
change and continental branding of African values on governance 
that challenge the normalisation of good governance (influenced by 
inter-state discipline dynamics). 
 
Sub-question four: Did similar or different dynamics influence the appli-
cation of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria?  
 
This sub-question aims to replicate the main findings on the applica-
tion of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia to these three secondary 
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case studies. It therefore relies on the same propositions as sub-
question three. 
 
Sub-question five: Which strategic considerations inform the functions 
that the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African 
Union?  
5a: The CPIA is an instrument that aims to support the geo-strategic 
(security), political and economic interests of the West; and 
5b: The APRM is an instrument that aims to support the geo-
strategic (security), political and economic interests of African coun-
tries. 
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3 The Content and Design of the CPIA and APRM 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the content and design of the CPIA and APRM. 
It focuses on answering the following research question: how are gov-
ernance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA 
and APRM? The main aim of the analysis is to describe the content and 
design of the CPIA and APRM and to understand how these assess-
ments promote the adoption of governance standards. The description is 
informed by an analysis of strategic documents of the World Bank and 
the African Union, complemented by academic literature on the CPIA 
and APRM. The content and design of the CPIA and APRM, and the 
manner in which these assessments promote governance standards, are 
analysed through the analytical lens of developmentality (including rele-
vant concepts related to the governmentality framework) described in 
Chapter 2. The analysis is further supported by the theoretical proposi-
tions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics. 
 
3.2 The content and design of the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
3.2.1 The content of the CPIA 
Context 
The CPIA measures the quality of a country’s policy and institutional 
framework. “Quality” pertains to the conduciveness of a country’s insti-
tutional framework to fostering ‘poverty reduction, sustainable growth, 
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and the effective use of development assistance’ (World Bank 2009: 1). 
The CPIA process determines the size of concessional lending and 
grants to low-income countries. It has fulfilled this function since the 
1980s (Tang 2010: xi). Concessional lending refers to the lending under-
taken by the World Bank Group’s International Development Associa-
tion (IDA) for ‘terms with significant grace periods, long repayment pe-
riods, and very low interest rates’ (World Bank 2016b). Two premises 
inform the use of CPIA outcomes as a guiding anchor in determining 
IDA allocations. Firstly, IDA resources are important to developing 
countries in supporting economic growth and poverty reduction, and in 
improving citizens’ living conditions. Secondly, these resources are uti-
lised most effectively in a context of sound policies and institutions 
(Tang 2010: 29).   
 
The neo-classical growth model serves as the theoretical foundation 
for explaining the effect of aid on growth (and, subsequently, its effect 
on attempted efforts to reduce poverty and raise living standards). This 
model considers aid to fill an external and domestic finance savings gap, 
and therefore supports investment leading to growth. Based on this 
premise, scholars have sought to further explain this mechanism, but 
have also challenged it by arguing that aid finances consumption, not 
investment. A seminal paper by Boone (1994), wherein he asserted that 
aid finances public and private consumption, particularly affirmed this. 
However, a World Bank working paper authored by Burnside and Dollar 
(1997, 2004) found that aid is effective – meaning that aid has a positive 
effect on growth – when provided in a context of “adequate” policies. 
However, in the decade following the publication of this report, no con-
sensus had been reached regarding the impact of aid on growth (Tang 
2010: 29-30). Despite the absence of consensus, this premise, in addition 
to the importance of adequate policies and institutions (governance), re-
flect the overarching belief of the Bank on aid effectiveness that informs 
the design of the CPIA.  
 
The issue of governance first came to the fore in a 1981 Bank report 
on Sub-Saharan Africa. The report stressed the importance of develop-
ing an efficient public sector and improving incentives and institutional 
support for economic development (World Bank 1981: v). This line of 
thinking was also put forth in the 1989 Bank report on Sub-Saharan Af-
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rica that pinpointed the failure of public institutions as the cause of weak 
performance, and stressed the need for good governance as well as the 
creation of a better relationship ‘between the government and governed’ 
(World Bank 1989: xii). The 1991 Bank discussion paper included further 
reflections on governance and defined it as ‘the manner in which power 
is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social re-
sources for development’ (World Bank 1991: i). The paper argued that 
governance is relevant to the work of the Bank, as governance relates to 
good order and discipline in the management of resources. The report 
focuses on four dimensions of governance, namely ‘capacity and effi-
ciency issues in public sector management; accountability; predictability 
and the legal framework for development; and information and transpar-
ency’ (World Bank 1991: 7). The 1992 Bank report on relating govern-
ance to development complemented these statements by adding that 
good governance is ‘synonymous to sound development management’ 
(World Bank 1992: 1).  
 
The continuity in the Bank’s thinking on governance is exemplified in 
its 2002 World Development Report. The report includes four elements 
that are key to the role of the state as regulator: securing property rights; 
a regulatory regime promoting competition; establishing macroeconomic 
policies for stable market activity; and the absence of corruption (Hout 
2009: 35, World Bank 2002: 99). Later reports also addressed critical po-
litical dimensions of reforms, as noted for instance in the Bank’s 2005 
report on economic growth in the 1990s. The report proposed the adop-
tion of “strategic incrementalism”, meaning that the Bank would have a 
diversified reform strategy based on the degree of state capture and lev-
els of administrative corruption in respective developing countries (Hout 
2009: 35-36). The issue of governance is again taken up in the 2017 
World Development Report on Governance and the Law, which ad-
dresses the issues of policy-making and implementation of policies, and 
particularly the complex political and social settings that influence these 
(World Bank 2016a). These considerations are all reflected in the Bank’s 
current overarching Governance Global Practice, which supports coun-
tries in building ‘capable, efficient, open, inclusive, and accountable insti-
tutions’ (World Bank 2017). 
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This strand of thought is also fundamental to the content of the 
CPIA. The assessment is underpinned by the understanding that govern-
ance matters for development. In this regard, governance is largely un-
derstood in terms of the regulatory role of government. In particular, it is 
noted that development should be harnessed through the existence of a 
conducive policy and institutional framework. The Bank asserts that 
good policies and institutions lead to growth and poverty reduction out-
comes, and this approach argues that development is a function of a 
country’s own effort.  
 
Assessment content 
The current design of the CPIA facilitates the assessment of four clusters 
related to the policy and institutional environment in aid receiving coun-
tries, further divided into 16 criteria (Tang 2010: xiii):  
 
Cluster A – Economic Management: 
Item 1: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
Item 2: Fiscal Policy 
Item 3: Debt Policy 
 
Cluster B – Structural Policies: 
Item 4: Trade 
Item 5: Financial Sector 
Item 6: Business Regulatory Environment 
 
Cluster C – Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity: 
Item 7: Gender Equality 
Item 8: Equity of Public Resource Use 
Item 9: Building Human Resources 
Item 10: Social Protection and Labour 
Item 11: Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability 
 
Cluster D – Public Section Management and Institutions: 
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Item 12: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance 
Item 13: Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
Item 14: Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation 
Item 15: Quality of Public Administration 
Item 16: Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in Public Sector 
(World Bank 2015: 83). 
 
This thesis is particularly interested in understanding the manner in 
which governance assessments promote governance and therefore fo-
cuses on Cluster D, which covers the following five items: 
 
Item 12: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance:  
‘The extent to which economic activity is facilitated by an effective le-
gal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and 
contract rights are reliably respected and enforced’ (World Bank 2015: 
83) 
 
Item 13: Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management:  
‘The extent to which there is: (a) a comprehensive and credible budg-
et, linked to policy priorities; (b) effective financial management sys-
tems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a con-
trolled and predictable way; and (c) timely and accurate accounting 
and fiscal reporting, including timely audit of public accounts and ef-
fective arrangements for follow up’ (World Bank 2015: 83) 
 
Item 14: Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation:  
Assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilisation – not only the 
tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they 
are actually collected (World Bank 2015: 83) 
 
Item 15: Quality of Public Administration:  
‘The core administration defined as the civilian central government 
(and sub-national governments, to the extent that their size or policy 
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responsibilities are significant) excluding health and education per-
sonnel, and police’ (World Bank 2015: 83) 
 
Item 16: Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in Public 
Sector:  
‘The extent to which the executive, legislators, and other high-level 
officials can be held accountable for their use of funds, administrative 
decisions, and results obtained’ (World Bank 2015: 83) 
 
Each item or criterion is composed of multiple dimensions, and these 
are further operationalised through different measurement indicators. An 
example of this is included below for Item 12: Property Rights and Rule-
based Governance:  
 
This criterion assesses the extent to which economic activity is facilitated 
by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which 
property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced. Each of 
three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) legal framework for secure 
property and contract rights, including predictability and impartiality of 
laws and regulations; (b) quality of the legal and judicial system, as meas-
ured by independence, accessibility, legitimacy, efficiency, transparency, 
and integrity of the courts and other relevant dispute resolution mecha-
nisms; and (c) crime and violence as an impediment to economic activity 
and citizen security’(World Bank 2011: 37). 
 
Measurement indicator of legal framework dimension: Formal property 
rights are hardly recognized, and informal rights are seldom enforced. 
Formal contractual arrangements are little used. Manipulation of property 
and contract rights by government officials or other elites is endemic. 
Laws and regulations change unpredictably, for example through frequent 
and unpublished executive decrees (World Bank 2011: 37). 
 
The different criteria, dimensions and indicators are assessed using 
guideposts that which comprise sources of data and information that can 
be used to inform the rating (World Bank 2011: 22). The guideposts of 
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Cluster D – Public Sector Management and Institutions are the follow-
ing: 
 
1. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network's Public 
Sector Group (PRMSP) Governance indicators;  
2. Actionable Governance Indicators;  
3. Support for Improvement in Governance and Management 
(SIGMA) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) Standards for Quality of Laws;  
4. Economic Freedom of the World Report – Indicator 2 on Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights;  
5. Index of Economic Freedom ‘Property Rights’ indicator;  
6. United Nations Development Program – Program on Governance in 
the Arab Region (POGAR);  
7. American Bar Association – Rule of Law Index indicators;  
8. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Perfor-
mance Measurement Framework;  
9. International Monetary Fund Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency;  
10. Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Manual and the Classification 
of the Functions of Government (COFOG);  
11. World Development Indicators – Table 5.6 on Tax Policies;  
12. United States Agency for International Develop-
ment  (USAID)/Collecting Taxes Data System;  
13. Global Integrity Index;  
14. Development Economics and Data Group (DECDG) Statistical Ca-
pacity Index; and  
15. Institutional Profiles Database (World Bank 2011: 37, 39, 42, 44 and 
47)  
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3.2.2 The design of the CPIA 
Evolution of the design 
The CPIA assessment was initiated in the late 1970s, but since has un-
dergone a number of revisions and adjustments, mostly to incorporate 
changes in development thinking and various lessons learned over the 
years. Key markers in the CPIA process include the adjustments made in 
1998, when governance and social policies were included in the review. 
Furthermore, the number of criteria was fixed at 20, the scoring system 
changed from a five- to a six-point scale, and a benchmarking step was 
included in the rating process (World Bank 2009: 1). The changes intro-
duced in 1998 also emphasised the importance of institutions. In this 
regard, criteria were added to reflect on the capacity to manage and im-
plement policies, and criteria were adjusted to emphasise institutional 
aspects. In addition, greater weight was assigned to the public sector 
management cluster by raising its importance from 14% for the CPIA in 
1997 to 20% in 1998. This was entrenched by emphasising that the 
CPIA assesses policies and institutions implementing these policies, in 
contrast to development outcomes. The policies and institutions were to 
be measured based on their respective level at that time, rather than by 
comparing this to changes based on the former year. This supported the 
assumption that the nature of policies and institutions were the central 
determinant of aid effectiveness (Tang 2010: 4-7).  
 
The increased emphasis on public sector criteria continued in 1999, 
when ‘accountability, transparency, the rule of law and participation’ 
were articulated as the major pillars of governance, critical for develop-
ment and the effective use of development resources (Tang 2010: 7). 
This new thinking on public sector effectiveness was translated into 
practice by further increasing the weight of the public sector by another 
5% to 25% and by moving the criterion “Property Rights and Rule-
based Governance” to the public sector cluster. The increased emphasis 
on social policies also continued in 1999 when two criteria were added to 
the social policy cluster. In addition, the weight of the cluster rose from 
15% in 1998 to 25% in 1999. By increasing the weights of the public sec-
tor and social policies cluster, the weights of the economic management 
cluster and that of structural policies fell to 20% and 30%, respectively 
(Ibid). 
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 In 2001, it was agreed 1) to include written records in the assessment 
process, 2) to establish guidance on criteria, 3) to further revise the con-
tent of several criteria, 4) to increase the number of countries that serve 
as benchmarks in the rating, and 5) to define rating levels (World Bank 
2009: 1). In addition, in assessing fiscal policy specific reference was 
made to economic growth (Tang 2010: 7). Comprehensive changes to 
the CPIA were also undertaken in 2004 following a review by an external 
panel of experts. Having concluded that the methodology produced ro-
bust results and focused on the right issues, the review made recommen-
dations on process and methodology. Based on this, the criteria were 
adapted and fixed at 16 criteria, with clear definitions and details across 
all ratings levels. Moreover, equal weights were attached to the four clus-
ters (World Bank 2009: 1-2). In addition, Bank experts would also con-
sider the country context when rating countries (Tang 2010: 9). A major 
change to the CPIA methodology occurred in 2005, when for the first 
time the overall score and scores for each CPIA criterion (of IDA coun-
tries only) were made public. While the scores became public, the written 
justification for the scores and the sub-ratings that informed each criteria 
score remained undisclosed (World Bank 2011: 6). Thereafter, and fol-
lowing the evaluation of the CPIA in 20101, several adjustments were 
made to address concerns related to, amongst others, the overlap of cri-
teria and the consistent treatment of topics across different rating levels. 
The revised criteria were used from 2011 onwards (World Bank n.d.: 4). 
Hence, although the content, criteria, and weight of criteria have 
changed, little change has been made to coverage of the CPIA since the 
major adjustment in 1998, emphasising the perpetuated focus of the 
CPIA on the public sector and social policies, and specifying that the 
CPIA assesses policies and institutions (Tang 2010: 8). 
 
Rating process of the CPIA 
A two-pronged approach guides the preparation of CPIA ratings. The 
first process concerns a benchmarking phase in which a representative 
group of countries is drawn from all six regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia) and 
rated accordingly. The second process concerns the rating of the remain-
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ing countries, in which benchmarked countries serve as guiding stand-
ards in the rating of the other countries within that region (World Bank 
2009: 2).  
 
The main aim of the benchmarking phase is to ensure that, based on the 
criteria, the ratings are adequately and fairly applied across countries and 
regions. The World Bank selects a group of countries from each of the 
six regions. The group of countries is a representative sample of each 
region, including countries both with relatively fair and poor CPIA 
scores. The World Bank country teams from the selected benchmark 
countries propose ratings for each criterion and include written justifica-
tions alongside this. The country economists, with participation of the 
country management team and sector specialists, are often responsible 
for this process.  Ratings are assigned on a scale of 1 (low/weak perfor-
mance) to 6 (high/strong performance). The proposal and write-ups are 
then reviewed by the Regional Chief Economist Office to ensure cross-
country consistency within each region. Then, the networks and central 
departments based at the headquarters review the proposed ratings to 
ensure cross-region comparability. Finally, the representatives of the Op-
erations Policy and Country Services from the regions, as well as net-
works and central departments, meet and review the ratings for each cri-
terion and for all the benchmark countries. The representatives consider 
the various CPIA criteria ratings alongside the written justifications pro-
vided by country teams, and also reflect on further comments from oth-
er Bank departments and on other relevant support documents such as 
external indicators (Tang 2010: 50, World Bank 2009: 2-4). 
Currently, the ratings of the various criteria are fixed, which allows 
the various country teams to prepare the rating proposals and written 
justifications2 for their respective countries based on the earlier estab-
lished ratings for the various criteria. The governments of the reviewed 
countries (including the benchmark countries) are presented with the 
draft ratings before these are submitted to the various internal Bank re-
view processes. This allows for respective governments to assess areas in 
which views may differ and for these governments to supplement infor-
mation to be considered for the rating (World Bank n.d: 8). Similar to 
the benchmarking stage, the draft country ratings are then reviewed by 
the Regional Chief Economist Office and thereafter reviewed again by 
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the networks and central departments at the head office. An important 
aspect of this process is to ensure consistency of the ratings within and 
across the regions (World Bank 2009: 3). When the ratings are finalised, 
these are once again presented to the governments, with implications for 
the Bank’s programme in the country. Parties then meet to consider how 
to address identified weaknesses (World Bank n.d: 8). 
 
As noted before, Bank country staff uses the guideposts to outline 
sources of information and indicators as an anchor in rating the coun-
tries. However, other considerations also are taken into account in this 
process. The first decision Bank staff makes concerns focusing on rele-
vant policies and institutions that are under the country’s control, in con-
trast to outcomes that may be influenced by factors outside of the con-
trol of a government (such as economic growth). The second decision 
Bank staff makes concerns focusing on assessing the level of current per-
formance against criteria, and not the degree of improvement against 
those same criteria (i.e. comparing performance in relation to the previ-
ous year). The third decision Bank staff makes concerns focusing on ac-
tual policy actions and implementation only, and not focusing on inten-
tions or commitments. The final decision Bank staff makes regards 
including the size of the economy and the manner in which policies are 
implemented when rating the country. When each of the sixteen criteria 
has been rated, the average of the specific cluster is calculated, followed 
by the calculation of an average of all four cluster averages, thereby lead-
ing to the final CPIA score (World Bank 2009: 4). 
 
From CPIA to IDA concessional lending 
The relationship between determining the CPIA score and, consequent-
ly, the relative size of IDA concessional lending and grants, is less 
straightforward than one may imagine. The IDA allocates its resources 
based on a Performance-based Allocation (PBA) system, which consid-
ers the country’s IDA Country Performance Rating (informed by the 
CPIA score) and, to a lesser degree, per capita Gross National Income 
(World Bank n.d: 2). The next section describes the process through 
which CPIA scores inform IDA Country Performance Ratings. 
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Although the average score obtained within each cluster determines 
the total CPIA score, each cluster does not bear the same weight in rela-
tion to IDA allocations. To be sure, the four clusters are unevenly 
weighted in the IDA allocation formula: Clusters A-C weigh 8% each 
(adding up to 24%), and Cluster D (Governance) weighs 68%. The port-
folio performance comprises the remaining 8%. Hence, Cluster D bears 
eight-and-a-half times more weight in the IDA allocation and calculation 
process than the other clusters (Tang 2010: xi). In this regard, the World 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group asserts that there is ‘insufficient 
evidence to conclude that the most heavily weighted CPIA cluster asso-
ciates better with loan performance than the other three clusters’ (Tang 
2010: xiii). In other words, there is no reasonable explanation for the ex-
tent to which the score of Cluster D influences the final IDA allocation 
and calculation process. Based on this, the report concludes that this 
practice is more than likely related to fiduciary and other concerns of 
donors, rather than to the objectives of poverty reduction and growth 
(Tang 2010: xiv). In addition, a base allocation is given to all recipients to 
be able to maintain an effective country programme and address fixed 
costs of country engagements (IDA n.d.: 2).  
 
The formula used for the Country Performance Rating is derived as fol-
lows:  
 
Country Performance Rating = (0.24 * CPIA A–C) + (0.68 * CPIA 
D) + (0.08 * portfolio performance) 
 
where CPIA A–C comprises the average of the ratings of CPIA Clusters 
A, B and C, and CPIA D comprises the rating of CPIA Cluster D (Tang 
2010: 11)3.  
 
The IDA country allocation takes into consideration country needs as 
reflected by country population and Gross National Income (as a meas-
ure of poverty). A 1% increase in population and/or a 1% decrease in 
Gross National Income both result in an approximate 1% increase in 
allocation (all else remaining constant) (IDA 2014: 4). ‘Population affects 
allocations positively (with an exponent of 1) while the level of Gross 
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National Income per capita is negatively related to allocations (with an 
exponent of -0.125’ (IDA n.d.: 2).  
 
The formula used for the IDA country allocation is derived as follows:  
 
IDA country allocation = (Country Performance Rating (with expo-
nent of 4), Population (with exponent of 1), GNI per capita (with ex-
ponent of -0.125).  
 
All countries also receive a base allocation (ibid). 
Figure 3.1 
The Performance-based Allocation System 
 
Source: (IDA 2010: 3). 
 
 
IDA allocation mechanisms 
The performance-based allocation (PBA) system signals three important 
matters. Firstly, it stresses that country performance is the main determi-
Figure 1. A Schematic Illustration of 
 Source: IDA Resource Mobilization Department
• The CPIA measures the extent to which a country’s policy and institutional framework 
supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and consequently the effective use of 
development assistance. It consists of 16 criteria grouped in four equally weighted 
clusters (see Annex 3).5 In calculating the 
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6
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nant of IDA allocations. Governance is assigned higher importance 
within the country performance assessment because it signifies develop-
ment performance and mitigates fiduciary risks for aid funds. Secondly, it 
stresses that needs matter too, as population and per capita Gross Na-
tional Income are included in the allocation formula. “Needs” is approx-
imated by per capita income and by using the so-called “ring-fenced ex-
ceptions” directing funds to the poorest countries among them. Ring-
fenced exceptions provide a tool for specifically targeting special coun-
tries such as post-conflict countries, or for increasing funds to regional 
projects, thereby allowing allocations to increase for countries that are in 
real need of resources (IDA 2007: 4). 
 
It is to be noted that the overall size of IDA allocations are deter-
mined on an annual basis and reflect the following variables: changes in 
country performance (informed by the CPIA score); performance rela-
tive to other countries; changes in eligibility for IDA resources (i.e. rela-
tive poverty defined as Gross National Income per capita, which was 
below $1,215 for the fiscal year 2016, and lack of creditworthiness to 
borrow on market terms); and grants and availability of resources (as 
these are determined annually based on World Bank membership contri-
butions). The allocation of IDA grants informs the financing scenario of 
the Country Partnership Strategy and Interim Strategy Notes (IDA n.d.: 
2, IDA 2016b). The specific allocation is provided for the upcoming fis-
cal year, and indicative allocations4 are provided for the “outer years” 
(years following the first fiscal year) to support planning at the country 
level. In order to facilitate the effective utilisation of IDA resources, the 
mechanism provides for the option of flexibilities within the replenish-
ment period (IDA 2007: 7).  
 
 Various operational realities highlight the need for flexible arrange-
ments, such as the front loading of funds (annual commitment may ex-
ceed PBA allocation) or back loading of funds (annual commitment may 
fall short of PBA allocation) (IDA 2007: 7). The front and back loading 
of funds does not exceed the range of the indicative three-year PBA en-
velope for the replenishment period (IDA 2010: 37). Clear guidelines are 
established for the practice of front and back loading. For instance, front 
loading is allowed within the first two years of the replenishment period 
of up to 30% of planned commitments, thereby facilitating accelerated 
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disbursements. This rule has been relaxed for smaller countries, where 
front loading is allowed for up to 80%. Resources can also be back load-
ed in the first two years of the replenishment period (IDA 2010: 37). 
Another principle concerns the reallocation of uncommitted resources in 
a country to the IDA pool, which redistributes these to other countries 
using the PBA system. This also possesses a regional dimension, as 
dormant funds in regions can be reallocated for up to 10% of the re-
gional PBA allocation to ‘better-performing countries with higher ab-
sorptive capacity’ (IDA 2010: 37). 
 
3.2.3 Promoting governance standards through the CPIA 
The assessment of aid recipient countries underscores the view that good 
policies and institutions lead to favourable growth and poverty reduction 
outcomes. Based on this, the CPIA functions as signal for the relative 
size of concessional lending and grants to low-income countries by the 
IDA. Moreover, the outcomes of the CPIA assessment also inform vari-
ous strategies and processes such as the Country Partnership Strategy 
and the Country Policy Dialogue. In addition, it supports Bank staff in 
assessing the degree of portfolio risk and helps identify countries that 
require further attention related to fiduciary standards and governance. 
Finally, it also provides a background for the preparation of Country As-
sistance Evaluations by the Independent Evaluation Group, and offers 
further input into research on prerequisites for growth and poverty re-
duction, and for WB Global Monitoring Reports (World Bank n.d: 1-2, 
6-7).  
 
Although the main objective of the CPIA relates to the effective use 
of development resources, its process generates performance-based 
competition, creating domestic incentives for reform (Riegner 2012: 13). 
This is particularly achieved through the PBA system, which relies on the 
outcomes of the CPIA as a major input. In this regard, there could be a 
strong incentive for governments to adopt CPIA policy standards with 
the understanding that this could lead to access to increased IDA re-
sources. The CPIA creates incentives through the implicit push for pre-
scriptive policies and environments deemed appropriate for develop-
ment (Steets 2008: 5). By releasing the CPIA scores in 2005, the Bank 
has further improved this incentive structure, as countries can better 
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grasp the link between CPIA scores and IDA allocations. By creating 
greater transparency and clarity, the incentive structures of the CPIA are 
better communicated to eligible countries (Watson 20008: 6-7 as cited in 
Sending and Lie 2015: 998). This gives the World Bank more leverage, 
and it is likely that aid-dependent countries in particular would ‘attempt 
to improve their scores in order to receive a higher share of the IDA al-
location’ (Dijkstra 2015: 11).	  	  
 
Through the CPIA scores, countries may also be compared to one 
another, generating competition between countries. To be sure, CPIA 
scores are determined annually following standards set through regional 
benchmark countries (in contrast to global fixed standards and ratings), 
which makes good or bad performance dependent on regional perfor-
mance (Steets 2008: 41). However, it is important to note one critical 
caveat, which relates to the fact that, theoretically, country Bank staff 
based in recipient countries could also have an incentive for supporting 
further developments in Cluster D and the scores at large, since it is di-
rectly linked to PBA and, thereby, their project budgets (Steets 2008: 41). 
The ratings provided by the staff (country, regional and those at the head 
office) ultimately inform final CPIA scores and as such provide a major 
input to IDA allocation processes and consequent allocations. These in 
turn also affect the size of Bank projects in the respective countries 
(Tang 2010: 50).  
 
3.2.4 CPIA governance standards and developmentality 
The content of the CPIA reflects the evolution of World Bank thinking 
regarding governance. The CPIA focuses on the quality of a country’s 
policy and institutional framework (World Bank 2009: 1) – an under-
standing that is central to the areas that the Bank considers critical in the 
pursuit of good governance. For instance, the assessment examines ‘the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1991: i). It 
equates good governance to sound development (World Bank 1992: 1), 
as reflected in the definition of CPIA’s measure of “quality” of the policy 
and institutional framework of assessed countries, and focuses on foster-
ing ‘poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of de-
 The content and design of the CPIA and APRM 61 
velopment assistance’ (World Bank 2009: 1). The CPIA also links to the 
Bank’s current overarching e Global Governance Practice that supports 
building ‘capable, efficient, open, inclusive, and accountable institutions’ 
management’ (World Bank 2017). The CPIA content reflects the Bank’s 
perspective that good governance is a prerequisite for development and 
for aid effectiveness, respectively. Based on these two understandings, it 
becomes clear why the Bank considers good governance both as an out-
come of development interventions and as a condition for receiving de-
velopment finance. In more analytical terms, these understandings of 
good governance represent “rationalisations” and “problematisations”, 
and the CPIA may be regarded as a “technology” (Merlingen 2011: 152-
153, Lemke 2011: 50).  
 
The intersection between knowledge and power is most evidently re-
flected in the manner in which the CPIA operationalises good govern-
ance. The Public Sector Management and Institutions cluster focuses on 
five core issues: (1) Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; (2) 
Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; (3) Efficiency of Reve-
nue Mobilisation; (4) Quality of Public Administration; and (5) Transpar-
ency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector (World Bank 
2015: 83). The operationalisation of a broad issue such as public sector 
management and institutions supporting these five areas reflects a par-
ticular understanding or frame that the Bank advocates to its aid recipi-
ents. This is further supported by the manner in which the Bank assesses 
these five areas – through the guideposts reflecting mostly the Bank’s 
own knowledge, as well as predominantly Western institutions that ad-
here to these similar understandings (including the International Mone-
tary Fund, the United Nations Development Program, United States 
Agency for International Development), the World Development Indica-
tors and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment. This approach reveals the way in which the Bank accumulates 
“knowledge” on governance – not only by defining what good govern-
ance means and its importance for development outcomes (and as an 
input in determining development finance), but also by limiting that 
analysis to the Bank’s approved Western sources of governance 
measures. This approach represents a clear frame of thinking on govern-
ance and is used as a technique to normalise the good governance narra-
tive (Abrahamsen 2004: 1459).  
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Based on this, it is possible to assert that the World Bank propagates 
a particular framework of thinking on governance. This framework of 
thinking on governance is reflected in and reinforced through the con-
tent of the CPIA (through its operationalisation in the five assessment 
items), and by limiting this assessment to sources that reflect similar 
thought. This creates a cycle in which the knowledge that the Bank pos-
sesses becomes reinforced and thus further supports the normalisation 
of good governance, the Bank’s definition and operationsalisation of the 
concept, and the importance of governance for effective development 
management.  
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the content of 
CPIA, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1a on the CPIA as 
follows: 
1a: CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance. 
These frames reflect the norm that (good) governance is central to 
sustainable development and to aid effectiveness. CPIA content rep-
resents a technology to advance the Bank’s framework of thinking on 
governance.   
 
 The CPIA design comprises a global, regular and extensive process 
through which aid recipients are assessed regarding their policies and 
institutional frameworks. The assessors are Bank staff at the country, 
regional and head office levels that rate countries based on detailed 
guidelines provided by the Bank. The Bank uses the final rating as an 
input to determine development finance allocations provided by the 
IDA. This development finance is performance-based, and good per-
formance is related to high CPIA scores. But the Bank communicates 
something even more specific: the PBA allocation formula weighs Clus-
ter D (Public Sector Management and Institutions) eight-and-a-half times 
more than the other three clusters in the final determination of IDA aid 
allocation. This reinforces the understanding that what matters most to 
the Bank is performance in the area of governance. According to Lie, 
new forms of governing and being governed are entrenched within offi-
cial development discourses, with these discourses thereby acting as a 
form of governmentality (Lie 2015b: 724). This new governing reflects a 
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form of indirect rule of the Bank, which can be seen in the manner in 
which the Bank not only assesses its aid recipients, but thereafter also 
links good or bad country performance to IDA development finance. 
This reflects a productive power of the Bank that works through the 
generation of knowledge on aid recipient performance (behaviour) and 
discursive practices that aim to constrain the behaviour of aid recipients 
(Abrahamsen 2004: 1458–1459). 
 
These discursive practices are generated as a result of the Bank’s deci-
sion to release the CPIA scores. Whereas prior to 2005 this entire pro-
cess took place behind closed doors, it is now communicated clearly to 
aid recipients that governance matters, that policies and institutions are 
critical, and that this matters to the Bank in its determination of IDA 
development finance. This process aims to make aid recipients feel re-
sponsible for their conduct (performance) and to adopt CPIA prescrip-
tions, which are reflected in the assessment indicators. Indeed, aid recipi-
ents are made responsible for their own CPIA score. This process of 
responsibilisation effectively means that the freedom of aid recipients is 
restricted to the discursive frames of the Bank (Lie 2015a: 30-34). This is 
enforced due to the fact that non-adherence of aid recipients to CPIA 
standards (reflected in low scores) would also result in lower levels of 
IDA development finance. These practices support the normalisation of 
good governance. 
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the design of 
CPIA, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1b on the CPIA as 
follows: 
1b: The CPIA is designed as a form of indirect rule of the World 
Bank over aid recipients. The assessment assumes the form of pro-
ductive power as the Bank generates knowledge on the performance 
of the aid recipient (through the CPIA rating) and uses the perfor-
mance-based allocation system as a discursive practice to incentivise 
“proper” conduct. This approach aims to hold aid recipients respon-
sible for achieving appropriate conduct (in the eyes of the Bank) and 
to improve performance within the frames set forth by the CPIA as-
sessment.   
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3.3 The content and design of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism 
3.3.1 The content of the APRM 
Context 
The historical roots of the APRM can be traced to developments in the 
1970s and 1980s, but also to developments in the preceding period. In 
the 1970s and 1980s the last African countries officially removed their 
colonial shackles by gaining independence from their colonisers. It was 
also a period in which African countries engaged with the World Bank 
and implemented its Structural Adjustment and Stabilisation Policies as 
part of a larger package of economic and political conditionalities. Politi-
cally and economically, it was a very turbulent period: Cold War politics, 
political instabilities, coups d’état, one-party regimes and economic fail-
ures related to increasing foreign debts and declining social development 
all impacted the continent’s stability (NEPAD 2016).  
 
The issues of authoritarian and unaccountable governing, rising pov-
erty levels and the exclusion of citizens in governance became more pro-
nounced during the implementation of structural adjustment pro-
grammes, exacerbated by the adverse effects of globalisation. It was this 
discontent that inspired the second independence or liberation move-
ment, spurring popular uprisings and protests across Africa. Citizens 
demanded democratic transitions, the prioritisation of development and 
participation in decision-making, and the state struggled to assert itself as 
an agent of development, human rights, governance and accountability 
(as cited in Osaghae et al. 2013: 397). The global economic crisis also 
undermined the development ideology that underpinned and legitimised 
one-party states. While living standards of citizens continued to fall, cor-
ruption, mismanagement and human rights abuses characterised the op-
eration of the state. This spurred thinking and action towards Africa’s 
democratic revival (Abrahamsen 1997: 134). 
 
The drive for democracy was first articulated in the 1970s when Afri-
can countries called for a ‘New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
through which they could craft self-reliant, culturally relevant and state-
influenced development strategies’ (NEPAD 2016). Similarly, the Organ-
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isation of African Unity shifted its focus from political liberalisation to 
economic development, and a host of pan-African development ap-
proaches were adopted, including the Lagos Plan of Action (1980); the 
Final Act of Lagos (1980); Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic 
Recovery (1986-1990); the African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programme (1989); the African (Arusha) Charter for Popu-
lar Participation and Development (1990); the Abuja Treaty (1991); and 
the Cairo Agenda (1994) (NEPAD 2016). 
 
 However, it was not until the turn of the 21st Century that African 
leaders took these initiatives to the next level. Three parallel initiatives 
were introduced with the aim of increasing the pace and impact of Afri-
ca’s development. The first initiative was the Millennium Africa Recov-
ery Plan, led by South African president Thabo Mbeki, which he pre-
sented at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 
2001. In that same month, then-President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade 
developed the Omega Plan, which was presented at the summit of Fran-
cophone African leaders in Cameroon. Later that year and through an-
other process, the summit merged the two initiatives to form a single, 
coordinated and inclusive plan called the New African Initiative, with 
South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal as its founding mem-
bers. The latter initiative was reframed as the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and was adopted in 2001 by African heads of 
state and the Government of the Organisation of African Unity. It was 
ratified by the African Union in 2002 and became the guiding vision and 
policy framework for pan-African socio-economic development in the 
21st Century. The main objectives of NEPAD are to ‘reduce poverty, put 
Africa on a sustainable development path, halt the marginalisation of 
Africa, and empower women’ (NEPAD 2016). NEPAD affirms and 
builds on this new development paradigm and extends the participatory 
framework to enhance country leadership, ownership, and mutual ac-
countability between donors and recipients. It envisages African solu-
tions as key for adding African perspectives to the governance and de-
velopment discourse, and seeks ownership and the implementation of 
appropriate policies (Mohidden 2011: 3). 
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development signalled a historic 
moment across the continent as Africans took their development per-
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spectives and futures into their own hands. NEPAD envisages the long-
term objective of an African-owned and African-led development pro-
gramme. It reflects a consensus and a determination to change the future 
of the continent and to improve the relationship of Africa with the rest 
of the world. NEPAD is a clear expression of the view that the only way 
forward is to have projects and programmes initiated, implemented and 
owned by Africans (Busia 2010: 37). Indeed, the vision is grounded in 
the understanding that socio-economic development of the continent is 
1) rooted in changing the way Africans see themselves, 2) changing the 
global partnership, and 3) promoting a comprehensive development 
framework, while cognisant of individual country particularities 
(NEPAD 2001). This understanding follows experiences and insights of 
African leaders in the context of Africa’s socio-economic development 
and democratisation processes and represents the most recent vision 
crafted by Africans in the course of struggles for freedom and independ-
ence (Mohidden 2011: 3).  
 
Assessment content 
The NEPAD declaration identifies stability, peace and security alongside 
‘democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protec-
tion of the environment and sound economic management’ as founda-
tions for sustainable development (NEPAD 2002: 4). Good governance 
is defined as ‘creating well-functioning and accountable institutions – 
political, judicial and administrative – which citizens regard as legitimate, 
in which they participate in decisions that affect their daily lives and by 
which they are empowered’ (NEPAD 2012: 17).  It comprises a compre-
hensive development agenda focusing on political and social objectives. 
In this regard, member states agree to work together to pursue democra-
cy and good political governance; economic and corporate governance; 
socio-economic development; and to establish the African Peer Review 
Mechanism. This mechanism was developed to promote adherence to 
and fulfilment of the agreements set forth in the NEPAD Declaration 
(NEPAD 2002: 3, 10).  
 
The APRM is an African voluntary self-monitoring mechanism man-
dated to ‘ensure that the policies and practices of participating states 
conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance 
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values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, 
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’ (NEPAD 2003a: 3). 
The APRM assesses progress in four thematic areas, namely democracy 
and political governance, economic governance and management, corpo-
rate governance, and socio-economic development (NEPAD 2003d: 4). 
As this thesis is particularly interested in understanding the manner in 
which governance assessments promote governance, the analysis is fo-
cused on the first theme, “Democracy and Political Governance”. This 
assessment of the APRM aims to assess progress towards the following 
objective: ‘[The consolidation of] a constitutional political order in which 
democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of 
powers and effective, responsive public services are realised to ensure 
sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society’ (NEPAD 
2003d: 6).  
 
The reviews measure progress towards this objective by formulating 
nine sub-objectives that are identified as follows:   
a. Prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts; 
b. Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competi-
tion and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, a Bill of Rights 
and the supremacy of the constitution are firmly established in 
the constitution; 
c. Promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political rights as enshrined in all African and international hu-
man rights instruments; 
d. Uphold the separation of powers including the protection of the 
independence of the judiciary and of an effective Parliament; 
e. Ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders 
and civil servants; 
f. Fighting corruption in the political sphere; 
g. Promotion and protection of the rights of women; 
h. Promotion and protection of the rights of the child and young 
persons; and 
i. Promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, in-
cluding displaced persons and refugees (NEPAD 2003d: 6). 
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For each of these nine objectives, the review process assesses the ac-
cession and implementation of standards according to indicative criteria 
and guided by examples of these indicators (NEPAD 2003d: 6). An ex-
ample of this is included below for objective B, which focuses on the 
constitutional democracy.  
 
Standards informing objective B:  
1. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000);  
2. The Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation 
(CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration (2000);  
3. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1990);  
4. The Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1999); and  
5. The NEPAD Framework Document (2001) (NEPAD 2003d: 8). 
 
Indicative criteria of objective B:  1. Are the provisions of the constitution for democracy, human rights, 
the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution clear and firm, 
with adequate provisions for enforcement?	  2. Are the constitutionally mandated institutions for democracy, human 
rights, the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution properly 
constituted and resourced for their effective functioning?	  3. What is being done to create an enabling environment for meaning-
ful popular participation in all forms and levels of governance?	  4. What is the resulting state of democracy and political governance in 
the country?	  5. How easy or difficult is it to change the constitution of the country? 
(NEPAD 2003d: 8).	  
 
Measurement indicators of objective B:  1. Adequacy of express provisions in the constitution; 	  2. Effectiveness of democracy and law enforcement institutions;	  3. Independence and effectiveness of Electoral Commission to ensure 
fair and free elections; 	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4. Adequacy of legal framework for free association and formation of 
non-governmental organisations and unions; 	  5. Effectiveness of independent media in informing the public and 
providing freedom of expression; 	  6. Public perceptions of and the degree of satisfaction with democracy 
and political governance; and	  7. Congruence of the national constitution with the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union (NEPAD 2003d: 8-9).	  
 
3.3.2 The design of the APRM 
APRM structures 
The APRM comprises intimately connected continental and national 
structures and operational processes. At the continental level, the highest 
decision-making power resides with the APR Heads of State Forum – a 
committee consisting of participating heads of state and governments. 
The forum has the key responsibility of overseeing the process and 
structure of the APRM. It adopts the Country Review Reports, com-
municates its outcomes to the respective heads of states, and through 
peer dialogue and persuasion aims to affect change in country practices. 
It is also the forum that persuades development partners to support the 
programme of action through technical and financial assistance. The 
APR Panel is further tasked with overseeing the process and reviews 
country reports, additionally furnishing the APR Forum with recom-
mendations. The APR Secretariat is tasked with providing support ser-
vices to the Forum. Finally, the APR Country Team visits participating 
countries, prepares the Country Review Reports, and assesses progress 
made as part of the programme of action (NEPAD 2003b: 1–7).  
 
In a further attempt to rationalise the operating procedures, the APR 
Committee of Focal Points was defined as an intermediary structure be-
tween the Forum and the Secretariat. It comprises the personal repre-
sentatives of the forum members and engages them on the budget pro-
cess, resource mobilisation, the APRM trust fund, audits, and the 
interaction between Secretariat, the Focal Points Committee and part-
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ners. The committee also oversees the APR Secretariat (APR Forum 
2012: 3). Moreover, a recent decision at the African Union Summit 
changed the operational context of the APRM when it was agreed for 
the APRM to become an autonomous entity within the African Union 
system (African Union 2014: 2). 
 
During the APRM review process, the following structures are estab-
lished at the national level: a national APRM Focal Point (reporting di-
rectly to the head of state on the APRM processes); a national commis-
sion or governing council (overseeing the country processes and 
reports); a national APRM Secretariat (supporting the council by provid-
ing technical and administrative support and operating ideally inde-
pendently and with their own budget); and technical institutions tasked 
with administering the APRM questionnaire and background studies 
(APRM 2016).  
 
The APRM process 
While the aforementioned section clarifies the various structures of the 
APRM, these are closely linked to the various stages of the APRM im-
plementation process. Specifically, the process entails periodic reviews of 
policies and practices in four areas: (1) democracy and political govern-
ance; (2) economic governance and management; (3) corporate govern-
ance; and (4) socio-economic development. (Although this study particu-
larly focuses on the application of the assessment to the first area, 
namely “Democracy and Political Governance”). Furthermore, four dif-
ferent types of reviews are undertaken – the base review, carried out 
within eighteen months of acceding to the mechanism, and periodic re-
views5, undertaken every two or four years. Besides this, member states 
can request for a separate review process (outside of the mandated one), 
and the APR Forum can suggest a review when a member state faces an 
impending political or economic crisis (NEPAD 2003a: 4–5). As noted 
before, these reviews all aid in ascertaining that progress is made in 
working towards achieving political, economic and corporate governance 
values, codes and standards as outlined in the NEPAD Declaration.  
 
The review process comprises four stages, namely country self-
assessments; review missions; preparation of the Country Review Re-
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ports; and peer reviews drawn up by participating heads of state and 
governments. A formal presentation of the report is made at key regional 
and sub-regional structures. The review process is undertaken under the 
leadership of the APRM Panel and with support of the APRM Secretari-
at. In order to kick-start the review process, a Country Support Mission 
providing support to countries in preparation of the review process is 
planned (NEPAD 2003c: 3–9).  
 
The process commences when member states of the African Union 
join the mechanism by adopting the Declaration (NEPAD 2003a: 3). 
Through this, member states commit to periodic reviews of country pol-
icies and practices to assess progress against or compliance with the val-
ues, codes and standards set forth in the declaration. The thereupon fol-
lowing Country Support Mission ensures a common understanding of 
the vision of the process and provides support to the national processes 
where indicated by the government. Issues that could be addressed in 
this mission relate to the provision of an improved understanding of the 
review processes and how these relate to national processes of develop-
ment management. Other issues include the provision of knowledge re-
lated to the self-assessment process and fitting this to the national con-
text; the provision of technical support in preparing the content, context 
and aspects to consider for the implementation of the draft National 
Plan of Action (NPoA); and, finally, peer learning through exchanges of 
best practices. During country visits, various briefing sessions and work-
shops are organised with national stakeholders. The mission also negoti-
ates the terms of reference of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU). When the MoU is signed between the APR Forum and the re-
spective country, the first stage of the APRM process commences 
(NEPAD 2003c: 4-5, 10). 
 
The process continues at the level of the APRM Secretariat and at the 
country level. The secretariat requests the completion of a questionnaire 
forming the basis upon which the country develops and undertakes the 
self-assessment. After the country completes the questionnaire, it drafts 
the preliminary NPoA and submits this to the secretariat. At the same 
time the secretariat prepares a background study of the country in terms 
of the APRM objectives. The background study also identifies key issues 
and challenges in relation to the forthcoming review (the Issues Paper) 
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and informs the country review process to be undertaken in the follow-
ing step. In the process of developing the Issues Paper, the technical 
partners of the APRM may provide assistance. If there were further is-
sues to be cleared up before the Country Review Mission, then the secre-
tariat would also prepare a technical assessment, in agreement with the 
country under review and with partner institutions conducting the analy-
sis (NEPAD 2003c: 5-6). 
 
During the second stage, the APRM country review team6 visits the 
country and consults relevant stakeholders (government officials, politi-
cal parties, parliamentarians and civil society actors including media rep-
resentatives, academics, trade unions and business/professional bodies). 
The consultations aim to engage stakeholders on their governance per-
spectives and to clarify issues raised in the Issues Paper and left un-
addressed in the NPoA (NEPAD 2003c: 8). 
 
During the third stage, the country review team prepares the draft re-
port, which considers the findings from the background study, the Issues 
Paper, as well as key insights from the interactions with stakeholders on 
the ground (both formal and informal). The Country Review Report also 
considers the commitments made in the draft NPoA and identifies 
weaknesses as well as suggested improvements to the programme of ac-
tion based on the findings of the review process. The final draft is pre-
sented to the government and allows for a review of accuracy, an oppor-
tunity to react to the findings, and for consideration of the suggested 
amendments made to the NPoA. The official government response is 
appended to the Country Review Report, and the NPoA thereafter is 
finalised (NEPAD 2003c: 8). 
 
During the fourth and last stage, the country report and final NPoA 
are sent to the Secretariat and the APR Panel, which reviews the Country 
Review Report and submits final recommendations to the APR Forum. 
Following this, the APR Forum meets and considers the Country Review 
Report and presents the final recommendations of the panel. The APR 
Forum communicates its final decisions to the heads of state and gov-
ernments of countries under review. These include considerations and 
action deemed necessary in accordance with their mandate. During these 
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processes, the APR Heads of State Forum exercises constructive peer 
dialogues and attempts at persuasion (by offering assistance or applying 
appropriate measures) to affect changes in country practice, where rec-
ommended. It is critical for the government to have the necessary politi-
cal will and commitment to rectify identified shortcomings and, where 
needed, to request the support of the international community in imple-
menting the NPoA (NEPAD 2003c: 9, NEPAD 2003b: 3). Thereafter, 
the APRM report is made public and is formally tabled at the key region-
al structures (NEPAD 2003c: 9). 
 
It is envisaged for the review process (stages one to four) to take no 
longer than six to nine months. Furthermore, the in-country costs for 
the review are borne by the respective countries under review. If neces-
sary, the NEPAD Secretariat sets up a mechanism to mobilise resources 
for participating countries from its external partners (NEPAD 2003c: 9-
10). Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the main APRM processes. 
Figure 3.2  
The APRM process 
 
Source: (NEPAD 2003c: 7).  
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The review process is a cycle in the sense that the final report does 
not mark the end of the road. The country is expected to make final 
amendments to the programme of action and to commence with its im-
plementation. NPoA implementation is to be reviewed regularly and the 
reports submitted to the forum. The secretariat supports this by organis-
ing regional workshops on common challenges, best practices and les-
sons learned. Through the provision of technical assistance and capacity 
building, the government is supposed to ensure the effective implemen-
tation of the programme of action (NEPAD 2003b: 15-16, NEPAD 
2003d: 15-16). Moreover, through sustained efforts from the govern-
ment, it is expected that new benchmarks and achievements are reached 
in promoting socio-economic development (NEPAD 2003e: 30-31). 
 
All these processes are harnessed by the commitment of the partici-
pating country and its effectiveness in managing the review process, 
which is anchored in strong national ownership and leadership. Owner-
ship of the process is facilitated by ensuring harmonisation of the NPoA 
with national strategies such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 
the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, other development frame-
works such as the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable De-
velopment Goals, alongside on-going institutional reforms and other na-
tional reform strategies alike. This requires strong leadership of the 
government to address capacity constraints to support these harmonisa-
tion efforts and, where needed, to request international support for the 
implementation of the NPoA (NEPAD 2003c: 1-3). 
 
Open and participatory process 
The review process should be credible, free of political manipulation and 
informed by technical competence. This is harnessed by relying on a de-
tailed process description, but also through steering for an open and par-
ticipatory process. Through this, the APRM engages national stakehold-
ers and facilitates exchange of information and dialogue on burning 
issues related to democracy and political governance. This increases the 
transparency of the decision-making process and, ultimately, public trust 
in the pursuit of national development goals (NEPAD 2003c: 3). Figure 
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3.3 provides further information on how participatory processes assist in 
the different stages of the review process. 
 
Figure 3.3  
The APRM participatory framework 
 
Source: (NEPAD 2003c: 14).  
 
Developing a transparent and participatory process is the responsibil-
ity of each member country under review.  In this regard, one of the first 
steps each country will take is to establish a focal person (at the ministe-
rial level) who reports directly to the head of state, and alongside 
him/her a technical committee in support of this function. Furthermore, 
countries under review and in collaboration with key stakeholders will 
define a roadmap regarding participation in the APRM. This roadmap 
should be widely disseminated and includes information on the national 
coordinating structures, as well as on further information about the 
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APRM process and the role of the various stakeholders. Related to this, 
it is expected that countries under review develop (and publicise) feed-
back mechanisms between levels of government and civil society organi-
sations. It is also the responsibility of member states to ensure the partic-
ipation of stakeholders in the implementation of the NPoA, and to 
report progress on this implementation to the secretariat (NEPAD 
2003c: 11-12). This participatory process aims to enhance the state of 
governance and socio-economic development:  
 
… Such interactions can build trust, establish and clarify mechanisms for 
on-going engagement and empowerment of stakeholders. These processes 
will be most effective if they build on existing structures, rather than dupli-
cating or creating parallel processes such that learning becomes cumulative 
(NEPAD 2003c: 12). 
 
Besides this, national oversight institutions play an integral role in the 
APRM – in particular oversight institutions such as the Auditor-General, 
Public Accounts Committees of Parliament and Human Rights Commis-
sions with constitutional functions covering areas of governance and de-
velopment. These institutions assist in identifying key areas of reform 
and ensure competence, integrity of the review, and play a role in draw-
ing up and implementing the NPoA. Furthermore, the intra-
governmental processes may link national and local level processes. The-
se include members of parliament bringing in perspectives from their 
constituencies, regional and local government participation in work-
shops, and other processes related to the review. Through this, the aim is 
to obtain local-level inputs and formulate priorities in the context of the 
broader national reform agenda envisioned in the NPoA. Finally, com-
munities and non-state actors provide crucial information regarding the 
local context and build ownership and commitment in the implementa-
tion of the NPoA. In particular, these actors add local perspectives for 
action and local accountability, addressing governance at all its levels 
(NEPAD 2003c: 12-13). 
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3.3.3 Promoting governance standards through the APRM 
The overarching goal of participation in the APRM is for countries to 
accelerate their progress towards both the adoption and implementation 
of NEPAD priorities and programmes. These are reflected in ‘the mutu-
ally agreed objectives’ and supported through ‘compliance with best 
practice in respect of each of the areas of governance and development’. 
In order to accomplish this, the APRM review process relies on the sus-
tained efforts of all actors (government, civil society and private sector 
actors) to implement the Programme of Action, which includes time-
bound objectives and links directly to the national budget (NEPAD 
2003d: 2-3). In particular, the APRM review is expected to enhance 
country efforts in achieving the shared objectives and standards related 
to democracy and political governance. Following the review process, it 
is foreseen that countries not only further strengthen their Programmes 
of Action, but also continue to update this by reflecting on the progress 
(self-monitoring) and learning from lessons shared by peers. This would 
furthermore result in the establishment of new benchmarks and targets, 
which would then serve as the basis for subsequent reviews. At a conti-
nental level, it is hoped that these processes will also serve as a basis for 
consolidating values and standards on governance. ‘If this happens, the 
APRM will have served its intended purpose’ (NEPAD 2003d: 28-29). 
Moreover, through the review the mechanism aims to stimulate coun-
tries to ‘consider seriously the impact of domestic policies, not only on 
internal political stability and economic growth, but also on neighbouring 
countries. It will promote mutual accountability, as well as compliance 
with best practice’ (NEPAD 2003a: 5).  
 
3.3.4 APRM governance standards and developmentality 
Developments in the 1970s and 1980s shaped new thinking on democra-
cy and governance in the continent. A pan-African vision for socio-
economic development in the 21st century was developed that was in-
formed by the need to change the way Africans see themselves, to 
change the global partnership, and to promote a comprehensive devel-
opment framework that was responsive to individual country particulari-
ties (NEPAD 2001). The NEPAD was meant to be a break from a past 
wherein international financial institutions set the development course of 
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African countries, particularly in the 1980s. This narrow focus on eco-
nomic stabilisation and adjustment aiming to transform economic struc-
tures and institutions, along with the promotion of market economies 
under downsized governments (Leftwich 1993: 607), was replaced by 
themes such as stability, peace and security alongside ‘democracy, good 
governance, human rights, social development, protection of environ-
ment and sound economic management’ as foundations of sustainable 
development (NEPAD 2002: 4). This reflects a much more comprehen-
sive development framework that also pays particular attention to good 
governance. But its definition is far more political than the Bank’s focus 
on the state as “regulator”, as it centres on ‘creating well-functioning and 
accountable institutions – political, judicial and administrative – which 
citizens regard as legitimate, in which they participate in decisions that 
affect their daily lives and by which they are empowered’ (NEPAD 2012: 
17).  
 
The NEPAD focuses on four key areas that are critical ingredients for 
this new development framework: democracy and political governance; 
economic governance and management; corporate governance; and so-
cio-economic development (NEPAD 2002: 4). The APRM was devel-
oped to promote adherence to and the fulfilment of the objectives and 
standards set according to each of these themes (NEPAD 2002: 3, 10). 
In particular, democracy and political governance are operationalised as 
the consolidation of ‘a constitutional political order in which democracy, 
respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers and 
effective, responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable de-
velopment and a peaceful and stable society’ (NEPAD 2003d: 6). In or-
der to attain these, the APRM describes nine key areas for this theme 
and, most importantly, considers African standards as reference (along-
side some international standards). While the APRM thus (similar to the 
CPIA) considers good governance to be critical to sustainable develop-
ment, it operationalises this within the context of democracy and politi-
cal governance and as such reflects a much more political definition of 
governance. This operationalisation not only is more political, it is also 
domestically anchored in the reliance on mainly African governance 
standards, and reflects African discursive frames on good governance.  
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By way of summarising these reflections regarding the content of 
APRM, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1c on APRM as 
follows: 
1c: APRM content comprises African discursive frames on good gov-
ernance that consider a more political operationalisation of govern-
ance and incorporates African standards as reference.  
 
The APRM review process possesses many elements that counter the 
more traditional governance assessments conducted by donors, including 
a focus on the voluntary nature of the process (in contrast to an imposed 
process); country-led assessments involving citizens (in contrast to ex-
ternal assessments conducted without the participation of governments 
and other stakeholders); governance reports prepared by African emi-
nent personalities (in contrast to Western experts); reviews conducted by 
peers (accountability to peers, not donors); and the development of pro-
grammes of action (instead of reliance on simple scores providing lim-
ited information on how to improve governance). This means that the 
design of the APRM counters the more traditional audit-like checklist 
reviews conducted by external partners, and could be regarded as a form 
of resistance.  Indeed, it seems that the APRM is designed in such a way 
to act as a “counter-discourse”, using ‘similar weapons in order to pursue 
their own interests … with the same vocabulary and espousing the same 
goals’. These operate within ‘the same discursive space and within the 
same field of power of the dominant strategy’ (Escobar 1984: 390). As 
donors are exerting a form of “biopower” over the continent (i.e. push-
ing for reforms in governance), African leaders are responding by using 
this same practice and engagement as the basis for political counter-
responses (Gordon 1999: 4-5).  
 
 In other words, the APRM is designed as a form of resistance that 
uses similar language, frames, methods and discursive spaces as that of 
donors to present a counter-approach to governance. Indeed, develop-
mentality is not a machine of disciplinary power (Lie 2015a: 30-34), and 
there is power on the recipient end to counter and resist the dominant 
framework of thinking. This approach may also be considered to reflect 
a form of ‘pan-African (subaltern) geo-politics’ that aims to counter the 
negative governance imago of the continent by giving the supranational 
80 THE CONTENT AND DESIGN OF CPIA AND APRM 
 
African brand a “more positive reading” rather than countering in any 
other way (Browning and Oliveira 2016: 6-7). 
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the design of 
APRM, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1d on the APRM 
is hence expanded as follows: 
1d: The APRM is designed to serve as a form of counter-rule (re-
sistance) against external influences on the African development 
agenda. This design reflects a form of resistance, as it wields similar 
language, frames, methods and discursive spaces to that of donors to 
present a counter-approach and method for promoting governance. 
This also aims to counter the negative governance brand of the conti-
nent. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the content and design of the CPIA and APRM. 
It focused on answering the question: how are governance standards giv-
en shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM? The CPIA 
content reflects the understanding that good governance (focused on 
policies and institutional frameworks) is critical to the effectiveness of 
development aid. This more technical perspective on governance – 
which focuses more on the regulatory role of the state – is particularly 
reflected through the assessment content of Cluster D – Public Sector 
Management and Institutions. This cluster focuses on the following five 
themes: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; Quality of Budget-
ary and Financial Management; Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation; 
Quality of Public Administration; and Transparency, Accountability and 
Corruption in Public Sector. These themes are operationalised through 
measurement indicators and guideposts that give direction to sources f 
information to consider in the assessment.  
 
 The design of the CPIA reinforces the importance of good govern-
ance and especially the relevance of policies and institutional frameworks 
for effective development management. The CPIA is a global, annual 
and comprehensive Bank rating process that assesses the conduciveness 
of the framework for fostering poverty reduction, growth, and the effec-
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tive use of development aid. The Bank uses the outcomes of CPIA as-
sessments as inputs to the performance-based allocation system of the 
IDA. In this performance-based allocation formula, Cluster D is as-
signed eight-and-a-half times more weight than the other three clusters. 
This further reinforces the understanding that for the Bank, public sector 
management and institutions is a critical component of effective devel-
opment assistance and that aid recipients ought to pay attention to this 
when considering their engagements with the Bank. 
 
APRM content – similar to that of the CPIA – is shaped by the un-
derstanding that strengthening good governance is important for sus-
tainable development in Africa. However, it considers a much more 
comprehensive and political operationalisation of governance. This is 
particularly reflected in the assessment theme “Democracy and Political 
Governance” that focuses on building and strengthening the constitu-
tional political order in which democracy, the separation of powers, rule 
of law and an effective public service ensure sustainable development. 
The assessment content reviews progress towards the attainment of Af-
rican governance standards, which are mainly guided by various conti-
nentally adopted treaties and agreements. While this operationalisation of 
the assessment according to themes, indicators and standards is quite 
similar in design to the CPIA, the manner in which the assessment is un-
dertaken could not be more different. The APRM is a voluntary self-
assessment that is country-led; involves domestic stakeholders; includes 
esteemed African personalities that assess the various themes; and ulti-
mately relies on African peers and citizens to engage with the govern-
ment on the implementation of actionable governance objectives. Thus, 
the governance standards are given shape by relying on voluntary pro-
cesses involving domestic actors, but also peers who support, yet pres-
sure governments to implement governance objectives that are outlined 
in the government’s programme of action. In contrast to the carrot and 
stick approach of the CPIA, the APRM is designed to build and support 
the necessary political commitment needed to implement governance 
reforms. 
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Notes 
 
1 ‘The evaluation concluded that the content of the CPIA is largely relevant for 
growth and poverty reduction in the sense that its components map well with 
the determinants found in the literature; that the ratings are generally reliable 
and correlate well with similar indicators and there is no evidence of upward 
bias. The evaluation also found that there is room to streamline and revise 
some of the criteria and makes some specific suggestions such as broadening 
the trade criterion, revisit the financial sector criterion taking into account the 
lessons of the recent financial crisis; adding an assessment on disadvantaged 
socio economic groups, and strengthening the linkages among criteria’ (World 
Bank n.d.: 4). 
2 ‘The country write-ups should provide: (1) a justification of the proposed 
scores that directly address the dimensions of each of the CPIA criteria; and (2) 
the relevant background information to support their proposals; (3) clearly in-
dicate the basis for the upgrade/downgrade of a specific score. When a criteri-
on contains more than one dimension, the write-up should provide a separate 
rationale for each of them, together with the each dimension’s proposed score’ 
(World Bank 2011: 5). 
3 The country performance rating then undergoes two steps to arrive at a final 
allocation: ‘first, grant allocations are discounted by 20 percent. Of this discount, 
13 percentage points are reallocated to all IDA-only countries, excluding gap and 
post-conflict countries, and 7 percentage points are made available on hard terms 
to creditworthy blend countries. Second, for countries eligible for debt cancella-
tion under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the debt service due in the rele-
vant fiscal year is netted out from that year’s allocation. The amount deducted as 
foregone debt service from an eligible country’s gross annual PBA allocation is 
capped at 30 percent of such gross PBA allocation. This capped deduction will 
continue to apply during the IDA17 period. As before, the netted-out amounts 
are redistributed to all IDA-only countries, excluding gap countries’ (IDA n.d.: 2). 
4 ‘Allocations for the outer years are subject to a number of uncertainties includ-
ing the country’s performance, its relative performance compared to other coun-
tries, the size of the available IDA envelope, traffic lights, MDRI status, reactiva-
tion of countries, and other reasons’ (IDA 2007: 7). 
5 It is to be noted that Kenya is the only country to have completed a periodic 
review (as at February 2017). All other conducted reviews have been base re-
views.  
6 The composition of the country review team is designed at the onset of each 
review, and may include the following members: APR Panel members as team 
leaders, members of the Secretariat, members of the NEPAD Secretariat, ex-
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perts, observers from partner institutions, and observers from other participat-
ing countries (NEPAD 2003c: 15). 
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4 CPIA and APRM Processes in Ethiopia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the application of the CPIA and APRM assess-
ments. It focuses on answering the following research question: how 
have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethio-
pia? The main aim of the analysis is to describe the empirical application 
of the CPIA and APRM, and to analyse the processes through which 
CPIA and APRM assessments have been shaped, specifically in Ethiopia. 
The analysis aims to unpack the different stages of the assessment pro-
cess by drawing on the perspectives of the actors involved. The analysis 
is informed by observations of different stages of the respective assess-
ments, obtained through interviews and complemented by a document 
analysis of the Country Review Report, and independent external evalua-
tion report (in the case of the APRM). In the case of the CPIA, it pre-
sents evidence on the process through which the ratings have been es-
tablished and how these were used to inform decisions on allocation 
contributions. In the case of the APRM, it presents evidence on the pro-
cess through which the assessment report was prepared, with a particular 
focus on the four review stages. The processes through which the CPIA 
and APRM assessments have been conducted in Ethiopia are analysed 
by applying the analytical lens of developmentality (including relevant 
concepts taken from the governmentality framework), and is further 
supported by the theoretical propositions that guide the explanation of 
relevant dynamics. 
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4.2 The CPIA process in Ethiopia 
4.2.1 Overview 
This section synthesises observations obtained through interviews con-
ducted with World Bank staff in Addis Ababa and Washington, D.C. It 
captures the method and practice of application of the CPIA, as narrated 
by five individuals that were involved in the process at its various stages 
(four at the Ethiopia country office, and one officer at the World Bank 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. who was interviewed through Skype). 
As noted before, interviews were conducted with World Bank staff only, 
as the CPIA is an external and Bank-led country assessment. Indeed, the 
main objective of these interviews was to understand the application 
process from the perspective of the World Bank. As the CPIA process is 
an internal Bank mechanism, it also limits the number of people that can 
participate in this type of assessment (due to the internal nature of the 
process, but also as the assessment is less comprehensive than, for in-
stance, the APRM). Furthermore, it engages with a more sensitive topic 
– the relationship between the Bank and the Ethiopian government. 
Cumulatively, these issues limited discussions on the CPIA process. This 
was evident in the expression of disinterest by some respondents, and 
the dismissal of interview requests by others. This unwillingness to par-
ticipate could be indicative of the political environment in which the 
Bank operates. As noted by Lie (2015a), he was interested in examining 
CPIA processes in Ethiopia, but was advised against doing so by diplo-
mats at the Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa, who noted that the 
relations between the development actors were politically tense and that 
the rather closed government bureaucracy would impede efforts to gain 
access to recipients (Lie 2015a: 12). He also indicated that processes 
through which access is denied could say something about the empirical 
field and processes of exclusion (Lie 2015a: 12). Despite the possible low 
number of interviews conducted with the Bank in this study, these inter-
views already provided a number of interesting indications of tensions 
between intended CPIA outcomes and the reality on the ground. 
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4.2.2 Rating the Public Management Sector and Institutions 
Cluster 
Observations from interviews on the rating process 
The CPIA process in Ethiopia commenced with the setting of regional 
benchmarks. Benchmarks were established for each of the six regions in 
which the Bank operates. The Chief Economist Office of the Africa Re-
gion identified the benchmark countries for the continent. The officers 
explained that in 2014, the following countries served as a benchmark 
reference: Angola, Ivory Coast, Kenya, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia. 
For these countries, the full write-up and rating were completed, serving 
as the reference point for the assessment of Ethiopia. Although the pro-
cess of receiving the ratings of the benchmark countries was clear to the 
officers, the process through which these ratings were established was 
less clear. The officers generally understood the function of the bench-
mark process, but not the exact manner in which the benchmarks were 
set. It seems – and as per the formal design processes – that the role of 
the country office is more pronounced in the actual rating aspect of the 
process (Interviews with World Bank officers, 16 July 2015; 21 July (a 
and b) 2015). 
 
The officers proceeded to explain how the benchmark countries as-
sisted in preparing the rating for Ethiopia. The rating of the benchmark 
countries, along with the assessment criteria and guideposts (sources of 
data), served as reference points for the rating. The criteria were both 
objective and subjective, requiring the assessing officer to triangulate be-
tween different information sources in order to make an informed as-
sessment. The Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Depart-
ment of the office in Ethiopia coordinated this entire process. The 
different questions of the CPIA were divided amongst the experts, who 
used the information on indicators and other sources to prepare the 
2014 assessment score and write-up. The governance cluster team of the 
World Bank office in Addis Ababa was responsible for the assessment of 
Cluster D of the CPIA. For each question, different reference points 
were indicated, and questions were further informed by the write-ups of 
the benchmark countries. Based on the information links provided in the 
guideposts and criteria, as well as on information provided by partner 
institutions and grounded in the individual knowledge of governance 
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policies and developments in the country, the officers assessed the vari-
ous indicators and provided a written justification for each rating. For 
Question 13, related to the quality of budgetary and financial manage-
ment, particularly the 2013 Public Expenditure and Financial Accounting 
Performance Measurement Framework1 of Ethiopia provided a critical 
input to the score. After an internal check and last consolidation, the fi-
nal assessment was sent to the Chief Economist Office for Africa, which 
again assessed all the ratings and reverted to the country office with 
feedback. Thereafter, the final rating and updated justifications were sent 
to the Global Practices Group on Governance and Public Sector Man-
agement at the headquarters, where the rating and justification were 
again assessed, and the process was finalised after a final discussion with 
the country office (Interviews with World Bank officers, 16 July 2015; 21 
July (a and b) 2015; 4 August 2015). 
 
Some of the officers considered the process to have been quite 
straightforward and uncontroversial, while another, more critical per-
spective was touted:  
 
The current governance ratings for Ethiopia could be higher … The rating 
is more conservative, which may be due to the financial consequences of 
increased CPIA scores (Interview with World Bank officer, 21 July (a) 
2015). 
 
This assertion brought to light the possible political aspects related to 
the rating of the cluster. In addition, it became clear that the guideposts 
and assessment criteria are not the only anchor for the country staff in 
the ratings. As noted before, CPIA guidelines prescribe that country staff 
should focus the assessment on: (1) the level of performance against cer-
tain criteria and not the degree of improvement against the same criteria 
(i.e. comparing performance in relation to the previous year); (2) policy 
actions and implementation (including policy relevance and the manner 
in which policies and their institutions are implemented) in contrast to 
intentions or commitments; and (3) the size of the economy in relation 
to the manner in which policies are implemented when rating the coun-
try. Considering the assessment criteria in conjunction with all these con-
textual considerations seems like a rather difficult undertaking, especially 
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as government action does not take place within a vacuum. Therefore, 
the Bank officers were asked to comment on how they actually assign 
scores while required taking into consideration all these difficult con-
texts. Contrary to expectations, the officers did not note any tensions or 
difficulties in this process: 
 
The CPIA indicators focus on policies and institutions, rather than on 
outcomes. The governance team therefore emphasises governance poli-
cies/frameworks and institutional measures, with a particular focus on the 
level of implementation. The criteria do entail both subjective and objec-
tive aspects, but by focusing on the aforementioned areas it can be as-
sessed comprehensively (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). 
 
In addition, the team used information from domestic sources, such 
as evidence emanating from country surveys and other locally conducted 
research, to further support the accuracy of the assessment (Interview 
with World Bank officer, 21 July (a) 2015). All of the sources used to 
inform the rating were outlined in the written justification. However, an-
other officer articulated the possible problems and difficulties that arose 
in accurately discerning the difference between commitment and imple-
mentation: 
 
In the case of Ethiopia, commitments and implementation are 
closely linked and in more sensitive areas, the government imple-
ments marginal actions (Interview with World Bank officer, 17 
September 2015).  
 
The officers were also asked to comment on the possible incentives 
they may have to increase the country scores. To be sure, the higher the 
CPIA score, the higher the IDA allocation of resources, accompanied by 
an increase of World Bank projects in Addis Ababa. Therefore, Bank 
officers commented on how the Bank guarantees the objectivity of the 
rating. This initial assumption was again countered as the officers ex-
plained the roles of the various controlling offices and how the scoring 
was almost a side task of the country office, thus not actually influencing 
the project portfolio. For instance, one officer explained: 
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At each of the review stages, the team assesses the ratings and justification 
in light of the guideposts and assessment criteria set. It is extremely im-
portant to provide thorough justifications, and at times the governance 
team is requested by the Office of the Chief Economist in the Africa Re-
gion or the Global Practices Department on Governance and Public Sec-
tor Management to provide further explanations, justifications, or we are 
informed that a rating is not accepted and should be reviewed. It is dis-
couraged to adjust the rating of an item either upward or downward (in 
comparison to the previous year). What is really sought is a balanced rating 
(Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). 
 
CPIA scores have been relatively stable, and only in cases of severe and 
sudden governance deficits did scores change (Interview with World Bank 
officer, 4 August 2015). 
 
According to the officers, the internal and external reviews provide 
the necessary balance to maintain objective ratings of the country, de-
spite a possible inherent incentive to upgrade ratings. Furthermore, there 
are internal procedures in place to deal with disagreements that may arise 
on allocated ratings between country offices and the external reviewers, 
with the final step being arbitrage (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 
July 2015). In addition, it was noted that resources would in any case 
continue to flow to the country office and that the CPIA is simply an 
additional task to be completed, but not the main job of the team. 
Moreover, according to the officers there was not much room for inter-
pretation or subjectivity. The process was characterised as a mathemati-
cal exercise where the numbers speak for themselves (such as through an 
assessment of budget deficits). For other criteria assessments, the indica-
tors are clearly operationalised, leaving little space for discretionary 
judgment (Interviews with World Bank officers, 21 July (a) 2015; 4 Au-
gust 2015; 17 September 2015). 
 
 In keeping with some of the general critiques of the CPIA, the offic-
ers were finally asked whether they felt that Cluster D comprised a more 
narrow and neoliberal perspective on governance, or whether other as-
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pects related to democracy also should be included in the review. In this 
regard, the officers generally agreed that the seemingly technical govern-
ance criteria were interpreted at a more political level. For instance, one 
Bank officer asserted that 
 
Cluster D comprises a mix of both political and economic governance as-
pects. Even the aspects that might seem more related to economics, such 
as efficiency and revenue mobilisation, do actually also discuss political as-
pects such as equal revenue distribution among groups and regions. Gov-
ernance is about managing public affairs in a right way, and making sure 
that the relation between government and citizen is according to certain 
norms (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). 
 
 Not all agreed on this point, however, as another officer expressed 
that issues related to democracy, human rights and freedom of expres-
sion are not covered in the review (Interview with World Bank officer, 4 
August 2015). 
 
Analysis 
Based on the findings from the interviews, it can be asserted that the rat-
ing process followed the formal processes as set forth in the CPIA 
guidelines. This may be unsurprising, as it concerns an annual and rigidly 
controlled process through the utilisation of guideposts and preparation 
of detailed justifications for each criterion. The process is also firmly an-
chored in validating scores through checking for intra- and inter-regional 
consistency. The officers also provided more detail regarding the internal 
Bank processes through which the scores are assigned. It would be 
worth mentioning that this process relied mainly on two sections, namely 
the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division and the 
Public Sector Management Section, housed within the Ethiopia country 
office. The former managed the process through which the scores were 
prepared, while the latter actually assigned the governance scores (as 
would make sense, knowing that Cluster D mostly resides there). Here it 
is possible to note that some officers could observe the more political 
nature of scoring country performance against formal criteria and also 
asserted that the score for Ethiopia might be on the lower end. This 
highlights the importance of the guideposts (sources of information) that 
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are considered for Cluster D and each of the five items it measures. Here 
an important aspect of what constitutes good performance in Cluster D 
is evident; and also the manner in which the Bank uses knowledge as a 
form of power. Others viewed this process as a more technical and 
straightforward exercise of checking sources and assigning scores ac-
cording to the guideposts.  
 
However, the broader contextual factors that were considered in the 
rating process seem to complicate the rating exercise. This is particularly 
a problem where reforms were marginally implemented. However, to 
adequately understand implementation, the officers used country sources 
to verify information. This was further aided by the government making 
a particular effort to improve the technical aspects related to governance 
(i.e. public financial management). To regard more sensitive and political 
topics, the government implemented reforms only at a marginal level. 
Hence, this allowed the officers to adequately assess the level of perfor-
mance against key assessment criteria. 
 
The entire process was also geared towards maintaining reliable scor-
ing across the globe. The guideposts and the different counterchecks all 
alluded to this. However, it also somehow showed that there could be a 
certain path dependency in the ratings, which illustrates the importance 
of the first rating. Moving the rating upward or downward means prov-
ing that a certain situation changed within that year. This seemed to be 
more difficult to ascertain for the offices that crosscheck the country 
scores.  
 
The tension between understanding governance assessments as mere-
ly a technical exercise (rather than a political one) also came to the fore 
in the CPIA. Governance is ultimately a political exercise, and although 
issues related to democracy are not articulated in the CPIA, the criteria it 
assesses are clearly linked to the performance of the democratic state. An 
example of this regards the operationalisation of the fifth indicator cov-
ered under Cluster D, namely “Transparency, Accountability, and Cor-
ruption in the Public Sector”, which covers the following dimensions: 
‘(a) the accountability of the executive and other top officials to effective 
oversight institutions; (b) access of civil society to timely and reliable in-
92 CHAPTER 4 
 
formation on public affairs and public policies, including fiscal infor-
mation (on public expenditures, revenues, and large contract awards); (c) 
state capture by narrow vested interests; and (d) integrity in the manage-
ment of public resources, including aid and natural resource revenues’ 
(World Bank 2011: 47). 
 
Three broad observations can be made regarding the process of es-
tablishing the CPIA ratings in Ethiopia. Firstly, the process is detailed 
and strictly operationalised to such an extent that assessing progress in 
public management and institutions was seen more as a technical exer-
cise. However, interviewees made remarks regarding the final rating as-
signed for Ethiopia, which they deemed to be on the lower end due to 
other considerations of the Bank. In addition, a remark was made re-
garding the general difficulty of assessing progress and performance, in-
stead of political commitments. Indeed, it could be more complicated to 
qualify marginal implementation of CPIA criteria.  
 
4.2.3 From CPIA score to IDA allocation 
Observations from the interviews on the IDA allocation process 
The process description stipulates that the draft ratings should be pre-
sented to the government. In this conversation, the government is in-
formed of the rationale behind the assessment outcomes and simultane-
ously given an opportunity to present relevant information that could 
further inform the process. A meeting could also take place ahead of the 
rating process with the aim of acquiring further relevant information re-
lated to performance. The officers noted that in the case of Ethiopia the-
se conversations did not take place. This was not considered problemat-
ic, though, as the assessing team consisted of governance experts that 
constantly monitored the governance environment in the country. As 
such, there had been no real need to have a prior consultation with the 
government, as all information was already known. The government of 
Ethiopia, through the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, 
was informed of the final CPIA score through a letter, which also in-
cluded an invitation to the Ministry to further discuss the allocated score 
(Interviews with World Bank officers, 20 July 2015; 21 July (a and b) 
2015). 
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However, the government for the last five years did not accept this 
offer, possibly due to the government’s view of the relative importance 
of the CPIA. An officer shared first-hand knowledge on the Ministry’s 
perspectives regarding the CPIA process: 
 
The Ministry of Finance believes that the ratings assigned to Ethiopia are 
too low, and primarily based on information from outside sources (Inter-
view with World Bank officer, 21 July (a) 2015). 
 
 The officers also described the process through which CPIA scores 
were translated into IDA resource allocation and the relation to the 
country partnership strategy. In this regard, the officers explained that 
IDA allocations consider different parameters, including the CPIA score 
(exponent of 4), population size (exponent of 1), and per capita Gross 
National Income (exponent of -0.125). The IDA is replenished every 
three years, and annual country allocations made annually in June are 
based on the aforementioned parameters. Within the available IDA an-
nual budget and based on the parameters, country fund allocations are 
made and communicated by letter to the government of Ethiopia in July 
of each year2. The country partnership strategy that acts as a guide to 
plans and budgets includes only indicative IDA allocations. Official con-
tributions are determined on an annual basis following the CPIA assess-
ment (Interviews with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 17 September 
2015).  
 
Analysis 
It is quite interesting to note that there is almost no involvement of the 
government in the CPIA process. Interviewed officers asserted that there 
was no need for its involvement, but that it could also be an indicator of 
the non-participatory nature of this review, resulting primarily from its 
design, but also from the apparent disinterest of the government in en-
gaging with the rating process. Discontent with the rating process was 
articulated during an aid forum in which late Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi argued that the CPIA rating of Ethiopia was too low because ‘of 
some of the policy choices we have made, although they are not less ef-
fective’ (Bieckmann 2010). This lack of engagement between the Bank 
and the government on the CPIA rating process raises serious questions 
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about the ability of the CPIA to create a learning effect, and most im-
portantly signals the presence of incentives by linking performance to 
outcomes. It seems that the linking of performance and outcomes is 
most clearly made through the annual IDA allocations. This link was 
characterised as “soft”, as the officers noted that other factors also weigh 
in IDA allocations. These are also further outlined in the PBA design, 
which ensures that country allocations meet country-specific needs (i.e. 
considerations for poverty levels and size of the economy). It also raises 
the question that if scores have been relatively stable, how could the 
CPIA signal incentives to aid recipients? This issue was also raised in 
passing in the previous section, where observations were made that in-
creasing CPIA scores also created increased financial commitments of 
the Bank. This is the reverse side of the coin, where increased country 
performance also commits the Bank to increased financial commitment. 
This issue also relates to the decision of the Bank not to fully clarify 
which type of score could secure which level of IDA allocations, made 
out of fear that this could create demands from aid recipients. Hence, 
these are some early indicators of the translation of CPIA scores to IDA 
allocation processes and the manner in which aid recipients were en-
couraged to adopt the norms and principles underlying the governance 
criteria. 
 
4.2.4 The CPIA process and developmentality  
The CPIA process in Ethiopia followed all the steps as set forth in its 
design. Even on aspects of the process where disagreement could arise, 
for instance regarding the preparation of the draft rating, such issues 
were pre-empted through the design. The respondents elaborated on the 
different steps of the process and explained these as “routine”, under-
taken with almost mathematical precision. At times, however, the rating 
process was more complicated due to difficulties in discerning between 
commitments and implementation (reflected in the marginal implemen-
tation of particular standards). Nevertheless, the process comprises a 
standardised and global rating process aimed at achieving reliability and 
comparability across countries that is both “standardising” and “individi-
alising” (Zanotti 2005: 473). The assessment sets standards related to 
public sector management and institutions and individualises these 
standards by indicating country-level areas for improvement. 
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In this regard, it is possible to view the CPIA as an ‘indirect mecha-
nism of surveillance’ (Lie 2006: 16). The CPIA surveys Ethiopia through 
the monitoring of conduct and assesses deviance from standards (Mer-
lingen 2011: 152). The conduct of Ethiopia is assessed through the CPIA 
rating process, particularly adherence and deviation related to standards 
on public sector management and institutions (Foucault 1982: 789). The-
se standards are conceptualised as norms, and establishes for Ethiopia 
what is considered an appropriate and, as such, “normal” governance 
framework. The CPIA can therefore be considered as a ‘technique of 
normation’ that functions to render particular governance standards 
“normal” (Taylor 2009: 52). These norms are then considered natural 
and necessary, in contrast to having been produced by the World Bank. 
Not only does this process support the process of bringing Ethiopia in 
conformity with governance standards, it also creates and perpetuates a 
power relation between the Bank and Ethiopia upon which the norm is 
based – that of Ethiopia “needing” good governance, and the Bank as 
the organisation upholding this standard across the globe (Taylor 2009: 
52).  
 
 A process of responsibilisation further supports this process of norm 
setting as the government is informed (be it only through a formal letter) 
of the attained standards of conduct and the financial consequence of 
their performance. In particular, this knowledge produced about Ethio-
pia is used to classify it (Paternek 1987: 108), and informs the level of 
access to finance the IDA provides. Rather than creating obedience, this 
process aims to show Ethiopia how it can optimise its governance 
framework by making the necessary reforms (Dean 1999: 19-20 as cited 
in Lo ̈wenheim 2008: 258). Where Ethiopia is held responsible for (non-
)adherence to governance standards and is expected to become the 
‘principle of his own subjection’ (as cited in Mokuolu 2013: 54), the 
Bank assumes the role of facilitator and monitor (Lie 2006: 14-15).  
 
However, the observations from the Bank officers on their non-
interaction with the Ethiopian government indicates the limited influ-
ence of the Bank in shaping and guiding the government’s behaviour and 
its failure to be disciplined. The Bank officers attribute the lack of dis-
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cussions with the government on the draft ratings or final allocations to 
the government’s disqualification of the content of the review. Indeed, if 
this discussion would have been imagined as a site of resistance, the gov-
ernment is not even engaging it. This seems to be further limited by the 
Bank’s favouring of the status quo in relation to the country ratings; con-
sequently, upward and downward changes are actually quite difficult to 
make. This means that there is a certain path dependency in the assess-
ments, which goes against the principles of aid selectivity, as good or bad 
performance may not adequately be reflected in the rating due to the fi-
nancial consequences accompanying this decision. This evidently con-
flicts with the aid selectivity principle and limits the manner in which the 
Bank can discipline and push for norm adherence in relation to its gov-
ernance standards.  
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the CPIA process 
in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 2a as follows: 
2a: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance (auditing/monitoring) 
that assesses adherence to the good governance norm and generates 
knowledge on aid recipient conduct;  
2b: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance that standardises gov-
ernance norms across aid recipient countries, but at the same time 
individualises these to respective country contexts;  
2c: The CPIA monitors the conduct of aid recipients by assessing 
deviance from standards; 
2d: The CPIA rating process establishes norms in relation to public 
sector management and institutions;  
2e: CPIA knowledge on aid recipient conduct informs the IDA fi-
nance allocation; and 
2f: CPIA inter-state discipline between the Bank and Ethiopia is lim-
ited due to the absence of dialogue on the rating process, which indi-
cates a form of resistance on the side of the government. 
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4.3 The APRM process in Ethiopia 
4.3.1 Overview 
This section provides an overview of the APRM’s application in Ethio-
pia. It combines information on the process, obtained from the official 
APRM Country Review Report, with findings from the interviews con-
ducted with the APRM informants involved in this process, and with the 
independent external evaluation report. Interviews were conducted with 
members of the continental APR structures (5 respondents), with conti-
nental APRM experts (3), with representatives of the APR structures in 
Ethiopia – government representatives (1), governing council representa-
tives (1) and civil society representatives (1) – and with local APRM ex-
perts (2). By compiling the different data sources, it is possible to con-
trast the official narrative in the Country Review Report (prepared by the 
APR Panel) to the lived experiences of those involved at each of the four 
stages, namely (1) the country self-assessment; (2) the review mission; (3) 
the preparation of the Country Review Report; and (4) the peer review 
by participating heads of state and government, followed by the formal 
presentation of the report at key regional and sub-regional structures. 
The sections below elaborate on each of the four stages of the APRM 
process. 
 
4.3.2 Stage One: Country self-assessment 
Observations on the motivation to accede to the APRM 
Ethiopia was one of the pioneering countries in acceding to the APRM 
in March 2003. Following its accession, it commenced with operational-
ising and institutionalising the APRM processes (APR Panel of Eminent 
Persons 2011: 41). As part of the initial APRM processes, the govern-
ment initiated a sensitisation conference to inform stakeholders of the 
major processes within the APRM review. These stakeholders included 
government institutions, civil society representatives, private sector ac-
tors and numerous other individuals. Following this conference, the gov-
ernment convened the various national APRM structures, such as the 
Focal Point, the National Governing Council (NGC), and the APRM 
National Secretariat (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 8). 
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The Country Review Report does not indicate the motivation for 
Ethiopia to accede to the process; hence, this question was posed to the 
various APRM informants. Indeed, the motivation to accede can give an 
important indication of the level of political commitment to the process. 
Various informants noted that the accession was primarily guided by the 
leading role of Ethiopia in the development of NEPAD and APRM in-
struments. However, although Ethiopia acceded in 2003, the review pro-
cess did not get off the ground until mid-2007. Here the informants not-
ed that the chairpersonship of late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of the 
APR Forum could have spurred the country to commence with the re-
view process (Interviews with non-governmental member of National 
Governing Council, 29 July 2015; and with member of continental 
APRM Secretariat, 28 July 2015). An APRM government representative 
noted that 
 
Ethiopia’s participation in the APRM followed the interest of the late 
Prime Minister in the vision of NEPAD and supporting the African Re-
naissance (Interview with APRM government representative, 11 Septem-
ber 2015). 
 
Ethiopia’s accession to the APRM was also interpreted in more prac-
tical terms. More than likely it became more difficult for the Ethiopian 
government to actively participate in and comment on the reviews of 
other countries during the Forum meetings, never having had gone 
through the process itself. This could have contributed to the decision to 
finally commence the review process. An important aspect of this is the 
fact that the mechanism forms part of the African Union, which is head-
quartered in Addis Ababa. As one of the pioneering countries, it would 
have been critical for Ethiopia to go through the process, since all other 
APRM pioneer countries had successfully done so (Interviews with 
member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; 2 October 2015).  
 
The decision also could have been motivated by the need or wish to 
demonstrate a strong commitment to good governance. The review 
would provide the possibility for the government to address the negative 
image it had acquired in the areas of democracy and good governance. In 
this regard, the review would showcase the commitment of the govern-
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ment and uncover areas requiring further strengthening. An important 
aspect raised in this regard was how this decision related to the foreign 
politics of the government. One expert stated that Ethiopia’s foreign 
policy is very much grounded in playing key roles in international and 
regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Develop-
ment, the African Union, and by having a strong regional presence 
through its various peacekeeping missions (Interviews with continental 
APRM expert 21 July 2015; and with national APRM expert, 16 Septem-
ber 2015).  
 
The government sticks to continental decisions for its own benefit as the 
organisation is used as a soft power, reinforcing its own foreign policy as 
well as combining soft and military power to legitimise the latter … 
NEPAD was a cover rather than a serious engagement. The late prime 
minister used NEPAD, like other international organisations, to promote 
foreign policy, but without letting that discourse impact the domestic 
agenda (Interview with national APRM expert, 29 July 2015).  
 
Analysis 
It is quite interesting to note that the different APRM informants ob-
served various dynamics relating to Ethiopia’s accession, which also sig-
nals the multifaceted aspect of the APRM as reaction to international 
governance standards. These motivations bring together the desire of 
adhering to an African development vision whilst operating within an 
international donor framework. The government representative was the 
only interviewee to refer to the African Renaissance vision, and the 
member of the NGC referred to the role of Ethiopia in NEPAD, and as 
such, supported the broader vision behind the instrument. The members 
of the Country Review Mission referred to the practical implication of 
joining the review and chairing the Forum without having subjected the 
country to a review. The continental and domestic experts considered 
accession and the commencement of the review as ways to show politi-
cal commitment to democratic processes, to show leadership in conti-
nental frameworks, and to strategically position the country in continen-
tal and international spheres. This decision was observed to be more of a 
tool to obtain external legitimacy for domestic and external actions. In 
this regard, it is possible to discern the importance for Ethiopia of seek-
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ing external legitimacy of its actions, but it can also be noted that these 
may not necessarily translate into strong domestic political commitment.  
 
Observations on setting up the national APRM institutions and the 
organisation of the Country Support Mission 
In early 2008, the government of Ethiopia enacted the Council of Minis-
ters Regulation No. 142/2008, with the aim of using it to guide the 
APRM implementation. The Prime Minister’s Office was designated as 
the focal point for NEPAD/APRM activities, and a special advisor to 
the Prime Minister was appointed as the APRM National Focal Point. In 
addition, Ethiopia established its National Governing Council (NGC), 
tasked with driving national processes. The council was led by the then-
Minister of Capacity Building and comprised 23 members, including 
government representatives, opposition members, and private sector and 
civil society actors. Alongside the national council, regional governing 
councils mirroring the national structure were established in the eleven 
consultative regions. These councils were tasked with coordinating the 
APRM processes at the regional state levels. At the national level, a sec-
retariat was established in support of the day-to-day work, and a tech-
nical research institute was identified to undertake the self-assessment 
(APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 41). 
 
A support mission took place from 10-14 June 2008. The aim of the 
visit was to officially launch the review process. The eight-member dele-
gation comprised representatives of APRM strategic partner institutions 
(the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African 
Development Bank), as well as of the APRM continental secretariat. The 
Country Review Report further notes that the government had made 
adequate budgetary provisions for the review (APR Panel of Eminent 
Persons 2011: 41). Indeed, the Ethiopian government fully funded its 
own APRM review by allocating US$1.65 million toward it (Fisseha and 
Tadesse 2011: 10). The Country Review Mission members interacted 
with various national actors such as the NGC, civil society organisations, 
and the research institute tasked with undertaking the self-assessment. 
The team also engaged various stakeholders in Bahir Dar, the capital of 
Amhara Regional State. Furthermore, marking the start of the self-
assessment, the late Prime Minister and the initial lead panellist, Profes-
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sor Adebayo Adedeji, signed the MoU on the technical assessment (APR 
Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 41-42). 
Table 4.1  
Composition of the National Governing Council of Ethiopia 
Stakeholder # Groups Members 
Government 4 Ministry of Capacity Building  
Ethiopian Federal Parliament  
Ministry of Youth and Sports  
Prime Minister’s Office 
Mr. Tefera Waluwa (Chair-
person)  
Mr. Asmeslash W/Sellassie  
Mrs. Aster Mamo  
Mr. Newaykirstos Gebreab 
Opposition 4 United Ethiopian Democratic Forces  
Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
Party  
Ethiopian Democratic Union Party  
Oromo Federalist Democratic 
Movement 
Prof. Beyene Petros 
Mr. Ayele Chamiso  
Mr. Ledetu Ayalew  
Mr. Bulcha Demekessa 
Developing Re-
gions 
1 President of Benishangul Gumuz 
Regional State 
Mr. Ahemed Nasser 
Private Sector 4 Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce Mr. Getachew Ayenew  
Mr. Muluwork Kidanemariam  
Mr. Yergalem Admassu  
Mr. Tekalegne Abate 
Civil Society 9 Labour Union  
Teachers’ Association  
University Students’ Council  
Ethiopian Bar Association  
Ethiopian Health Professionals As-
sociation  
Ethiopian Economists Association  
Women‘s Association (3 seats) 
Mr. Kasahun Follo  
Mr. Yohanes Benti  
Mr. Yosefe Anbessa 
Mr. Beshada Gemechu 
Dr. Mengistu Asnake 
Dr. Welday Ameha 
Mrs. Asefach Ayenaleme 
Mrs. Abeba Shumete  
Mr. Shasha Yadessa 
Academia 1 Addis Ababa University 
 
Prof. Andreas Eshete 
Source: (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 42). 
 
The NGC is a critical national body in the APRM, taking the review 
process from a government activity to a national, country-led activity. It 
is therefore crucial for the council to enforce autonomous, inclusive (di-
versity of stakeholders), representative, encouraging, and encompassing 
broad-based participation (APRM 2016). In the interviews, the respond-
ents were asked to comment on the extent to which the council embod-
ies these principles. The government representative explained that the 
NGC was composed of around 23 members, including members of var-
ious segments of society such as the ruling party, the opposition party, 
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and actors from civil society. The council was responsible for the prepa-
ration of the self-assessment report. The chair of the council, then-
Minister of Capacity Building, was also responsible for facilitating the 
relationship between the Panel of Eminent Personalities and the host 
country (Interview on 11 September 2015).  
 
The NGC member complemented this information by explaining that 
the council would meet regularly at the office of the chair. The council 
had an open character and was inclusive, with opposition leaders form-
ing part of the team and participating in the discussion. As the chair did 
not try to steer the discussion, the council was able to freely and lively 
discuss topics of interest. However, the member also critically noted that 
the meetings and entire APRM process were quite protracted, as mem-
bers would only meet every few months; these meeting moreover served 
only to assess reports and documents. Regarding the nature of the civil 
society organisations represented on the council, the NGC member con-
ceded that these organisations could be better characterised as profes-
sional bodies, since they did not specifically operate in the realm of good 
governance. Moreover, the NGO law may further have restricted partic-
ipation of these types of organisations and their engagement on political 
issues (Interview on 9 July 2015).  
 
However, some of the Country Review Mission team members were 
more critical and asserted that the governing council was mostly hand-
picked by the government and tutored in their comments and responses, 
in addition to being limited in their movements and interactions in the 
field. Indeed, ‘everything was controlled’ (Interview with member of 
Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015). Other members also raised seri-
ous reservations about the council’s autonomy and adherence to the 
principles of inclusive and diverse participation (Interviews with member 
of Country Review Mission, 30 July 2015; 31 July 2015; 2 October 2015).  
 
These critical perspectives could be explained by examining the dual 
character of civil society in Ethiopia. In this regard, professional bodies 
are considered the legitimate “civil” society and are intimately linked to 
the government (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015). A 
national APRM expert confirmed this by saying that  
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The NGC represented actors of various segments of society; however, 
concerns were raised that these civil society organisations were actually 
linked to the government (governmental NGOs). By and large, the council 
was inclusive and showed the intent of the government to at least appear 
representative (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 September 
2015).  
 
Analysis 
It is noteworthy that the interviewed government representative did not 
come forward with an assessment, but referred to the approval of the 
Panel of the established structure as fulfilling the principles set forth in 
the APRM. The same elusiveness is somewhat found in the answer of 
the NGC member, who noted that there were lively discussions includ-
ing opposition members in the NGC, but that the meetings also seldom 
occurred and often served only to assess reports. The external evaluation 
report by the Open Society Foundation similarly observes that the chair 
was responsible for calling meetings of the NGC and that there was no 
separate meeting schedule (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 10). Moreover, 
while the Country Review Mission did give the green light for organising 
the national processes, it also made recommendations regarding widen-
ing the membership of the council to include ‘more women and other 
stakeholder groups such as the physically challenged’ (Fisseha and 
Tadesse 2011: 24). However, the Country Review Mission members 
raised more critical concerns about the independence of some of the 
members. While the national experts shared these concerns, they also at 
the same time felt that the government made concerted efforts to at least 
make the NGC formally appear to be representative and balanced. This 
is also somewhat echoed in the external evaluation report, which notes 
that ‘the Ethiopian NGC was merely a nominal entity, and its functional 
activities were controlled by its chair and the Secretariat’ (Fisseha and 
Tadesse 2011: 14). The NGC was mostly engaged in a discussion on 
budget proposals, and the secretariat executed the work required. The 
report suggests that the government solely determined the composition 
of the NGC. In this regard, it had elected organisations that ‘could speak 
its own language’ (Ibid). In addition, the report notes that there was a 
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knowledge disparity among members, which made it difficult to exercise 
the mandate of the NGC (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 14-15).  
 
The role of the NGC is critical in the APRM processes, but as can be 
observed from the various characterisations of its autonomy and compo-
sition, it can also be co-opted by the government. The chair of the meet-
ing was the then-Minister of Capacity Building, but in the context of 
Ethiopia, this also meant that he was a member of the government and 
of the ruling party. Indeed, there is almost no separation between the 
legislative powers of the parliament and the executive powers of the 
government. Hence, the spirit of the APRM principles as they pertained 
to the organisation of the NGC seemed to be only nominally adhered to.   
 
Observations on undertaking the self-assessment and preparing the 
draft report 
The African Institute of Management Development and Governance 
(based in Addis Ababa) was commissioned with undertaking the self-
assessment. The Country Review Report reveals that the institute devel-
oped six research instruments, including desk research; undertaking a 
survey covering 4620 households; conducting interviews with key in-
formants; and holding focus groups discussions alongside administering 
expert opinion surveys and district consultative forums across the coun-
try. The Self Assessment Report was validated through five national and 
nine regional validation workshops and thereafter submitted with a draft 
NPoA to the APRM Secretariat in May 2009. The Country Review Re-
port further notes that the self-assessment met the objective of technical 
competence and that it was ‘sufficiently candid about the governance 
situation in Ethiopia’. It furthermore recommends the six-stage method-
ology as an example to other countries planning their review (APR Panel 
of Eminent Persons 2011: 42-43). 
 
The independent external evaluation report provides slightly more in-
formation on this process and elaborates that the desk review focused on 
the collection of secondary data related to the thematic areas of the re-
view. The expert opinion survey was conducted in the nine regional 
states and Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations. Around 400 
experts participated in the survey and were selected based on their 
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knowledge of governance issues. In this, the institute sought to create a 
balanced representation by taking into account age, gender, religion and 
other key characteristics. The public consultations were undertaken in 33 
districts in the regional states and city administrations3. The consultations 
brought together 50 individuals (farmers and residents), as invited by the 
district administration. In all but one, regional governing council (mir-
rored on the national governing council), conferences were organised to 
inform the public about the APRM and its objectives. The household 
survey complemented this information and aimed to gather national es-
timates on citizens’ perceptions at the grassroots level. After submitting 
the draft country self-assessment to the governing council in late 2008, 
there were over 100 workshops and five validation conferences were or-
ganised in January 2009. According to the CEO of the secretariat, about 
1,500 participants joined these discussions on the draft report, including 
members of government, civil society actors, political parties and private 
sector actors. The self-assessment report was submitted to the APRM 
secretariat in February 2009. The report was unanimously adopted by the 
governing council with one vote against it, namely that of the United 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces (opposition party on the NGC). The inde-
pendent external evaluation report notes that the NPoA was prepared 
solely by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and sub-
mitted only at a later stage, namely after the country review visit and 
without the support of the NGC (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 14-16).  
 
The APRM stakeholders reflected on the content of the self-
assessment report and considered whether it provided an adequate rep-
resentation of the democratic and political landscape of Ethiopia. The 
majority of respondents appreciated the elaborate methodology through 
which the self-assessment report was prepared, but also raised more crit-
ical concerns as to who participated in the various consultations and how 
these voices informed the self-assessment report and the NPoA. 
 
The government representative elaborated on the preparation of the 
self-assessment report and explained that the council “headhunted” ex-
perienced academics/practitioners and requested them to come together 
to bid for the consultancy engagement (as there was not a research or-
ganisation working on governance issues at that time). The budget for 
the self-assessment report was approved by the Council of Ministers and 
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completely domestically financed. The institute selected to undertake the 
self-assessment briefed the governing council on the data collection 
strategy. The council reviewed the different research instruments, includ-
ing the questionnaire, and made adjustments on the latter. Following the 
adoption of the research instruments, the survey questionnaire was dis-
tributed and consultations across the country were conducted with the 
support of the local governments. The institute held public consultations 
across 40 regions and provided a space for citizens to give their own im-
pressions on governance. Six focus group discussions were held with 
different groups (representing women, opposition parties, civil society, 
the youth, ruling party and others). The focus group discussion with the 
ruling party in particular provided an opportunity for the government to 
respond to critical issues brought forward in the assessment process. An 
example of such issues concerned the contested neutrality of the elec-
toral commission. As such, the report did not seek to present a consen-
sus, but rather reflected different views and perspectives. In its engage-
ment with citizens, the institute remained neutral and created a space for 
people to speak freely (Interviews with APRM government representa-
tive, 11 September 2015; and with national APRM expert, 16 September 
2015). 
 
The draft self-assessment report was presented to the governing 
council, which reviewed the content and provided comments based on 
group consensus. In particular, the governing council commented on 
factual errors and ambiguities in the text. The final report provided the 
basis for the preparation of the NPoA, which was prepared by the gov-
ernment and thereafter submitted to the APRM Secretariat (Interview 
with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015). However, 
in the Country Review Report it is mentioned that the main opposition 
party in the parliament – the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces – 
commented that there were ‘irregularities and methodological bias in the 
self-assessment process’; however, only two members of the NGC 
agreed with this critique on the self-assessment report. Besides this, 
while the government representative suggests that the NGC agreed on 
the adoption of the report, the Country Review Report actually notes 
that the ‘[r]epresentative of the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces 
voted against the adoption of the Country Self Assessment Report while 
the representatives of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement Par-
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ty, another opposition party in parliament, abstained from voting’ (APR 
Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 45).   
 
The domestic APRM expert also added that, contrary to the state-
ment of the government representative, the draft report was actually first 
reviewed by the “inner circle” of the NGC (the Focal Point and Chair of 
the NGC), who commented on the accuracy of the report. Some com-
ments were made that in certain instances the situation on the ground 
was not reflected. The institute responded that these were the percep-
tions of groups on the ground, which could not be changed in the re-
port. To counter this, it was suggested for the government to issue its 
own comments on some of the findings. Hence, the institute did not feel 
pressured to alter the content of the report, but dealt with criticism by 
including it therein. Moreover, the chairman of the council was quite co-
operative and understanding. The final report was handed over to the 
government, which held public consultations on the APRM themes (with 
over 1,500 participants), of which insights were reflected in the final re-
port and thereafter submitted to the APRM institutions alongside the 
draft NPoA (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015). 
 
The NGC member provided more critical observations of these pro-
cesses and noted that 
 
The self-assessment was conducted in a somewhat routine and bureaucrat-
ic manner, with less attention given to actually learning from findings of 
the study. The focus was on making the outcomes of the assessment “look 
good”. The research was conducted out of need, rather than out of real in-
terest to learn from the process, and as a result it was not conducted with 
full scrutiny. The research would have benefitted from more and better 
focus groups and/or consulting existing youth platforms (Interview with 
non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).  
 
The country review members also shared mixed reviews of the self-
assessment process, with some respondents observing more positively 
that the self-assessment report had a multidisciplinary approach and in-
teracted with a broad array of constituencies, while others were more 
critical of the process (Interviews on, 23 July 2015; 30 July 2015; 31 July 
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2015; 2 October 2015). The work of the research institute was also fur-
ther complicated due to constraints in the research environment. In or-
der to counter this and similar situations, the APRM has an in-house 
mechanism to deal with cases in which the self-assessment report does 
not adequately represent the situation on the ground, or when the gov-
erning council cannot operate independently. In these cases, the role of 
the review team becomes even more important for revealing the real sto-
ry, and for the partner institution (such as the Economic Commission 
for Africa) to prepare its own background report on the situation in the 
country (Interview with member of APRM Secretariat, 28 July 2015). 
 
The preparation of the self-assessment report was problematic as threats 
were made to withhold payment should the report not reflect matters 
deemed appropriate (Interview with continental APRM expert, 21 July 
2015). 
 
This brings to light another important aspect, namely the political 
context in which a review takes place and how this impacted the process 
in Ethiopia. Indeed, the APRM review does not take place within a vac-
uum, but often links to a past or upcoming election. Ideally, a review 
would take place 18 months after a government is elected and comes to 
conclusion a maximum of six months ahead of the next election. This 
minimises the risk of the review process focusing too much on the per-
formance of the government. Ethiopia was not much different in that it 
considered the consequences of the 2005 elections when preparing for 
the APRM review. The self-assessment process was undertaken ahead of 
the 2010 elections, and there were serious concerns for the assessment 
not to bring up any surprises (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 
21 July 2015; 31 July 2015). 
 
The self-assessment was undertaken in a centralised, subtly controlled, 
manipulated and stage-managed manner, raising concerns about the validi-
ty and legitimacy of the findings (Interview with continental APRM expert, 
31 July 2015). 
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The civil society actor made similar characterisations and observed 
that the government controlled the preparation of the self-assessment 
report. The government (through the Ministry of Capacity Building) was 
involved in several stages of the process (the household survey was con-
ducted through Addis Ababa University, which was headed at that time 
by a member of the NGC). The actor noted that it is not clear who was 
consulted on what and which data was obtained. On different occasions, 
the civil society actor tried to obtain the basic research data, but to no 
avail (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).  
 
Analysis 
Since the self-assessment process is so complex, it may be expected to 
find different perspectives regarding its nature. The APR panel consid-
ered the review technically sound, and at face value Ethiopia seemed to 
have conducted an exemplary assessment process. However, different 
actors did note concerns about the level of government control over the 
process, but this seemed to be subtle, and, hence, difficult to put a finger 
on. One example is that the civil society actor mentioned the inability to 
succeed in obtaining sought primary data. In the previous section, it was 
also noted that the term “civil society” may have a different domestic 
connotation, such as comprising associations that are strongly linked to 
the government, and one could question whether the civil society repre-
sentatives invited to participate in the assessment really were independ-
ent. The same applies to the household survey, which included youth 
respondents, but did not make clear how youth was to be defined. In 
addition, the survey was conducted at Addis Ababa University, but the 
university’s president also served on the NGC.  
 
Moreover, it was also the inner circle of the governing council that 
supposedly first reviewed the self-assessment report, and the link be-
tween the self-assessment report and the NPoA is not clear, as these re-
ports should have been produced and validated simultaneously. In these 
reports, it is possible to observe subtle control mechanisms that are not 
transparent on paper or even in the process, but become clear when crit-
ically examining the manner in which the assessment was conducted. 
The self-assessment and the number of citizen perspectives obtained 
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seemed to be technically sound, but it is not clear whether and how the 
more substantive and critical perspectives and voices were incorporated.  
 
The external evaluation report also suggests that despite the elaborate 
process of establishing the self-assessment report, questions could be 
raised in relation to the selection process of individuals that participated 
in all the various research instruments. Furthermore, it is concerning that 
the government produced the NPoA without consultation of the NGC 
(Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 16). Here, the role of the external review 
panel is further needed, as the members can capture those elusive per-
spectives while relying on the findings from the continental scoping as-
sessment. The self-assessment process also seems somewhat to continue 
the narrative that emerged from the establishment of the NGC – that 
participatory structures and processes were in place, but not so subtly 
controlled. 
 
4.3.3 Stage Two: Country review visit 
Observations on the Country Review Mission 
The official Country Review Mission took place from 31 August-17 Sep-
tember 2009, composed of 15 prominent African experts and led by Pro-
fessor Adebayo Adedeji. The Country Review Report reveals that the 
Focal Point and the national secretariat facilitated the review mission. It 
started with a meeting with H.E. Mr. Addisu Legese, then-Deputy Prime 
Minister of Ethiopia, and a ceremonial handover of the Country Self-
Assessment Report and the NPoA to the Head of Mission took place. 
During the review, the mission interacted with senior government offi-
cials and also with representatives of governance institutions. Besides 
this, the mission also interacted with non-state actors, such as private 
sector representatives, civil society organisations, women’s groups, and 
political parties. A few days thereafter (on 2 September 2009), the mis-
sion met with the NGC and also held sessions with the President of the 
Supreme Court, the High Court of Justice, the Constitutional Court, and 
the Judicial Service Commission. The mission met with ministers and 
with heads and representatives of 27 ministries, agencies, the National 
Electoral Board, the Human Rights Commission, the Ethics and Corrup-
tion Commission, as well as with the National Bank of Ethiopia. The 
mission moreover held sessions with different constituencies represent-
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ing women, youth, trade unions, universities, civil society organisations, 
and the physically challenged. In addition, the mission interacted with 
the private sector, with political parties, and with the parliament. The 
mission continued its engagements with interactive sessions with stake-
holders in Tigray, Oromia, Addis Ababa City Council, Dire Dewa, Hara-
ri, Gambella and Benishagul-Gumeze. During these visits, the mission 
also made courtesy calls to district officials. These regional visits served 
the purpose of validating the Country Self-Assessment Report with 
stakeholders in the region and gauging their perspectives on governance. 
Finally, the mission conducted sessions with various key stakeholders, 
such as women’s groups, people with disabilities, the youth, academics, 
the media, faith-based organisations, small businesses, private sector ac-
tors, trade unions, and community-based organisations. The latter con-
sultations were aimed at producing a comprehensive understanding of 
governance in Ethiopia. The review was concluded in mid-September, 
with a wrap-up session with late Prime Minister Melas Zenawi (APR 
Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 43-46). 
 
The level of participation and interaction during the review mission is 
a critical aspect of the review. The Country Review Mission confirms the 
observations from the self-assessment, but more importantly also looks 
for constraints and best practices unaddressed in this report. Broad par-
ticipation is the first step to securing this. In this regard, the country Re-
view Mission team engaged with different stakeholders and submitted 
the final draft report to the government. This report was then discussed 
at the regional levels and at federal level, and culminated in the country 
response, which was annexed to the final review report (Interview with 
APRM government representative, 11 September 2015).  Regarding the 
discussions in the governing council, respondents observed that it was  
rather difficult to incorporate more critical voices, raised for instance by 
some of the opposition parties (Interview with non-governmental mem-
ber of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).  
 
The members of the mission gave different accounts of the process, 
on the one hand highlighting the frank discussions, but also government 
control over the process. The team divided itself and travelled to the var-
ious regions of Ethiopia, interacting with a broad array of constituencies, 
such as teachers, business leaders, NGOs, journalists and opposition 
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leaders. The team learned of critical concerns of the various groups and 
was informed on the aftermath of the 2005 elections and government 
scrutiny of civil society organisations. It was noted that the level of par-
ticipation not only was high at both the federal and state levels, but also 
frank, open and critical, although there seemed to have been some de-
gree of self-censorship, with a number of participants requesting individ-
ual meetings with Country Review Mission members outside of formal 
meetings. However, other members of the mission were more critical. 
For example, one member asserted that the process was not open 
enough, thereby compromising the representativeness of inputs (Inter-
views with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; 30 July 
2016; 31 July 2015): 
 
I would not say there was broad-based participation. Wherever we went, 
heavily armed police or soldiers escorted us. We were even forced to leave 
the country earlier than planned (Interview with member Country Review 
Mission, 2 October 2015). 
 
The continental experts also used less kind words to describe the par-
ticipatory and interactive dynamics of the review, with experts comment-
ing that the process in Ethiopia was the most difficult and closed process 
of all review processes. There was a strong government oversight role 
during the entire APRM process. The low levels of civil society participa-
tion may have been due to the strict government control of the process 
and also as a result of the civil society law, which governs the operation 
of organisations within the field of democracy and governance. As a 
country that is arguably less versed with democratic governance princi-
ples, the law impacted on the ability to have an open space for and dis-
cussions on governance, and organisations were self-censoring. In this 
regard, the experts asserted that freedom of speech in Ethiopia exists 
nominally, but not practically (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 
21 July 2015; 31 July 2015). 
 
There was no independent civil society part of the process. Indeed, the 
process was skewed, as opposition parties, independent media and “unciv-
il” society were not engaged … The unique ideology of the ruling party 
does not see a place for independent civil society to provide input to poli-
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cy as valued in the Western world. The engagement was artificial and su-
perficial, formal, and not substantive (Interview with national APRM ex-
pert, 29 July 2015). 
 
As such, it was observed that mass-based organisations4 (which the 
government refers to as civil society actors) were consulted in the review, 
but non-state actors in the true sense of the word were not involved in 
the process (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).  
 
Analysis 
The nature of the interactions during the review mission has been as-
sessed quite differently, highlighting broad participation of different ac-
tors, but remaining unclear on the extent to which participants spoke 
freely. There seemed to have been some government control during the 
consultations, evident in, for example, escort parties comprised of gov-
ernment officials, the requests of participants of official meetings for 
separate side meetings (also included in the review report), and, accord-
ing to one member, the need to leave the country early. This subtle form 
of control was picked up on and mentioned in the Country Review Re-
port. Here it notes:  
 
The National Governing Commission printed only few copies of the his-
toric self-assessment report. Stakeholders had to contend with duplicated 
summaries of the Country Self Assessment Report. This was frustrating 
not only to stakeholders but also to the Country Review Mission. Despite 
this constraint, the Country Review Mission team held an interactive ses-
sion. The high level of representation at the consultative and interactive 
meetings is noteworthy. Commendably, all the stakeholder groups were 
very candid in their assessment of the governance challenges facing the 
country. At the prompting of the Country Review Mission, institutions 
such as the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Body and United Ethiopi-
an Democratic Forces (UEDF) made written submissions to the mission 
(APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 45). 
 
The abovementioned observation suggests that the participatory spirit 
of the APRM processes was only nominal adhered to by the govern-
ment. 
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4.3.4 Stage Three: Preparing the Country Review Report 
Observations on the preparation of the Country Review Report 
This stage is not documented in the Country Review Report, as it regards 
mainly internal processes such as the preparation of the draft country 
report and the finalisation of the NPoA by the government of Ethiopia. 
The respondents commented on the final Country Review Report and 
on whether they believed that this provided an adequate description of 
the state of affairs, or whether key issues had been excluded. 
 
The government representative was unable to provide a characterisa-
tion of the report, but noted that all comments by the government had 
been appended to the report. One of the Country Review Mission mem-
bers and a national APRM expert also referred to the official govern-
ment response, observing that the government was not happy with some 
of the review findings; its critical comments were appended to the review 
report (Interviews with APRM government representative, 11 September 
2015; with member of Country Review Mission, 30 July 2015; and with 
national APRM expert, 29 July 2015). Others agreed that the report pro-
vided an adequate description, observing that the report reflected the 
situation on the ground. The APRM Secretariat Officer was also more 
positive, asserting that the Country Review Report adequately articulated 
the best practices and challenges in the area of democracy and good gov-
ernance (Interview with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 
2015; and with member of the Country Review Mission, 2 October 
2015). 
 
My understanding was that the Country Review Report, in general, and the 
Democracy and Political Governance chapter, in particular, reflected an 
adequate description and reflection of the state of affairs in the country at 
the time of the review (Interview with member of Country Review Mis-
sion, 31 July 2015). 
  
However, some of the continental experts were more critical of the 
content of the report and felt that some issues were omitted. One expert 
explained that despite strong government control and oversight, the re-
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port did indeed address major concerns related to democracy and gov-
ernance. It is here where a deeper look into the actual report-writing may 
explain this contradiction. The report is not only informed by the inputs 
of constituencies as part of the self-assessment, but also by the back-
ground document prepared by the secretariat, which framed the broad 
issues and concerns. During the Country Review Mission, the independ-
ent experts also dug deeper and spoke to various constituencies. As they 
have no political affiliation with the government, they were only interest-
ed in preparing an independent input to the report. The panel is the last 
control mechanism, which as a result of its political status cannot be in-
fluenced by the government under review. However, in this regard, ob-
servations were made that relations between the lead panellist and the 
government actually were compromised. Here, the expert referred to the 
dynamics of the relationship between late Prime Minister Zenawi and 
lead panellist Professor Adedeji, and particularly to how the late Prime 
Minister allegedly attempted to build an alliance within the panel. Anoth-
er expert was of the opinion that the report was quite comprehensive, 
critical, honest, and candid about the governance and democratic envi-
ronment in Ethiopia. However, possibly issues linked to political free-
doms were not adequately represented in the report (Interviews with 
continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; 30 July 2015). The civil society 
actor was also quite critical in the assessment and asserted: 
 
The current Ddemocracy and Political Governance chapter reflects more 
the party ideology on democracy and governance. The APRM often has 
had predictive characteristics (in the sense that it can alert on issues that 
should be addressed earnestly), but this is not present in the Ethiopia 
APRM Country Report (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 
2015). 
 
Following the review, the government of Ethiopia submitted the up-
dated NPoA to the continental secretariat in early 2010. In this regard, 
the respondents also reflected on whether it provided an adequate policy 
strategy for concerns raised during the review. This was actually the crux 
of the entire review process, as the NPoA is a formal commitment of the 
government to address the concerns raised in the review. It is vital for all 
critical areas to be included and for these to be well-captured in various 
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interventions. The members of the country review were somewhat divid-
ed in their assessment of the adequacy of the NPoA – one member be-
lieved it addressed the main concerns, but other experts were more criti-
cal, observing that the NPoA was prepared to raise funds for the various 
activities abroad. Another expert asserted that this is the major weakness 
of the APRM, as it is too diplomatic and tends to skate around the is-
sues. Another member raised a more general concern with the manner in 
which the NPoAs are prepared, as the NPoAs often do not reflect cur-
rent national priorities. This was also the case in Ethiopia. Indeed, 
NPoAs should be harmonised with national developments plans and 
budgeted for accordingly. In this regard, it is important to include the 
parliament at an early stage of the review. This would address some of 
the unbudgeted NPoAs. Even if questions would then arise regarding 
the funding of the plans of action, this could then adequately be ad-
dressed by the parliament (Interviews with member of Country Review 
Mission, 23 July 2015; 30 July 2015; 31 July 2015; 2 October 2015). 
 
The secretariat officer, as well as continental and national experts, was 
also more critical of this aspect of the process. In particular, the secretar-
iat officer observed that 
 
Not all concerns related to democracy and governance were incor-
porated in the NPoA, especially in relation to inclusiveness and 
representation of all ethnic groups of Ethiopia, which did not sit 
well with the government. As Professor Adedeji was no longer 
there when the report was being finalised, it was quite difficult to 
defend some of the stances taken in the report, and a long discus-
sion with late Prime Minister Zenawi on the final report ensued 
(Interview with member of continental APRM Secretariat, 28 July 
2015).  
 
The national expert also highlighted that the government had a differ-
ent perspective of the role of the NPoA, and explained that the draft 
self-assessment report provided indicators for recommendations and a 
framework for the development of the NPoA, which the government 
could have used. However, the expert noted that there seemed to be 
some misunderstanding regarding the nature of the NPoA, which the 
government interpreted as being part of the national development plan. 
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Hence, the first NPoA submitted to the APRM concerned a comprehen-
sive action plan in preparation of the second Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (the government thought of the NPoA as a long-term objective 
related to the implementation of this programme). The chair of the Panel 
refused to accept the NPoA and asked the government to prepare a plan 
based on the findings of the self-assessment.  The government thereafter 
asked the ministries to come up with plans and indicators related to the 
APRM, which served as the basis of the final NPoA (Interview with na-
tional APRM expert, 16 September 2015). 
 
Analysis 
The reflection of the different actors on the process of preparing the fi-
nal report and the NPoA is significant. Turning first to the final chapter 
on Democracy and Political Governance, some experts believed the con-
tent provided an adequate description, while others believed that more 
could have been included. In this regard, it is important to emphasise 
that the reference to the government commentary is particularly telling. 
More than likely, the government would not have had such strong cri-
tique of the content, had the review not brought out critical matters. In 
addition, the independent external evaluation report suggests that the 
government made considerable efforts to comment on the draft report 
(Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 12). The government response is a six-page 
commentary note on the entire review, where detailed critique is given of 
the interpretation of the Country Review Mission on aspects related to 
the review. A few of the comments are included here: 
 
There are no political asymmetries between the regional states. All the 
states have the same political and legal powers given to them by the consti-
tution. Economic inequalities exist, however. 
 
Party rules (such as democratic centralism) are designed to be applied 
within the party structure and not in government structures. This is allud-
ed to in a number of paragraphs but is a wrong reading of the relationship 
between the party and the government institutions in the Ethiopian con-
text. 
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The allegation that opposition supporters are discriminated against in 
some services is completely unfounded. All citizens get the services regard-
less of their political inclination. 
 
There was no crackdown on peaceful protestors and demonstrators. It was 
part of a planned criminal act to overthrow the government by force. 
 
Ethiopian laws do not require permission from government authorities to 
conduct public meetings as alleged by the opposition. All they require is 
notification to the authorities. The media is not intimidated by fear of 
prosecution. That this is so can be observed from a cursory glance of their 
content. Censorship is prohibited. If journalists are found to have 
breached the rules, there is no reason why they should not be brought to 
justice. 
 
Implicit in many paragraphs is the assumption that the ruling party is not 
interested in strengthening democratic institutions, including the legislature 
and House of the Federation. This is a wrong understanding of the poli-
cies of the ruling party and the achievements of the Ethiopian govern-
ment. Since assuming power, the ruling party has established many institu-
tions whose purpose is to ensure the revitalisation of democratic culture 
and the prevalence of rule of law (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 
345-347). 
 
 A careful observation therefore could be that the suggested subtle 
control of the process did not result in an assessment the government 
was prepared to accept; as it could not change the content, it used its 
right to formally comment on the findings of the review.  
 
The respondents furthermore noted some issues with the NPoA. Alt-
hough this is a difficult aspect of the process, as emphasised by the mis-
sion members, there were further issues related to the preparation and 
content of the NPoA. In particular, the response of the national expert is 
quite striking, as it shows that there was a misunderstanding regarding 
the purpose of the NPoA. The independent external evaluation report 
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also picked up on this and stated that the Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Development prepared the report without consideration of the 
review process. The report reads: 
 
Government departments (the ministries and some institutions like the 
Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ombudsman and 
the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission) who do work related to the 
four thematic areas were told to share their own plans of action for the 
coming years. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development then 
assessed the contents of the action plans and compiled them (Fisseha and 
Tadesse 2011: 13).  
 
 The report suggests that the NPoA was prepared unilaterally, like 
other government plans. In this process, there was no consideration of 
feedback from the findings of the participatory processes of the APRM 
(Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 13). Hence, there was a misunderstanding 
regarding the role of the NPoA. This was further aggravated by the ab-
sence of a link between the review process and NPoA content. This is 
another example of how the government controlled the domestic pro-
cess and the interpretation of APRM principles within the Ethiopian 
context. 
 
4.3.5 Stage Four: Peer review and presentation of report 
Observations on the peer review process and report release 
Ethiopia underwent a peer review at the 14th Summit of the APR Forum 
on 29 January 2011. Heads of state representing nine other countries 
were in attendance during this meeting, and ministers and heads of dele-
gations represented other APRM countries (APR Panel of Eminent Per-
sons 2011: 349). Although the formal presentation and peer review dis-
cussion are closed to the public, a summary of the discussions is included 
in the Country Review Report, providing an understanding of the delib-
erations. After the lead panellist provided a summary of strengths, best 
practices and challenges, the late Prime Minister took the floor and made 
some critical observations. The Prime Minister asserted that the report 
did not describe the real situation on the ground. He then continued his 
intervention, noting that the APRM is an African mechanism established 
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to assess countries based on African principles and culture. He asserted 
that the mechanism was a response to the imposition of the neoliberal 
paradigm of economic development, which failed to bring about demo-
cratic change or economic growth. He asserted that this vicious cycle of 
poverty traps and underdevelopment could only be addressed by an ac-
tivist state. Based on these beliefs, he wondered why the Country Review 
Report was so critical of the government, since it had intervened to ad-
dress poverty traps alongside economic growth and democratic devel-
opments. He also noted that development is a political process that re-
sults in economic and social processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 
2011: 350-351). 
 
Concluding his response, the Prime Minister said that the thematic areas 
of Democracy and Political Governance, and Economic Governance and 
Management of the report, were evaluated on the basis of the “rejected, 
bankrupt and dead” principles of World Bank, and not on the basis of the 
African principles (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 351). 
 
Analysis 
The comments of the Prime Minister are insightful for many reasons. It 
shows a concrete example of how a state can counter the perceived 
dominant development and governance narrative. It also shows how a 
state can use that same language to perhaps defend undemocratic princi-
ples. It furthermore shows how, within the APRM, a head of state can 
suggest that the APRM review itself is still based on neoliberal considera-
tions. It finally shows that a head of state can use this language to coun-
ter the validity of the mechanism and its findings, which is also very in-
triguing. The statements also validate the sentiments of various 
respondents, who noted that a tension existed between the report find-
ings and what the government believed to be true (or what the govern-
ment wanted to reflect about its practice to the outside world). It also 
reflects the tension that was present between the government and the 
Country Review Mission, and the tension between the participatory na-
ture of the review process, in contrast to central development planning 
systems of the government. For instance, it explains how the NPoA be-
came based on plans of different governance agencies rather than on the 
review outcomes.  
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Moreover, it is notable that the government chose to defend itself in 
this prime example of the complexities of inter-state disciplining, which 
is one of the pinnacles of the review process. Even more telling is the 
fact that although the country was reviewed in early 2011, the Country 
Review Report was only formally released two years later, in January 
2013 and in the presence of current Prime Minister Hailemariam De-
salegn. 
 
4.3.6 The APRM process and developmentality 
Within the APRM process, it is possible to discern the larger ideological 
battles related to governance and development that informed the initia-
tion of the mechanism. For instance, various considerations informed 
Ethiopia’s accession to the APRM. These considerations particularly re-
flect the multifaceted aspect of the APRM as it operates within continen-
tal and international governance standards. One the one hand, motiva-
tions were related to the NEPAD development agenda, but on the other 
hand, it was also a way in which to show peers and other partners that 
Ethiopia is committed to strengthening democracy and political govern-
ance, as well as to other important themes related to the review. While 
the motivation of Ethiopia to accede to the mechanism could be viewed 
as political commitment to the review process, this did not necessarily 
translate into practice. 
 
 Indeed, where the APRM process envisions a country-led self-
assessment process, the review of Ethiopia could be better characterised 
as a government-led process. This is reflected in the manner in which the 
national structures were set up, the manner in which the NPoA was pre-
pared, as well as the government-attempted control of the external coun-
try review. This can best be characterised as nominal adherence, meaning 
that the process was technically observed and followed, but did not ad-
here to the spirit of the process. In spite of this, the report provided a 
critical reflection of democratic and governance aspects that could be 
further strengthened; moreover, it elicited an extensive critique of the 
government.  
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A critical aspect of the APRM is its participatory dynamics, which are 
reflected in the role and composition of the NGC, in the manner in 
which the self-assessment is produced, and in the interactions with the 
external country review team. An important vehicle for securing this is 
by mandating citizen engagement throughout almost the entire process. 
However, Ethiopia’s APRM review was mostly a government-controlled 
process. The review principles clashed with the perspectives of the gov-
ernment on what constitutes civil society (i.e. mass-based organisations) 
and what role these organisations have in governance. Here it is possible 
to discern an indication of weak intra-state disciplining of the mecha-
nism’s principles, as the government interpreted citizen participation 
within its own established frameworks of these engagements and more 
or less rejected alternative conceptualisations as presented within the 
APRM. 
 
The inter-state disciplining of the APRM reached its apex at the 
Heads of State Forum Meeting. However, this is exactly the moment 
when late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi resisted and rejected the assess-
ment as it pertained to democracy and political governance, and even 
questioned the basis of the assessment (as reflecting neoliberal mentali-
ties). His comment was fuelled by the content of the assessment and the 
rationalisation of ideas and recommendations proposed by the Panel. 
This subtle battle of ideologies also played out in the dynamics between 
the Panel and the government, between the assessment criteria and final 
report writing, as well as in relation to the preparation of the NPoA and 
particularly how it sits with national development planning and imple-
mentation policies.  
 
These dynamics seem to indicate that there had been only nominal 
adherence to the principles of the review. This could be explained as a 
case of inadequate application of the review principles, but it could also 
be indicative of other considerations. For instance, Ethiopia’s accession 
to the APRM and its implementation of the review process may also be 
explained as a way of strengthening the external legitimacy of the gov-
ernment. The review seemed to the government to be the appropriate 
thing to do and “looked good” to internal and external actors. Indeed, by 
submitting the country to such a delicate review, it rebrands the govern-
ment as one committed to the vision and principles that founded the 
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APRM (Schwak 2016: 428). Moreover, the government’s wish to 
strengthen democracy and political governance (nominally) could also be 
considered as a response to the overall normalisation of good govern-
ance through which good governance is no longer perceived as a norm, 
but as natural and necessary (Taylor 2009: 52). These considerations also 
influence the dynamics between African countries, which may respond 
collectively to the normalisation of good governance by enacting pro-
cesses that are deemed “legitimate” and appropriate, for instance by 
pushing for African standards on governance. These inform the nature 
of the peer pressures exerted during the APR Forum meetings, where 
leaders persuaded Ethiopia to commit to the outcomes of the review, 
resulting in collective ‘isomorphic transformation’ (Frumkin and Galas-
kiewicz 2004: 285-286, DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). These dynam-
ics seem to indicate that there are more considerations that inform the 
application of the APRM.   
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the APRM process 
in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 2b as follows: 
2g: The APRM is a voluntary monitoring mechanism that assesses 
adherence to African governance norms and generates knowledge on 
policies and practices of African countries; 
2h: Voluntary accession to the APRM is an indicator of political 
commitment to African governance norms; 
2i: The APRM process monitors adherence to African governance 
norms, but this does not necessarily translate into adherence to the 
review’s principles (i.e. government control of the process); as a re-
sult, the intra-state discipline of the mechanism could be considered 
weak; 
2j: The APRM review generates knowledge on policies and practices, 
but this does necessarily translate into the acceptance of its standards 
(i.e. resistance of the government by dismissing review findings); as a 
result, the inter-state discipline of the mechanism could be consid-
ered weak;  
2k: It could be suggested that the APRM process responds to the 
global normalisation of good governance, as indicated by a wish to 
“brand” and collectively pursue democracy and political governance 
on the continent. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the application of the CPIA and APRM assess-
ments. It focused on answering the question: how have CPIA and 
APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia? The findings 
suggest that CPIA processes followed the process description as set 
forth in the technical guiding documents, with the exception being the 
government consultations on the draft score. While at times the rating 
was complicated due to the difficulties between governance reform 
commitments and implementation, the overall process reflected a stand-
ardised and routine assessment of Ethiopia’s performance in the areas of 
public sector management and institutions. The standardised nature of 
the process meant that the occurrence of disagreements over ratings was 
pre-empted within the design, and procedures were developed to address 
this. In this regard, it is possible to view the CPIA as a surveillance 
mechanism that monitors Ethiopia’s conduct by assessing (non-
)adherence to standards regarding public sector management and institu-
tions. These standards are conceptualised as norms and establishes for 
Ethiopia what is considered an appropriate and, as such, “normal” gov-
ernance framework. The process comes together by the Bank informing 
the government of Ethiopia on its CPIA score and how this informs 
their IDA allocation. While this is meant to make the government take 
responsibility for its performance, the government actually declined en-
gaging with the Bank on the rating process. This process is further com-
plicated by the suggestion that the Bank’s ratings are path dependent, 
meaning that upward or downward ratings of Ethiopia are discouraged 
due to the financial consequences accompanying this decision. This lim-
its the manner in which the Bank can discipline and push for norm ad-
herence in relation to its governance standards.  
 
 In contrast to the CPIA process, the APRM review did not take place 
according to the process description as set forth in the technical guiding 
documents. Ethiopia’s review process was less participatory, more gov-
ernment-controlled, and less harmonious than envisioned within the 
APRM principles. This can best be characterised as nominal adherence, 
meaning that the process was technically observed and followed, but did 
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not adhere to the spirit of the process. On the other hand, and possibly 
against the odds, the review did result in a critical assessment of the state 
of democracy and political governance in Ethiopia and solicited a fair 
amount of critique from the government. While Ethiopia’s voluntary 
accession to the APRM signalled political commitment to the mecha-
nism, this did not translate into adherence to the review’s principles. 
Similarly, while the report generated knowledge on the state of democra-
cy and political governance and indicated areas of improvement, this did 
not translate into acceptance of the findings by the government. This 
suggests that the inter- and intra-disciplining function of the APRM is 
limited. It also suggests that this nominal application of the review could 
be indicative of a different dynamic, namely that by going through the 
APRM process, Ethiopia is able to externally and internally brand itself 
as a country that is committed to political governance. This approach is 
based less on an internal conviction that pursuing political governance is 
important, but responds more to the global normalisation of good gov-
ernance and continental pressures to adhere to this norm.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The framework (PEFA) assesses and reports on public financial management 
performance and identifies strengths and weaknesses.  
2 The IDA country allocations for the Fiscal Year 2014 were 843 Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) million (international reserve asset) (IDA 2014: 3).  
3 Ethiopia has nine regional states and two chartered cities. The regions are fur-
ther divided into 68 zones, which are further divided into woredas (districts), and 
then again further divided into kebeles (municipalities), comprising the lowest 
level of administration.  
4 These concern organisations that align with the government, such as youth and 
women groups. 
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5 Outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the outcomes of the CPIA and APRM assess-
ments. It focuses on answering the following research question: how 
have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related 
governance standards in Ethiopia? The main aim of the analysis is to in-
vestigate the outcomes of the assessment processes, and principally to 
understand how they have promoted their governance standards. The 
analysis is based on the observations of respondents involved in prepar-
ing the respective assessments, complemented by a document analysis of 
the documented outcomes. In the case of the CPIA, it presents evidence 
on the CPIA ratings and IDA commitments, and places this in the con-
text of the outcomes as narrated in the Country Partnership Strategy, the 
Bank’s strategic framework for its operations in Ethiopia. In the case of 
the APRM, it presents evidence on the outcomes of the assessment by 
focusing on the release of the Country Review Report, the implementa-
tion of the NPoA, and the two main drivers of government commitment 
to governance standards in the review process, namely horizontal peer 
pressure and vertical civil society monitoring. The outcomes of the CPIA 
and APRM in Ethiopia are analysed through the analytical lens of devel-
opmentality (including relevant concepts taken from the governmentality 
framework), and is further supported by the theoretical propositions that 
guide the explanation of relevant dynamics. 
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5.2 Outcomes of the CPIA in Ethiopia 
5.2.1 CPIA ratings and IDA allocations   
Observations from the document analysis on the CPIA outcomes 
The CPIA assessment culminates from the preparation of individual rat-
ings for each of the five indicators covered under Cluster D (Public Sec-
tor Management and Institutions), which firstly feeds into an overall av-
erage rating for Cluster D, and then into an overall average rating for 
Clusters A-D together, which is officially called the IDA Resource Allo-
cation Index (and more informally the CPIA score). In 2014, Ethiopia 
ranked 11th out of the 37 regional (African) IDA recipient countries, and 
with an overall IDA resource allocation index score of 3.5 was above the 
Sub-Saharan Africa regional average of 3.2 (World Bank 2015: 6). The 
0.1 increase between 2013 and 2014 is attributed to improved financial 
management scores, which are covered under Cluster D. Although the 
grounds for increased and decreased scores are not publicly available, the 
annual Africa CPIA Report does provide a small glimpse into the rea-
sons for differences in scores. The report explains that Ethiopia en-
hanced its auditing reporting, noting that at the federal level the auditing 
coverage was 100% and that reports were submitted in a timely manner. 
Moreover, the 2013 World Bank Public Expenditure and Financial Ac-
countability Assessment, which reviews capacity and provides reform 
guidance, reported a reduction in the deviation of actuals from the budg-
et (World Bank 2015: 32-33). 
 
Where the CPIA provides an assessment of the institutions and policy 
environment of aid recipients, the Bank’s strategic framework also pro-
vides a guide to the focus areas of IDA support. In this regard, the 2013-
2016 World Bank Country Partnership Strategy sets forth the IDA pro-
gramme for Ethiopia. The Country Partnership Strategy focuses on sup-
porting good governance and state-building efforts by focusing on ‘im-
proving public service performance management and responsiveness; 
enhancing space for citizen participation in the development process; 
and enhancing public financial management, procurement, transparency 
and accountability’ (World Bank 2012: 42). The strategy hails various ef-
forts made by the Ethiopian government in the area of governance, par-
ticularly efforts aimed at decentralising authority and improving service 
delivery, public financial management reforms, on-going fiscal decentral-
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isation, public sector reform, the strengthening of legislative and regula-
tory frameworks, and anti-corruption measures (World Bank 2012: 7–8). 
 
Hence, the CPIA score provides an assessment of institutions and 
policies, and the Country Partnership Strategy sheds light on the overall 
framework for the support of Bank operations in Ethiopia. What re-
mains thereafter is the translation of the CPIA score to IDA resource 
allocation, which guides on the financial scope of the strategy. Figure 5.1 
presents information on the CPIA Cluster D score, the IDA Resource 
Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and the IDA 
Country Performance Rating informing the IDA allocation (calculated 
through the application to the CPIA of the formula described in Section 
3.2.2). The IDA Country Performance Rating is only available from 2006 
onwards. 
Figure 5.1  
Ethiopia Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and IDA Country 
Performance Rating 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016).  
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In order to provide insight into IDA allocation dynamics and, particu-
larly, the distribution of funds, the analysis relies on data pertaining to 
IDA commitments and grants1. Commitments refer to ‘the sum of new 
commitments on public and publicly guaranteed loans’ from the IDA, 
whereas ‘[g]rants2 are net disbursements of grants’ from the IDA (World 
Bank 2016c). Instead of comparing the data on commitments and grants, 
the aim rather is to show how the IDA allocation mechanism influences 
both these sources of finance for developing countries. Figure 5.2 pre-
sents information on the Country Performance Rating (on the right axis, 
ranging between 3.2 and 3.5), and IDA commitments and allocated 
grants (on the left axis in US$).  
Figure 5.2  
Ethiopia IDA Grants, IDA Commitments, and Country Performance Rating 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016a). 
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garding this relationship, the strategy notes the following: 
3.2	  3.25	  
3.3	  3.35	  
3.4	  3.45	  
3.5	  
	  -­‐	  	  	  	  
	  500.00	  	  
	  1,000.00	  	  
	  1,500.00	  	  
	  2,000.00	  	  
	  2,500.00	  	  
2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
1	  
=	  
lo
w
	  -­‐	  
6	  
=	  
hi
gh
	  
M
ill
io
ns
	  in
	  (U
S$
)	  	   IDA	  grants	  
IDA	  Commitments	  IDA	  Country	  Performance	  Rating	  
130 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Although over the past few years Ethiopia’s CPR has been relatively stable 
(e.g., between 3.35 in 2006 to 3.37 in 2011), its provisional IDA16 alloca-
tion of US$3.38 billion (e.g., US$1.1bn per year) is close to 28 percent 
higher than IDA15 allocation due to the increased overall size of IDA163. 
The Country Partnership Strategy will span the last two years of IDA16 
(FY13-14) and the first two years of IDA17 (FY15-16). In FY12 Ethio-
pia’s new commitments amounted to US$1.12 billion. The lending pro-
gram for the first two years of Country Partnership Strategy (FY13-14) has 
been designed with a buffer of about 19 percent (US$1.5bn in FY13 and 
US$1.2bn in FY14). Given that the IDA allocation for the two outer years 
of the Country Partnership Strategy (FY15-16) is not available, the Coun-
try Partnership Strategy program is indicative and will be reconfirmed 
based on the IDA17 allocation and discussions with the Government 
(World Bank 2012: 44-45). 
 
The translation of the Country Performance Rating to IDA commit-
ments is described above. In particular, it shows that in spite of the rela-
tive stable Country Performance Rating (3.35 in 2006 to 3.37 in 2011), 
the allocation was relatively higher. Also, the forthcoming commitments 
depend (besides on the future performance rating) on a host of external 
factors, such as the overall size of the IDA commitments, the terms of 
IDA assistance to the country based on the debt sustainability position, 
multilateral debt relief and redistribution, performance and assistance 
terms of other IDA borrowers, and the number of IDA eligible coun-
tries (World Bank 2012: 44). 
 
Based on this, a number of observations can be made. Ethiopia has 
witnessed improvements in Cluster D. In addition, despite relatively sta-
ble country performance ratings, the provisional IDA allocations rose as 
a result of an overall increase of the IDA pool of IDA16 (FY12-14); 
moreover, the final annual allocation depends on a multitude of factors, 
of which the CPIA score is only one.  
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5.2.2 Outcomes of the Public Sector Management and Institutions 
Assessment 
Observations from the interviews on CPIA outcomes 
The functional objective of the CPIA is to inform the aforementioned 
IDA allocations, but its design also has the strong normative objective of 
disciplining adherence to its standards. These standards are operational-
ised through CPIA indicators and source guidelines. However, since the 
CPIA does not release the justification for the annual ratings, nor pro-
vides very detailed information on motivations for increased or de-
creased scores in the annual CPIA reports, a query regarding this was 
posed in interviews with participating World Bank officers. Through 
their involvement in the rating process they could provide valuable in-
sights regarding the more normative outcomes of the CPIA, such as 
whether it informs government decisions to adhere to and adopt some 
of the prescribed principles as a result of the annual review.   
 
It is to be noted that minor changes have occurred in the overall 
CPIA score of Ethiopia. This may be attributable to the CPIA rating be-
ing a composite of different indicators. In the case of Ethiopia, this 
means that changes have occurred in the individual criteria scores, but 
because these often balance each other out, the overall score was im-
pacted only slightly. This changed in 2014 when the overall CPIA score 
increased from 3.4 to 3.5 between 2013 and 2014. However, it is notable 
that the CPIA scores and their underlying indicators actually cannot be 
compared on a longitudinal basis, as indicators’ and scores’ definitions 
are adjusted on an annual basis.  Hence, in actual fact the increased score 
(to 3.5 in 2014) reflected the improved performance of Ethiopia in com-
parison to regional IDA recipients for that year (Interviews with World 
Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 17 September 2015). 
 
Almost all of the officers were of the opinion that the improved per-
formance of Ethiopia was not as a result of the CPIA rating process. Ac-
cording to some of the officers, the government actually was aware that 
increased CPIA scores could result in an increased IDA allocation (In-
terviews with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 17 September 2015). 
However, this knowledge did not provide an incentive for the govern-
ment to adopt the standards of the CPIA. Several reasons for this have 
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been cited. Firstly, it was commonly understood that the government has 
a clear development agenda underscored by an emphasis on prudent fi-
nancial management, but not because it is an assessment criterion of the 
CPIA (Interviews with World Bank officer, 4 August 2015; 16 July 
2015). Secondly, the officers asserted that the relation between perfor-
mance and CPIA scores is not strong enough, thereby marginalising its 
impact. Indeed, some of the officers asserted that Ethiopia’s CPIA rating 
should be higher considering its performance, but that adjusting the rat-
ing (in comparison to the previous year) is discouraged (Interviews with 
World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 21 July (a) 2015). Thirdly, an important 
project management component affects the IDA allocations. The IDA 
funds are allocated and also reallocated on an annual basis following the 
basic parameters of IDA, but adds on a different set of criteria related to 
the ability of governments to absorb finances and expend accordingly 
(Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). As the officer ex-
plained: 
 
… if a country has in the previous year not spent allocated IDA funds, it 
will impact the reallocation of the following year. As the Ethiopian gov-
ernment “front loads”, with expenditure 30% above the annual IDA allo-
cation, it benefits from the annual reallocation, accessing funds from 
countries that have less capacity to absorb and spend funds. The govern-
ment pays particular attention to its ability to absorb and implement pro-
jects, thereby benefiting from funds that theoretically could have gone to 
another country, for example, a country with perhaps more positive pa-
rameters. As the country is populous, and with a relative low GNI and 
stable CPIA score, the Ethiopian government has seen its IDA allocations 
increase over the years (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). 
 
Within the Bank there is a perverse incentive to disburse cash, as this is 
part of the internal project management mechanisms. Hence, a harmony is 
created whereby governments just meet conditionality criteria and funds 
are then disbursed (Interview with World Bank officer, 4 August 2015). 
 
This suggests that the government’s ability to absorb funds – which is 
also reflected in its ability to implement IDA projects and programmes – 
allows it to benefit from the full scale of flexibility arrangements within 
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the IDA project. This is a paradox in the sense that the score of Cluster 
D is assessed within the CPIA, but that one of its key criteria, namely 
effective public management, also impacts the ability of the government 
to utilise the IDA flexibility arrangements to their fullest capacity. As a 
result, the government can benefit from annual reallocations of (amongst 
others) underutilised funds, as it outperforms other countries by front 
loading funds and effectively utilising these. Hence, on the one hand, the 
Bank’s partnerships strategy states that IDA allocations can increase for 
a multitude of reasons, of which the CPIA scores is only one. On the 
other hand, the World Bank officers explained that the CPIA score does 
not fully represent actual performance levels, and that effective fund 
management is an important aspect of IDA allocation processes. In addi-
tion, the officers suggested that the government actually has understood 
the allocation processes quite well by front loading IDA allocations and 
benefiting from reallocations based on the IDA’s flexible arrangements. 
All of this suggests that the CPIA process in Ethiopia has not resulted in 
improving governance by means of linking the assessment process to 
accessing IDA concessional lending. 
 
Analysis 
A recent study on the ability of the CPIA to provide incentives through 
the assessment process suggests something similar in the case of Ethio-
pia. The study analyses the discontent of donors with the manner in 
which the government handled the post-2005 election turmoil, which 
informed the decision of donors to move away from direct budget sup-
port. However, and surprisingly, IDA funding actually increased in the 
same period (2005-2008) – from US$449.9 million to US$634.5 million. 
From this the authors conclude that the CPIA does not signal incentives 
to aid recipients to adhere to its standards as, in fact, this specific period 
should have seen decreased Cluster D scores and annual IDA allocations 
(Sending and Lie 2015: 1001). Indeed, Cluster D scores actually rose 
from 3.1 in 2005 to 3.3 in 2006 and remained at this level until 2008. 
Moreover, also in this study the authors note that the strengthening of 
macroeconomic frameworks was due to ‘the own initiative of the gov-
ernment’ (Sending and Lie 2015: 1002). To be sure, the interviews the 
authors conducted with the government and donor representatives sug-
gest that the government would not alter its development policies to ac-
commodate donor prescriptions. It would rather opt out and risk losing 
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development assistance as result of this decision (Ibid). The study also 
suggests that the lack of a strong link between CPIA scores and IDA 
allocations, as well the difference between what the CPIA prescribes and 
the content of government policy, suggests that the CPIA is not authori-
tative (Sending and Lie 2015: 1003).  
 
 Similarly, Borchgrevink (2008) examines the relation between Ethio-
pia and the international donor community and finds that although the 
donors have applied different policies towards Ethiopia, none of these 
have had much impact in terms of influencing Ethiopian policies. This is 
due to both the inability of donors to follow coherent and coordinated 
strategies, and the strategies employed by the government to resist impo-
sition (p. 195). The author also refers to the turbulent post-2005 election 
period and the grave concerns of donors regarding the consequent insta-
bility. In December of that year, the budget support donors, including 
the World Bank, the European Commission, the African Development 
Bank, and the bilateral support agencies of the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Germany and Sweden, planned to withhold US$375 million, an amount 
which would equal to over 20% of the total aid received in 2004. In addi-
tion, in early 2006 the Development Assistance Group (a forum of 29 
bilateral and multilateral donors to Ethiopia) prepared a joint strategy on 
how to address the situation in a coordinated way, with the aim of fol-
lowing through with political conditionality. However, it became clear 
that aid was actually not reduced, but reallocated to programmes with 
stricter earmarking and monitoring procedures. In addition, in February 
2006 the second United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
was signed, with development projects valued at US$1 billion by 2010 
(Borchgrevink 2008: 210-212). Furthermore, in March of that same year, 
the World Bank announced its pledge of US$1.278 billion in debt relief 
to Ethiopia and the cancellation in June of debt amounting to a further 
US$2.337 billion. The United Kingdom announced its intent to double 
its aid to Ethiopia by the 2007–2008 financial year, as compared to the 
2004-2005 period. Hence, despite the harsh stance taken by the donor 
community, in reality aid remained stable and even increased from 
US$1.910 million in 2005 to US$1.947 million in 2006. Based on this, the 
author can assert that donors that moved aid to the earmarked pro-
grammes did so to continue development operations, to continue en-
gagement with the government, and as a way to enter into and remain in 
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dialogue with the government on governance. This engagement policy 
can be understood as a way of creating a space to influence and persuade 
the government to engage or disengage certain behaviour (Borchgrevink 
2008: 212-213).  
 
On the other hand, Ethiopia has been able to manage its relations in a 
way that limits the influence on its development programmes, and has 
been willing to take tougher stances within the donor community 
(Borchgrevink 2008: 217). To be sure, the Ethiopian government has a 
relative level of autonomy concerning its engagements with donors. This 
autonomy may be explained by the fact that Ethiopia was never colo-
nised and consequently had a state apparatus in place before engaging 
with donors. The exchanges with donors are hence viewed as taking 
place on equal footing, both in the past and present. This is further sup-
ported by the confidence the government has in its own development 
agenda, its entitlements, and its position in relation to the international 
donor community (Furtado and Smith 2007: 1). While the government is 
dependent on aid, it has only accepted policy prescriptions of the Bank 
that fit its own development agenda, and rejecting others. ‘It has largely 
succeeded in controlling the pace and degree of reform’ (Fraser and 
Whitfield 2008: 9). The negotiating power of Ethiopia could be ex-
plained as due the presence of ‘professional civil services, capable state 
institutions, strong planning institutions and centralized aid management 
systems’ (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 12). This is further supported by the 
long-held tradition of strengthening the public order and modern bu-
reaucracy. Not only did this provide the space to pursue a domestic de-
velopment vision, it also gave the government credibility as it pursued 
this vision with relative low levels of corruption and an effective public 
service (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 12). Finally, the translation of a de-
velopment vision into a coherent strategy allows the government to de-
fend its policies and argue against donor policies it does not deem ap-
propriate (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 19). More specific strategies the 
government has adopted entail:  
 
… holding policy dialogues with donors at central level while decisions on 
spending are made at lower levels; splitting up dialogues into separate fo-
rums on narrow themes and thereby avoiding discussion on overarching 
issues; having an authority structure where decisions are made within the 
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party and not in the ministries that participate in dialogues; separating do-
nors in different dialogue forums; balancing traditional donors with new 
sources of funding, such as China, to reduce dependence; and resisting 
foreign-funded technical assistance (Furtado and Smith 2008 as cited in 
Borchgrevink 2008: 216).  
 
These studies point to two overall observations. Firstly, the strict ap-
plication of selectivity by increasing aid to good performers and reducing 
aid to poor performers is more complicated in practice than it appears. 
Secondly, the government of Ethiopia has been able to manage its rela-
tionship with the donor community in such a way that donors have had 
limited influence on its development programme and vision. These ob-
servations further can be placed in context by linking aid dependency 
dynamics to the concept of regime survival. In this regard, the threat of 
aid withdrawal (as was the case in 2005 when the donors were not 
pleased with the manner in which the government handled the post-
election processes) did not actually make the government comply with 
donors’ wishes. On the one hand, this may be explained by the depend-
ency of the regime on (aid) resources (Hassan 2013: 1), which significant-
ly raised the political stakes of the threat made by donors to levels that 
were unacceptable to the government. On the other hand, it would also 
have been politically very risky for the government to comply with the 
donors’ wishes (as it would have meant that the government would, for 
instance, not use force to secure its domestic political position) 
(Borchgrevink 2008: 217). These observations also seem to hold true in 
the case of the CPIA in Ethiopia. Here, it is possible to see that the 
CPIA standards have had a limited influence on government policies, 
and the government has been able to “manage” the IDA allocation dy-
namics by focusing on fund absorption as reflected in the internal alloca-
tion dynamics within the IDA.  
 
5.2.3 CPIA adoption of standards and developmentality 
This section analysed the outcomes and overall influence of the CPIA 
assessment process, and particularly gauged how CPIA scores inform the 
size of IDA concessional finance and thereby disciplines Ethiopia to 
adopt the prescriptive policies it promotes. The analysis showed that the 
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World Bank uses the CPIA score as a form of knowledge and disciplines 
aid recipients – based on reward and punishment through IDA devel-
opment finance – on the appropriate norms regarding public sector 
management and institutions. This form of disciplining is not geared to-
wards creating obedience, but rather is focused on making aid recipients 
responsible for their performance, resulting in the “willing” adoption of 
the appropriate governance framework (Dean 1999: 19-20 as cited in 
Lo ̈wenheim 2008: 258-259). This furthermore produces a hierarchical 
relation between the Bank and aid recipients, as it for instance constructs 
Ethiopia as in need of good governance, which further legitimises the 
governance norms put forth in the CPIA (Abrahamsen 2000: ix-x). 
 
However, the case of Ethiopia shows that the translation between 
knowledge and power is not made effectively. Indeed, two critical obser-
vations were made in the analysis – that despite relative stable country 
performance ratings, the provisional IDA allocations to Ethiopia could 
nevertheless rise, and that a multitude of other factors inform IDA con-
cessional grant allocations; these comprise both internal grant adminis-
trative processes (guiding principles of annual reallocations) and external 
processes that influence the overall size of the IDA pool. This means 
that the coercive pressures exerted through the CPIA process are inade-
quate in providing the necessary (dis)incentives to engage in particular 
behaviour (Stokke 1995: 11-12). Here, a paradox seemingly exists, as the 
government of Ethiopia has understood that the administrative logic of 
IDA grant administration processes – defines, but also works against its 
principal source of power. The government has used this knowledge in 
its engagements with the Bank. Instead of considering adopting the gov-
ernance standards promoted in the CPIA, Ethiopia resorts to its own 
overall strategic vision for national development. In this vision of devel-
opmental states, planning and the principles of sound public financial 
management are strongly emphasised. Moreover, rather than adhering or 
succumbing to external pressures to exercise self-governance, the focus 
on public financial management and the absorption of funds has been 
central to the ability of the government to spearhead its national devel-
opment endeavours. The paradox is that the CPIA assesses these capaci-
ties within the content of the rating, but also again as a criterion in the 
subsequent allocation and reallocation processes. As a country that has 
become adept in “managing” donors, it has been able to engage with the 
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policies that the CPIA promotes (good public sector management and 
institutions) within the context of the overall strategic vision of its na-
tional development agenda.  
 
The case of Ethiopia suggests that the government has been able to 
manage the impacts of CPIA processes – what initially seemed like a 
powerful tool of coercion – by engaging with the inherent logic on 
which the assessment is based, namely that aid is more effective in coun-
tries with sound institutions and policies. What emerges is the suggestion 
that Ethiopia is not being “ruled” indirectly by donors because the CPIA 
assessment is ineffective in influencing the behaviour of the state (Lie 
2015a: 242). Rather, the mechanisms of coercion (access to IDA alloca-
tions) can be managed by focusing on the administrative processes that 
inform the allocation. This means that the productive power of the 
CPIA is ineffective in shaping Ethiopia’s conduct (Abrahamsen 2004: 
1463).  
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the outcomes of 
the CPIA process in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical propo-
sitions 3a and 3b as follows: 
3a: The translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipient is in-
effective, as the Bank does not make the appropriate connection be-
tween norms, performance, and punishment/reward. The CPIA is 
only one of several factors determining final IDA country allocations. 
As a result, the CPIA process does not discipline Ethiopia to adhere 
to its policy standards by engendering self-optimisation; and   
3b: Ethiopia is adept in “managing” its engagements with donors and 
has been able to resist adopting governance standards it does not 
deem appropriate. This level of autonomy is also grounded in the 
presence of proper structures of financial management, which para-
doxically positively influence the ability of Ethiopia to benefit from 
annual IDA reallocations. 
 
 Outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia 139 
5.3 Outcomes of the APRM in Ethiopia 
5.3.1 Political commitment to implementing the APRM findings 
Observations from interviews on the APRM outcomes 
Ethiopia underwent its peer review during the 14th Summit of the APR 
Forum on 29 January 2011. However, the Peer Review Report was only 
launched in January 2013, two full years later, in the presence of the cur-
rent Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. This begs the question of 
what happened in this period to delay the report’s launch. The external 
review report describes some of the immediate steps taken by the gov-
ernment following the completion of the review in 2010. The report 
notes that the NGC was dissolved following the completion of the self-
assessment and that no meetings were conducted following the comple-
tion of the Country Review Mission; the office of the NGC Secretariat 
also discontinued its activities by June 2010. The regulation enacted by 
the government to manage the APRM processes was formally repealed 
in August 2010, and the rights and obligations were transferred from the 
NGC Secretariat to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
(Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 10). At the time of the writing of that report, 
no action had been taken to establish offices or personnel for these 
tasks, and according to their research, the officials of the Ministry were 
unaware of the responsibilities that were transferred to them (Fisseha 
and Tadesse 2011: 19).  
 
During the official launch of the report in 2013, the Prime Minister 
made the following remarks: 
 
Ethiopia highly values the report, as it would be used as a reference mate-
rial in designing future plans of the country to improve governance and to 
address identified deficiencies in the thematic areas studied … Together 
with the National Plan of Action that Ethiopia prepared, it has a good in-
formation base to track progress and chart the road ahead for good gov-
ernance … Ethiopia joined the APRM out of deep conviction, as the peer 
review is good for Africa as a whole (Rajaonary 2013).  
 
The NPoA describes the priorities and commitments the government 
made to address the challenges reported in the Country Self Assessment 
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Report and the Country Review Report. The government committed an 
estimated ‘USD 27.581 billion over a five-year period from 2010 to 
2015’, of which US$5.2 billion (19%) was allocated to strengthening de-
mocracy and political governance4 (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 
2011: 290). The Programme of Action describes specific actions for each 
of the thematic areas reviewed, and actions for crosscutting issues identi-
fied in the report (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 290). The 
NPoA is coordinated and regularly monitored and evaluated by the 
House of Peoples Representatives (the parliament), the government Cab-
inet, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and grass-
roots level institutions (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 294-295). 
 
As the NPoA is presented as a logical framework, it is more difficult 
to provide a summary of its content regarding democracy and political 
governance. To give an indication, however, it can be revealed that the 
NPoA contains a commitment to ‘enhance the adoption of international 
and regional standards and codes’ and lists the various treaties to be 
signed and ratified, as well as other, related activities such as civic educa-
tion (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 297-298). Thereafter it pro-
vides a detailed list of actions for each of the nine sub-objectives under 
the theme “Democracy and Political Governance”. It includes specific 
and very detailed objectives and describes the required specific actions, 
monitoring indicators, means of verification, on-going initiatives, the 
agency responsible for implementation, as well as relevant stakeholders 
engaged in this subject. Moreover, it presents a timeline of action (in-
clude a baseline, a plan, and targets within the implementation period) 
and outlines the expected outputs, estimate costs, and particular moni-
toring and evaluation arrangements (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 
2011: 297). 
 
However, since the release of the Country Review Report, Ethiopia 
has not presented any progress report related to the implementation of 
the NPoA. It can be noted that member states are not obliged to publicly 
release these reports, as they only need to be submitted to the secretariat; 
however, there is no indication that this was done. In the interviews with 
APRM respondents, this issue was raised, alongside questions regarding 
the possible motivation for holding off on the report release, since this 
could be indicative of low political commitment to the process and 
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NPoA implementation. In this regard, the government representative 
explained that due to the change of leadership of the government and 
the minister responsible for the APRM process, the processes were not 
properly followed up on. He noted that the governing council could 
have played a role in taking initiative to request the progress report from 
the government, and that the APRM institutions could have brought this 
matter to the government’s attention. However, he also noted that this 
does not mean that no work has been done, only that it has not been 
reported. In this regard, the government representative believed that an-
nual reporting might be too frequent to assess progress, unless, of 
course, implementation regards the enactment of legislation (Interview 
with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015). Issues re-
lated to the change of leadership were also touted by other respondents 
(Interviews with member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015; with 
continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with national 
APRM expert, 16 September 2015). 
 
However, the most common explanation provided by the other re-
spondents is the suggestion that the government and, particularly, the 
late Prime Minister was not pleased with the content of the report (In-
terviews with non-governmental member of National Governing Coun-
cil, 29 July 2015; with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; 
with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with con-
tinental APRM expert, 21 July 2015). But other, more political dynamics 
also may have impacted these processes. For instance, one of the Coun-
try Review Mission members shared that the relation between the Panel 
and the government of Ethiopia deteriorated after the finalisation of the 
process. Supposedly, the relation between the late Prime Minister and 
then-Lead Panellist Prof. Adebayo Adedeji was tense, as was that be-
tween the APRM Focal Point of the government and the Panel (Inter-
view with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015). Another 
respondent stated that: 
 
The report launch was delayed, as the government was uncomfortable 
with the tone and findings of the report, and readily aware that reviews 
may have negative consequences. As the government is more closed off, 
there is a certain discomfort with exposing itself to an external review. Al-
so, the government may have feared that the APRM report could possibly 
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cast any negative shadow on the 2010 election outcome. Hence, the de-
layed release is a clever, sophisticated and subtle manner in which to man-
age the consequences of the actual findings. Regretfully, this does not 
show strong government commitment to the spirit of the APRM (Inter-
view with continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015). 
 
A related issue concerns the lack of institutional platform of the APRM 
within the government. Indeed, it seems that the lack of ownership of the 
report created a leadership vacuum to proceed with the report launch and 
implementation (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).  
 
Analysis 
Various explanations are proposed for the delay in releasing the Ethiopi-
an Country Review Report, including the discontent of the government 
with the critical nature of the report, the fact that the responsibility for 
APRM implementation was not allocated to an office, as well as the de-
teriorating relationship between the late Prime Minister and then-Lead 
Panellist, and between the APRM Focal Point and the Panel. It seems 
that the report release delay marked a key site of resistance for the gov-
ernment and also particularly indicated a space where the role of the 
Panel to support APRM processes clashed with the position of the gov-
ernment. Here, the government had the power simply to refrain from 
releasing the report as a strategy to counter the report’s critical content. 
It allowed the government to manage its external legitimacy, albeit for a 
short period, with its African peers and international stakeholders. This 
would suggest that the government was unafraid of burning bridges 
where it deemed fit, especially when it came to the Panel.  
 
The government representative also noted that an annual progress re-
port might not have been feasible in the context of the long-term struc-
tural engagements in the areas of democracy and good governance. In 
addition, just because progress reports have not been prepared, this does 
not mean that no work has been done. This again shows how the gov-
ernment was able to manage the outcomes of the process by co-opting 
the report within the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, but seemingly without assigning an office or 
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agency to its implementation. On the one hand this is good, as the 
NPoA was never meant to be a standalone exercise, and should find its 
place within the national development planning structures. On the other 
hand, however, the lack of a clear indication regarding committed activi-
ties (e.g. through progress reporting) allows the government to basically 
ignore the NPoA, its findings, and to stick to the original course of ac-
tion in the areas of democracy and political governance. In this regard, it 
is the horizontal and vertical processes within the APRM that engage 
with disciplining powers and attempt to persuade governments into 
committing to the implementation of the NPoA: the exertion of pressure 
by peer countries and civil society. These drivers of political commit-
ment are examined in the following two sections. 
 
5.3.2 Horizontal pressures to support commitment – the role of 
peers  
Observations from interviews on the APRM outcomes 
The peer review that took place during the APR Forum was a critical 
moment in the APRM process. The Forum was also significant because 
it was a platform envisioned for leaders to share best practices and en-
courage one another, challenge current governance practices, and sup-
port each other in attaining the objectives set forth in the NPoA. In the 
Country Review Report, an overview is provided of the discussions that 
ensued during the peer review process of Ethiopia. It is to be noted that 
the late Prime Minister was perhaps in a more defensive mode during the 
meeting, as he dismissed the findings of the democratic and governance 
assessment of his country. Another respondent recalled that the late 
Prime Minister even walked out of the room in protest. Having said that, 
the peer review is supposed to occur in a cyclical manner instead of 
once. (For instance when countries present their progress reports and 
there is a discussion on outcomes). However, Ethiopia has not presented 
any progress reports, and this raises the question of whether the peers, 
namely other African countries, could provide this necessary pressure to 
implement commitments set forth in the NPoA. 
 
The overall responsibility for the APRM is assigned to a committee of 
participating heads of state and governments of the Member States of 
the African Union, together forming the APR Forum. The APR Forum 
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has the ultimate responsibility for oversight of the APRM’s organisation 
and process for mutual learning and capacity building, and for exercising 
constructive peer dialogues and persuasive techniques required to render 
the APRM effective, credible and acceptable. It is to be noted that given 
such a wide-ranging mandate, for peer review to be effective, it is im-
portant for the heads of state and governments to sufficiently under-
stand and, more importantly, to accept the working of the entire peer 
review process, its objectives, and their role in promoting and achieving 
those goals and in sharing these values. Central to this is the modality, 
manner and earnest with which peer review discussions are supposed to 
be conducted to ensure effective engagement and consequent commit-
ment to take the necessary remedial measures to attain common objec-
tives. Here, the role of the APRM analytical reports such as the Country 
Review Report and the progress reports are critical tools to influence 
reform. However, this has been constrained by the length of the Country 
Review Reports and untimely and inadequate reporting on NPoA pro-
gress (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with con-
tinental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with member of 
Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).  
 
Only half of the countries have been reviewed and the others seem disin-
terested to start the process. Of the countries reviewed, there are almost 
no progress reports submitted and when they are, these are not properly 
discussed, making it a self-reporting exercise (Interview with continental 
APRM expert, 21 July 2015). 
 
Further concerns have also been raised that the APR Forum has be-
come more or less a club for “comrades”, where, irrespective of perfor-
mance, countries are not held accountable for their actions. This is at-
tributed to a lack of political will to hold one another accountable, which 
is related to geo-politics and the absence of strong pioneers. It also sug-
gested that members who are not always present at the meetings under-
mine the Forum. For instance, some heads of state have a tendency to 
send representatives to Forum meetings. This is also not helped by the 
limited time allocated for the APR Forum meetings, which take place on 
the sidelines of the annual African Union Summit (Interviews with con-
tinental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with continental APRM expert, 31 
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July 2015; and with member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 
2015).  
 
Significantly, with the departure from office of the pioneer heads of state 
in the likes of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, and to some extent 
the death of Meles Zenawi, there is less enthusiasm among the current 
crop of African leaders for the work of the APRM. This has, to a large ex-
tent, worked against the original objectives of the APRM  (Interview with 
member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015). 
 
Regarding this, it is critical to note that the late Prime Minister of 
Ethiopia had a strong character and was difficult to engage with or coun-
ter while he was chair of the Forum. The position of the country as a 
geo-political force in the region, as the home of the African Union, and 
as home to a large donor community, as well as its big and growing 
economy, leaves other countries with less of an ability to leverage their 
influence. Indeed, the APRM Forum members were referred to as “birds 
of a feather”, with heads of state trying to be respectful to one other, 
thereby creating a situation where countries undergoing the review are 
patted on the back without having to make real reforms (Interviews with 
continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015; and with civil society actor, 1 
September 2015). 
 
This is the challenge of the APRM, if it is not to be a “toothless” force for 
enforcing the accountability of its member states to their obligations under 
the base document and MoU. But the issue must be seen as a medium- to 
long-term one, and the power of moral suasion unfolds slowly but inexo-
rably (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015). 
 
The horizontal pressures of heads of states as exhibited in the Forum 
meetings have been extremely disappointing. Attendance is extremely low, 
and meetings are procedural and rushed. In the beginning there was a live-
ly discussion, for example on the report of Ghana, and even the late Prime 
Minister of Ethiopia made active and critical contributions on the report, 
but currently the mechanism suffers from fatigue and loss of momentum 
(Interview with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015).  
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Moreover, something could also be said about the receptiveness of 
the Ethiopian government to peer persuasion or influence, which is the 
crux of the peer dialogue. In this regard, the receptiveness to external 
feedback was questioned, and it was suggested that often the govern-
ment takes on more of a defensive role, which would also influence the 
level of peer pressure (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 Sep-
tember 2015).  
 
Analysis 
Horizontal dialogue is the pinnacle of inter-state disciplining and pro-
vides the space for constructive peer persuasion in the context of the 
APRM. This takes place at the APR Forum meetings, where the partici-
pating heads of state and governments convene to discuss country and 
progress reports. The main aim of these meetings, besides activities relat-
ing to learning and sharing of best practices, also relates to the promo-
tion of adherence to the APRM norms that guide the process and con-
tent, as embodied in the NEPAD and APRM declarations. However, 
various challenges arise in this process of normalising adherence to the 
principles of democracy and political governance. These relate to the 
technical aspects of these dialogue processes, as it quite a comprehensive 
task to engage fully with the country reports. Inadequate and untimely 
reporting by member states further hamper the dialogue processes. Fur-
thermore, the political will to exert pressures remains problematic, as 
these also reflect the geo-political roles of member states.  
 
Besides this, the Forum no longer includes the original pioneers as 
gatekeepers of the process, and the review process is influenced by geo-
political considerations that trump the principles of the review. Indeed, 
not all countries are on equal standing within the Forum, and Ethiopia is 
a strong and powerful country often assuming leadership roles within 
international fora. This seems to be reflected in the procedures of the 
Forum, which have become more formal and procedural, and whose 
meetings are a side activity to the strategic African Union summit meet-
ings. This, in combination with the strong stance taken by Ethiopia dur-
ing its peer review meeting and subsequent delay in releasing the report, 
is also indicative of the extent to which the government is receptive to 
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external guidance, particularly when it concerns democracy and political 
governance.  
 
Hence, various structural challenges and country-related factors affect 
the peer dialogue processes. These are related to the political “weight” 
the government carries within international fora such as the APR Forum, 
and these limit the scope of horizontal pressures on the government to 
adhere to the commitments set forth in the NPoA.  
 
5.3.3 Vertical pressures to support commitment – the role of 
national actors  
Observations from interviews on the APRM outcomes 
A country’s commitment to democracy and political governance is em-
bodied within the content of the APRM review, but also in the process 
of preparing the review report, which has a distinct participatory process. 
Participatory processes help broaden ownership and strengthen com-
mitment and impact in support of the NPoA implementation. The gov-
erning council was supposed to be a key vehicle for achieving this, but its 
functions were formally repealed shortly after the review process was 
concluded. Hence, this left only the national actors that were involved in 
the review or those that had an interest in engaging with these processes 
to promote accountability and commitment to implementing the com-
mitments set forth the NPoA.  
 
The ability for non-state actors to monitor the implementation of the 
NPoA is first and foremost impacted by the decision to delay the release 
of the report, along with the lack of clarity regarding the integration of 
the NPoA commitments within the larger national development agenda 
of the Ethiopian government. Indeed, it is not clear whether the gov-
ernment implemented the NPoA, as progress reports have not been pre-
pared; moreover, it is not clear which department has assumed responsi-
bility for these tasks:  
 
There is no possibility for civil society organisations to monitor the im-
plementation of the APRM, as there is no responsible institution or per-
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son assigned to the implementation of the plan (Interview with civil socie-
ty actor, 1 September 2015).  
 
A number of contextual considerations also hamper the space for 
non-state actors to engage in monitoring the NPoA. In this regard, the 
Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 12/2009 was cited as a serious 
impediment to this civic space that civic actors required for engaging 
with the government. The legislation prescribes that non-state actors can 
only engage with the government regarding issues related to democracy 
and political governance if a minimum of 90% of its resources is raised 
domestically. This de facto means that an organisation that receives more 
than 10% of its finance from abroad cannot engage in any issues related 
to governance (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; 
with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; and with non-
governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).  
 
 The government believes that improving governance is the responsibility 
of the state and does not include a strong role for civil society (Interview 
with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 
2015). 
 
I do not think that non-state actors in Ethiopia have the courage, let alone 
the capacity, to monitor the implementation of the NPoA (Interview with 
member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).  
 
One of the respondents also shared an interesting personal experience 
related to the organisation of a symposium in Addis Ababa on APRM 
knowledge with civil society:  
 
I found it difficult to locate civil society organisations willing to participate, 
and for the research, it took a lot of effort to obtain a valid sample size. 
Civil society organisations feared deregistration if they were to engage in 
the study. The study was conducted in an atmosphere of fear, as civil soci-
ety organisations were even more fearful to speak in comparison to the 
time of the APRM review … I have not seen this level of opacity and lack 
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of transparency in implementation in any of the other countries reviewed 
under APRM (Interview with continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015). 
 
This brings to light an important consideration of these participatory 
processes – that the APRM provides a framework for participatory pro-
cesses, but that these are ultimately shaped by the political context of a 
country. In this regard, the domestic political and legal environment for 
participatory processes should be problematised further. The ability of 
non-state actors to participate in an instrumental manner is influenced by 
their relationship with the government (Interviews with continental 
APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with continental APRM Secretariat member, 
29 July 2015; with continental APRM expert, 30 July 2015; and with 
member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015). 
 
Analysis 
Various challenges arise regarding the ability of non-state actors to play a 
monitoring role of the NPoA. One the one hand, this is related to the 
fact that the government integrated the APRM within the ministerial 
structures to such an extent that it is not clear which department is re-
sponsible for the implementation and who carries financial responsibility 
for the actions of the NPoA. This is further complicated by the absence 
of progress reports. On the other hand, there is also a context of strin-
gent state and civil society relations, which are formally embodied by the 
rather restrictive legislation governing the operation of non-state actors 
in Ethiopia. In the Country Review Report the civil society Proclamation 
is problematised, and the late Prime Minister responds to this issue as 
follows: 
 
On the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 12/2009, cited in 
Paragraph 176, the Prime Minister explained that the law aimed to 
protect the sovereignty of the people of Ethiopia. He indicated 
that, as done in USA, foreign NGOs are not allowed to fund polit-
ical parties because that practice compromises the sovereignty of 
Ethiopia. He noted that foreign NGOs work for foreign govern-
ments and that Ethiopia passed this law to limit foreign-funded 
entities. He emphasised that if an NGO gets 90% of its funding 
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from abroad, then it was not qualified to operate within Ethiopia 
as a local NGO (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 351). 
 
While the late Prime Minister worded it slightly differently, the proc-
lamation actually states that local NGOs are those that raise no more 
than 10% of their funding from abroad. In this context, it is difficult to 
imagine a role for non-state actors in supporting and monitoring the im-
plementation of the NPoA. In this context it is also difficult to consider 
these non-state actors as essential actors in the vertical peer dialogue 
processes. Thus, it seems that the government pushed back on the adop-
tion of the APRM content (governance standards) by constraining the 
ability of societal actors to engage in the outcomes of the country review. 
The ultimate aim of the review process is to strengthen democracy, and 
as such it should be considered as a long-term process, filled with con-
testation, resistance and improvements along the way. From the initial 
evidence it is possible to ascertain that the deliberate participatory 
framework for priority-setting in these areas is already an outcome. 
However, the evidence also suggests that this not necessarily opens up a 
space for change, as the APRM operates within the framework of estab-
lished political cultures. In this regard, these cultures refer to established 
norms that determine how development planning should take place, who 
legitimate contributors to these processes are, and the content of such 
plans and strategies. This approach is captured in Ethiopia’s develop-
mental state model, which is not necessarily democratic and builds upon 
a strong role for the state in national development planning.  These 
norms may not necessarily fit with the operationalisation of democracy 
and political governance in the context of APRM, and could provide an 
initial explanation for the limited outcomes of the review process.  
 
5.3.4 APRM adoption of standards and developmentality 
The APRM envisions the acceleration of progress towards adopting and 
implementing the priorities and programmes of NEPAD, through the 
self-assessment process and by relying on horizontal peer dialogue pro-
cesses and vertical national stakeholder engagement processes promoting 
mutual accountability. Or in the words of the late Prime Minister: 
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The democratic forms that NEPAD espouses, even when they lack sub-
stance, give us the instruments for peaceful transformation. The economic 
strategies of NEPAD can serve as the guidelines in the struggle for eco-
nomic transformation. The peer review process of NEPAD gives us the 
opportunity to learn from and emulate best practice and to pressurise the 
forces of the status quo to move forward. NEPAD does not provide a 
quick fix, but a guide for action for the long haul (Zenawi 2002: 4). 
 
However, the late Prime Minister’s external commitment to the prin-
ciples of the APRM did not translate into tangible outcomes resulting 
from the process. For various reasons, the official release of the Country 
Review Report was delayed, marking a late conclusion of the review pro-
cess and of the subsequent commencement of the implementation of the 
NPoA. Since then, the government has not released any progress re-
ports, and the status of the APRM and the NPoA remains unclear. The 
APRM processes pre-empt possible faltering political commitment by 
institutionalising horizontal and vertical pressures within the mechanism. 
The horizontal peer dialogue processes take place at the APR Forum 
meetings and provide a space for rationalising and promoting the norms 
envisioned in the APRM. Nevertheless, this space is also a site of re-
sistance, as norms openly clash. This was evident, for example, in the 
public claim of the late Prime Minister that the review of democracy and 
political governance was based on dead principles of the Washington 
Consensus.  
 
However, less open forms of resistance reflect internal power dynam-
ics, embodied by concepts such as political “weight” and “status”, which 
influence the ability to speak critically to a relative strong country like 
Ethiopia. Furthermore, domestic legislation seriously impacts the vertical 
processes of accountability governing the engagements of non-state ac-
tors with the government, which provides additional evidence of the 
strained relationship between the government and non-state actors. The-
se dynamics all cast doubt on the ability of either the peer dialogue pro-
cesses or non-state actors to spur political commitment to the NPoA. 
Considering the aforementioned, it may come as no surprise that the 
substantive outcomes of the review process have been limited.  
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Various dynamics come into play in these processes, such as the role 
of maintaining external legitimacy, reflected in a political commitment to 
the process, but, when this commitment requires a contestation in estab-
lished governance dynamics, this is met by resistance as exhibited in the 
peer dialogue processes and using various strategies to basically negate 
the domestic impact of the review outcomes, and act as if it never took 
place. This observation is problematic, as it conflicts with the vision up-
on which APRM is based. At a basic level, the inter-intra discipline 
mechanism is weak and fairly easily can be resisted, but more problemat-
ic are dynamics that enable participating states to uphold appearances, 
undergo the review process, but not face pressure from peers to be held 
accountable. This could be explained by viewing the APRM not as a 
form of resistance against external donor agendas on development and 
governance, but as the possible internalisation of such agendas. The 
normalisation of the good governance agenda makes it seem necessary 
(normal and natural) for African countries to pursue democracy and po-
litical governance on the continent (Taylor 2009: 52). African countries 
are continuously disciplined to follow a particular donor framework for 
development that requires good governance, and are engendered to ex-
ercise self-control (Lie 2006: 16). The APRM therefore may be seen not 
as a form of resistance against this donor agenda, but rather as an exam-
ple of the “conduct of conduct” where the subject governs itself (Fou-
cault 1982: 789). This is reflected in the development of an elaborate 
self-assessment process that African countries undertake on a voluntarily 
basis (an example of freedom) and guides on necessary reforms needed 
to strengthen governance in APRM member states. Moreover, this ap-
proach allows African countries to diffuse external pressures by adopting 
practices that are deemed legitimate in the eyes of donors (Frumkin and 
Galaskiewicz 2004: 285-286), thereby “rebranding” the entire continent 
as one committed to good governance (Schwak 2016: 428). 
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the outcomes of 
the APRM process in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical prop-
ositions 3c to 3d as follows: 
3c: The APRM process does not discipline African countries to ad-
here to its policy framework; 
3d: Inter-state disciplining of the government is weak, as the Forum 
can act as a space for openly dismissing report outcomes or indirectly 
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retaining legitimacy by nominal compliance, reflected in subjection to 
the review process without strong compliance regarding progress re-
porting;  
3e: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM operates within the 
confines of established state-society structures and does not alter the-
se by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for 
non-state actors; and 
3f: Rather than challenging external development strategies and coer-
cive financial pressures exerted by donors, the APRM seems to have 
internalised the good governance agenda. The APRM is an example 
of institutional isomorphism and continental branding of African val-
ues on governance that internalise the normalisation of good govern-
ance. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the outcomes of CPIA and APRM assessments. 
It focused on answering the following question: how have CPIA and 
APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance 
standards in Ethiopia? In the case of the CPIA, the findings suggest that 
they have had no influence on the promotion of related governance 
standards. This is explained by the inadequate link between governance 
norms, performance (the rating process), and punishment/reward (the 
IDA allocation process). The link is not made effectively as grant admin-
istrative dynamics impact IDA allocation and in the case of stable CPIA 
scores, countries can increase their IDA commitments regardless. In-
deed, the CPIA is only one factor determining the IDA allocations, and a 
multitude of internal and external factors inform the final country alloca-
tion. Closely related to this is the particular relationship Ethiopia has en-
joyed with its donors. In this regard, the government has been able to 
manage relations in such a way that it has been able to resist adopting 
governance standards it does not consider appropriate. This level of au-
tonomy is also grounded in the presence of suitable structures of finan-
cial management, which paradoxically positively influence the ability of 
Ethiopia to benefit from annual IDA reallocations. As a result, the CPIA 
process does not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its policy standards.  
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In the case of the APRM, the findings similarly suggest that it has had 
no influence on the promotion of related governance standards. Hori-
zontal and vertical pressures as the two drivers of change were unsuc-
cessful in promoting the implementation of the NPoA. The inter-state 
disciplining mechanisms of the APRM are rather weak, as the Forum 
provides a space for openly dismissing report outcomes or for indirectly 
retaining legitimacy through nominal compliance regarding the peer re-
view process. This practice is also present in the case of Ethiopia, where 
the late Prime Minister dismissed and disregarded the findings of the re-
port (in relation to democracy and political governance), and where it 
remains unclear who is responsible for the implementation of the NPoA 
and whether any progress has been made in this regard. Furthermore, 
the role of non-state actors in monitoring the NPoA is limited due to 
restrictive legislation governing the engagement between state and civil 
society. This suggests that the intra-state disciplining mechanisms of 
APRM are also rather weak, as these operate within the confines of es-
tablished state-society engagements and do not alter this relationship by 
mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state 
actors. As a result, the APRM process does not discipline African coun-
tries to adhere to its policy framework. While these challenges could be 
understood as reflecting “weak implementation”, it also may be indica-
tive of other dynamics. The APRM seems to have internalised the good 
governance agenda and as an approach actually responds (rather than 
challenges) the pressures exerted by donors, allowing the continent to 
rebrand itself as being (at least nominally) committed to governance.  
 
Notes 
 
1 IDA country allocations have only been made available on IDA’s website since 
2012. As this study is also interested in allocation dynamics before this year, the 
decision has been made to include information on IDA commitments and IDA 
grants, which are readily made available on the World Bank DataBank. 
2 ‘IDA funds are allocated to the recipient countries in relation to their income 
levels and record of success in managing their economies and their ongoing IDA 
projects. IDA's lending terms are highly concessional, meaning that IDA credits 
carry no or low interest charges. The lending terms are determined with reference 
to recipient countries' risk of debt distress, the level of Gross National Income 
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per capita, and creditworthiness for the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) borrowing. Recipients with a high risk of debt distress 
receive 100 percent of their financial assistance in the form of grants and those 
with a medium risk of debt distress receive 50 percent in the form of grants. 
Other recipients receive IDA credits on regular or blend and hard-terms with 38-
year and 25-year maturities respectively’ (IDA 2017).  
3 ‘IDA15 covered period of FY09-11; IDA16 covers FY12-14 and IDA17 will 
cover FY15-17. IDA resource envelopes are provided for 3-year replenishment 
cycles. The FY13 allocation for Ethiopia of Special Drawing Rights SDR759.2 
million (equivalent of US$1.2bn) is firm while the FY14 allocation of SDR 
664.5mln (US$1.1bn) is indicative and can change depending on: (i) total IDA 
resources available in the respective fiscal year; (ii) Ethiopia’s performance rat-
ing; (iii) the terms of IDA's assistance to the country (grants or credits) in the 
respective fiscal year based on Ethiopia’s debt sustainability position; (iv) 
MDRI debt relief and the redistribution of the MDRI compensatory resources 
as applicable; (v) the performance and assistance terms of other IDA borrow-
ers; and (vi) the number of IDA-eligible countries. Note that Ethiopia’s IDA 
envelope was provided in SDR terms, and the US dollar equivalent amounts are 
converted using the IDA16 replenishment rate of 1SDR=US$1.50233; howev-
er, the exchange rate for each IDA operation depends on the applicable prevail-
ing rate at the time of project approval’ (World Bank 2012: 44). 
4 ‘USD 10.12 Million (0.37 percent) to Economic Governance and Management; 
USD 14.32 Billion (52 percent) to Corporate Governance and USD 7.99 Billion 
(29 percent) to Socio-Economic Development’ (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 
2011: 290).  
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6 CPIA and APRM applications in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria 
 
 	  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the application of the CPIA and APRM in differ-
ent and similar governance contexts. Through an analysis of three coun-
try case studies, namely of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it focuses on 
answering the following research question: did similar or different dy-
namics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, 
Nigeria and Ghana? The chapter presents the salient observations re-
garding the application and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in the 
primary case of Ethiopia, and replicates these findings through an analy-
sis of similar factors for the case studies of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. 
The main aim of the analysis is to contextualise the findings pertaining to 
the case study of Ethiopia to broader dynamics in other African coun-
tries (comparative similarity and dissimilarity to Ethiopia). The evidence 
is informed solely by a document analysis of the CPIA and APRM appli-
cations for the three country case studies. In the case of the CPIA, the 
analysis presents evidence on the CPIA scores, IDA allocations, and 
governance outcomes as narrated in World Bank documentation, in par-
ticular in the Country Partnership Strategy for each country. In the case 
of the APRM, the analysis presents evidence on the process descriptions 
in the Country Review Reports, progress reports, and external process 
and outcome reviews. The application and outcomes of the CPIA and 
APRM in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana are cross-synthesised and thereaf-
ter analysed through the analytical lens of developmentality (including 
relevant concepts drawn from the governmentality framework). The the-
oretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics fur-
ther support the analysis. 
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6.2 The CPIA applications in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana 
6.2.1 Main findings in the Ethiopian country case study 
The case study of Ethiopia showed that CPIA processes followed the 
technical procedures as laid out in the process documents, with the ex-
ception being the consultation with the government on draft scores. Alt-
hough very interesting, this is possibly less relevant from a comparative 
perspective, as the main tool of discipline is not these government con-
sultations of draft scores. In fact, the CPIA documents state that, besides 
serving to discuss the initial score with the government, the aim is also to 
provide a space for the government to present other documents for con-
sideration. However, this is not the main vehicle whereby the CPIA is 
envisaged to support change. Rather, the process of change is linked to 
the performance-based allocation system and the selectivity principles 
guided by Cluster D of the CPIA and final IDA commitments. Hence, 
the focus of the analysis is the CPIA and its ability to discipline govern-
ments through IDA allocation processes. Both the Country Partnership 
Strategy and the interviewed Bank officers working in Ethiopia revealed 
that the IDA commitments are higher for Ethiopia due to IDA realloca-
tions and other administrative mechanisms. This suggests that there is no 
clear-cut relationship between the IDA Country Performance Rating and 
the final IDA allocation, which should have resulted from the perfor-
mance-based allocation mechanism. This is problematic, as this under-
mines the principal logic of the CPIA – linking CPIA performance, par-
ticularly in Cluster D, to IDA allocation.  
 
In this regard, the analysis replicates the following main theme and 
observation: 
• The CPIA does not discipline governments to adhere to its poli-
cy standards, as internal and external administrative fund dis-
bursement dynamics influence IDA allocations. 
 
In replicating this main theme, it was expected that similar dynamics 
be observed for the case of Rwanda, which is even more aid dependent 
than Ethiopia. It was also expected that even less strong disciplining 
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principles are found for the cases of Ghana and Nigeria, as they are far 
less aid dependent and therefore even less susceptible to IDA funding 
dynamics than Ethiopia and Rwanda (Börzel and Hackenesch 2013: 
540). The analysis relies on the respective CPIA scores in relation to the 
other regional performers, the IDA Country Performance Rating, and 
IDA grants and commitments, as well as on a description of the alloca-
tion dynamics informed by the Country Partnership Strategy. These pro-
cesses are all informed by aid dependency dynamics, which show the 
first principle of engagement between the government and the World 
Bank in their roles as aid recipient and donor.  
 
6.2.2 The CPIA application in Rwanda 
The aggregate CPIA score of Rwanda was 4.0 in 2014 – the highest ag-
gregate CPIA score of all the regional (Sub-Saharan Africa) IDA coun-
tries. Similar to Ethiopia, Rwanda improved its CPIA score with 0.1 in 
2014 and has seen steady progress in its policy environment over recent 
years (World Bank 2015: 6). Unlike Ethiopia, the increase was a result of 
a different cluster, namely Cluster A – Economic Management. In par-
ticular, this increase was based on improvements on the fiscal policy 
front, as the risk of debt distress declined and further progress was made 
on the legal and governance structures of debt management (World 
Bank 2015: 9, 11-12). The Cluster D score of Rwanda is 3.6, which is 
also much higher than the regional average of 3.0 (World Bank 2015: 71). 
 
The 2014-2018 World Bank Country Partnership Strategy sets forth 
the IDA programme for Rwanda and includes therein three focus areas, 
of which one is ‘supporting accountable governance through public fi-
nancial management and decentralization’ (World Bank 2014a: iii). The 
focus herein lies on supporting the government in the process of decen-
tralising decision-making with the aim of aiding open and participatory 
processes (Ibid). The strategy hails the country as a success story for effi-
cient donor harmonisation and budget support and as a country where 
financial assistance through aid has had a positive and sustainable impact 
(World Bank 2014a: 1). Regarding IDA allocation, the strategy notes the 
following: 
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The working assumption is that allocations will be similar to those in the 
past, perhaps a little higher in recognition of the improving CPIA score 
and the switch from a mix of grants and credits to credits only. As such, 
IDA may commit approximately US$200-250 million a year during 
IDA17, likely spread across three investment operations, two Programs 
for Results operations and one series of three Development Policy Opera-
tions. In addition, regional IDA should be leveraged for some priority in-
vestments (World Bank 2014a: iv). 
 
In this context, the strategy clearly emphasises that the improved 
CPIA score would result in a somewhat higher allocation. However, it 
also states that this is linked to the switch of a mix of grants and credit as 
sources of income to credit only (World Bank 2014a: iv). In the section 
on the World Bank portfolio, the strategy also explains that the ‘IDA16 
allocation for Rwanda was SDR400 million which is approximately 
US$617 million, a 54.7 percent increase from IDA15 (SDR258.5 mil-
lion)’ (World Bank 2014a: 33). Hence, in the period from IDA15 (FY09-
11) to IDA16 (FY12-14), IDA allocations rose by over 50%. In addition, 
IDA17 (covering FY15-17) will result in similar or slightly higher alloca-
tions for this period. When taking a closer look at this, it seems odd that 
there is an over 50% increase in allocation from the period 2009-2011 to 
2012-2014 and a similar or slightly higher allocation for the forthcoming 
period of 2015-2017. For instance, the Country Performance Ratings 
were 3.59 in 2009, 3.69 in 2010, 3.7 in 2011 (an average of 3.66 for the 
period 2009-2011), and 3.63 in 2012, 3.7 in 2013 and 3.72 in 2014 (an 
average of 3.68 for the period 2012-2014). However, somehow allocation 
doubled. Figure 6.1 provides further details on the CPIA Cluster D 
score, the IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four 
clusters), and the IDA Country Performance Rating, which determines 
the IDA allocation. 
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Figure 6.1 
Rwanda Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and Country Per-
formance Rating 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016a).  
 
Figure 6.2 presents information on the Country Performance Rating 
(on the right axis, ranging between 3.4 and 3.75) and IDA commitments 
and allocated grants (on the left axis, in US$). No data is available on 
IDA commitments for the period 2006-2009. 
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Figure 6.2 
Rwanda IDA Grants, IDA Commitments, and Country Performance Rating 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016a).  
 
The strategy notes that, at the time that the report was drafted, IDA 
allocations were not fixed, but were expected to be similar to those of 
the past. Should commitments in FY15 be higher than actual allocations, 
then the strategy includes a proposal to front load from FY16 and FY17 
(World Bank 2014a: 34). The strategy notes the following in this regard:  
 
Actual allocations will depend on (a) total IDA resources available; (b) the 
country’s performance rating, GNI per capita, and population; (c) the 
terms of IDA assistance (grants/credits) and the allocation deductions as-
sociated with Multi-lateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) annual debt ser-
vice foregone; (d) the performance, other allocation parameters, and IDA 
assistance terms for other IDA borrowers; and (e) the number of IDA-
eligible countries (World Bank 2014a: 34).  
 
In spite of the possible suggested link between the increased CPIA 
score and the slightly higher IDA allocation, the strategy confirms that 
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IDA16 allocations were 50% higher than those of IDA15, although with 
an almost similar average Country Performance Rating for the two peri-
ods (2009-2011 average of 3.66 and 2012-2014 average of 3.68). In addi-
tion, IDA17 would remain almost similar or increase slightly more. If 
not, it could be adjusted through front loading for FY16 and FY17. In 
addition, actual allocation is not informed solely by the Country Perfor-
mance Rating, but is determined by five other factors, of which only the 
Country Performance Rating is under the control of the country. Anoth-
er interesting observation is that the strategy actually mentions front 
loading as a way of addressing lower allocations when compared to 
commitments. Similar to the case of Ethiopia, for Rwanda it shows that 
the relation between the Country Performance Rating and IDA alloca-
tions is influenced by internal and external administrative fund dis-
bursement dynamics. 
 
6.2.3 The CPIA application in Nigeria 
The aggregate CPIA score of Nigeria in 2014 was 3.5, which was above 
the regional Sub-Saharan Africa average of 3.2. The CPIA score de-
creased from 2013 due to a decline in commodity prices in 2014, which 
affected revenues from the extractive sector and economic management 
at large. This also brought to light weaknesses in the country’s fiscal 
framework and resulted in a decline in the economic management cluster 
score on fiscal policies (World Bank 2015: 5-6, 9, 11). The 2014-2017 
World Bank Country Partnership Strategy describes the strategic pro-
gramme of the World Bank in Nigeria. It is worth mentioning that with 
this new strategy Nigeria has officially entered a “blend status”1, meaning 
that it is declared creditworthy and hence open for financing provided by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
also because the country exceeded the IDA operational cut-off level in 
FY13 (World Bank 2014b: vii). In particular, the strategy focuses on 
governance and public sector management as cross-cutting pillars that 
focus broadly on strengthening public financial management systems and 
public reform, and particularly on strengthening accountability, public 
expenditure, and investment management (World Bank 2014b: 21, 37).  
 
Figure 6.3 provides further details on the CPIA Cluster D score, the 
IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and 
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the IDA Country Performance Rating, which determines the IDA alloca-
tion. 
Figure 6.3 
Nigeria Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and Country Perfor-
mance Rating 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016a).  
  
Furthermore, Figure 6.4 presents information on the Country Per-
formance Rating (on the right axis, ranging between 2.9 and 3.2) and 
IDA commitments (on the left axis, in US$). No data on IDA grants is 
available, which may be explained by the status Nigeria holds as a 
“blend” country (with grants offered only to countries with a high risk of 
debt distress).  
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Figure 6.4 
Nigeria IDA Commitments and Country Performance Rating  
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016a).  
 
Reflecting the blend status of Nigeria, the report notes that that fi-
nances for the first two years will be allocated from the IDA and the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (US$3.1 billion 
from the IDA and US$1.6 billion from the IBRD). The strategy further 
notes that the IDA allocations in the first year are based on allocations in 
IDA16 (FY12-14), but that the actual amount will depend on:  
 
… (a) the country's own performance; (b) its performance relative to other 
IDA recipients; (c) the total amount of resources available to IDA; (d) any 
changes in the list of IDA-eligible countries; (e) any changes in the per-
formance-based allocation system for IDA17, and (f) the overall size of 
the IDA17 replenishment (World Bank 2014b: 41). 
 
It is to be noted that these aforementioned factors only apply to the 
IDA and, hence, to about two-thirds of the funds Nigeria accesses 
through the World Bank. The report also shows that Nigeria is no longer 
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Initiative (MDRI) and that the lending terms will also be hardened from 
FY14 onward to reflect Nigeria’s level of income (World Bank 2014b: 
41). The case of Nigeria is interesting, as it shows that levels of economic 
development and national income influence the relation of Nigeria with 
the Bank. Even more pronouncedly than in the cases of Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, the case of Nigeria suggests that the influence of the CPIA on 
aid allocations further is limited, as the country accesses one-third of its 
funds from the IBRD, not the IDA. In the case of the IDA, it again sug-
gests that the Country Performance Rating is but one out of six indica-
tors informing the allocations.  
 
6.2.4 The CPIA application in Ghana 
The CPIA score of Ghana has witnessed a steady decline since 2011. 
With an overall score of 3.4 in 2014, the country’s score is still above the 
regional Sub-Saharan Africa average of 3.2, but the score is still lower 
than those of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Nigeria. The reason for the 0.3 de-
crease of the overall CPIA score was weakening macroeconomic man-
agement and governance, as well as slipping scores related to building 
human resources and a financial and business environment. In the area 
of Cluster D, there were specific setbacks for three out of the five indica-
tors (World Bank 2015: 6-7). The Country Partnership Strategy of Ghana 
covers the period 2013-2016. Worth noting is that Ghana was classified 
as lower middle-income country in 2011 (World Bank 2013: i). The strat-
egy identifies three key focus areas, including sound economic institu-
tions. Through this, the strategy aims to support public financial man-
agement, budget institutions, state-owned enterprises, and the enhanced 
management of natural resources (World Bank 2013: 18-19).   
 
Figure 6.5 provides further details on the CPIA Cluster D score, the 
IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and 
the IDA Country Performance Rating, which determines the IDA alloca-
tion.  
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Figure 6.5 
Ghana Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and Country Perfor-
mance Rating 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c; IDA 2016a).  
 
Furthermore, Figure 6.6 presents information on the Country Per-
formance Rating (on the right axis, ranging between 3.0 and 4.0) and 
IDA commitments and allocated grants (on the left axis, in US$). No 
data is available on IDA comments for the year 2013.  
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Figure 6.6 
Ghana IDA Grants, IDA Commitments, and Country Performance Rating  
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 
2016c, IDA 2016a).  
 
Similar to the Country Partner Strategy of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda, 
the IDA allocations are approximations and are further explained as fol-
lows: 
 
The indicative IDA allocation for the new four-year (FY13-16) Country 
Partnership Strategy period will be approximately SDR927 million (ap-
proximately US$1.39 billion). This indicative amount reflects the con-
firmed SDR allocations of 205.8 million and 257.9 million, respectively, 
for FY13 and FY14, and the annual IDA16 average of SDR226.63 million. 
The same annual averages are assumed for each of the two IDA17 years 
(FY15 and FY16) (World Bank 2013: 42). 
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The strategy again also confirms the parameters on which IDA alloca-
tions are based as:  
 
… (i) total IDA resources available, (ii) the country’s performance rating, 
GNI per capita, and population; (iii) the terms of IDA assistance 
(grants/credits) and the allocation deductions associated with Multi-lateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) annual debt service foregone; (iv) the per-
formance, other allocation parameters, and IDA assistance terms for other 
IDA borrowers; and (v) the number of IDA-eligible countries (World 
Bank 2013: 42). 
 
Similar to Nigeria, Ghana is also moving towards graduating to a 
blend status (World Bank 2013: 18). This would suggest that the influ-
ence of the CPIA review on final IDA commitments is further limited, 
as part of the fund would be accessed through the IBRD. The latter op-
erates under different funding conditions to the IDA and, as such, the 
influence of the performance-based allocation system is limited even fur-
ther.  
 
6.2.5 Cross-case synthesis – the CPIA application and 
developmentality 
The Ethiopia country case study suggested that the CPIA does not disci-
pline governments to adhere to its policy standards, as IDA allocations 
are influenced by internal and external administrative fund disbursement 
dynamics. It was expected that the findings would be similar (or possibly 
less) for the case of Rwanda (which has higher aid dependency dynam-
ics) and even further pronounced for the cases of Nigeria and Ghana 
(being less aid dependent). In each of the replication studies, the respec-
tive chapter attempted to shed light on the different Cluster D scores, 
the CPIA score and the Country Performance Rating, and reflected on 
this in the context of planned IDA commitments and grants. This was 
also presented alongside the narrative of the Country Partnership Strate-
gy, which informs on planned allocations. It is worth recalling the prin-
cipal logic of the CPIA and the performance-based allocation system, as 
suggested by the IDA on its website: 
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The main factor that determines the allocation of IDA resources among 
eligible countries is each country's performance in implementing policies 
that promote economic growth and poverty reduction. This is assessed by 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which for the 
purposes of resource allocation is referred to as the IDA Resource Alloca-
tion Index (IRAI). The IRAI and portfolio performance together consti-
tute the IDA Country Performance Rating (CPR). In addition to the CPR, 
population and per capita income also determine IDA allocations (IDA 
2016b). 
 
However, the analysis of the country cases suggests that CPIA scores 
and the Country Performance Rating are not the main factors determin-
ing the allocation of IDA resources. Indeed, by taking a closer look at 
the relationship between Cluster D, the overall CPIA score (IDA Re-
source Allocation Index) and the Country Performance Rating, as well as 
at final IDA commitments, limited linear relations are evident. The per-
formance-based allocation principle suggests that increased Cluster D 
scores provides the largest input to the overall CPIA score, and an in-
creased CPIA score should result in an increased Country Performance 
Rating and consequent commitments. (Especially since considering that 
population and per capita income do not change much on an annual ba-
sis). Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 depict Cluster D scores and the Country 
Performance Rating and IDA commitments for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nige-
ria and Rwanda. It is to be noted that as no data is available on grants 
provided to Nigeria, this data has been excluded from this analysis. 
When comparing the parameters for each country, it is for instance pos-
sible to see that the commitments (although at different levels) somehow 
behave similarly for the period 2005-2011 (except for Rwanda, where no 
data is available in the period 2006-2009, and Nigeria, which sees a 
steady increase in this period). Thereafter, a steep increase and decrease 
occur (with the exception of Ghana, which sees a steady decrease).  
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Figure 6.7 
CPIA Cluster D scores for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank website (World Bank 2016c). 
Figure 6.8 
IDA Country Performance Rating for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank website (World Bank 2016c). 
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Figure 6.9 
IDA Commitments for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank website (World Bank 2016c). 
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The explanation for these dynamics could be assigned to the internal 
and external IDA administrative fund disbursement principles. To be 
sure, in all the country case studies the partnership strategy described 
similar fund disbursement considerations. The case studies of Ghana and 
Nigeria furthermore show that higher levels of economic development 
and national income limit the possibility of accessing concessional lend-
ing governed by the IDA. Indeed, as countries graduate and enter into 
blend status, the funds are no longer governed by IDA fund mecha-
nisms, but by those of the IBRD. All these factors determine the annual 
allocation of IDA resources; however, the case study of Ethiopia also 
showed the importance of internal IDA flexibility arrangements that aim 
to facilitate the effective utilisation of resources. These include front and 
back loading, as well as the reallocation of IDA allocations to better-
performing countries with higher absorptive capacities (IDA 2007: 7, 
IDA 2010: 37). It is possible to see how Rwanda and Ethiopia utilise 
front loading strategies and how Ethiopia even uses this strategy to ben-
efit from annual reallocations.  
 
Hence, the following factors also determine the final allocation of 
IDA concessional grants to aid recipients: 
• Any changes to the list of IDA-eligible countries;  
• The terms of IDA assistance (grants/credits);  
• The allocation deductions associated with Multilateral Debt Re-
lief Initiative annual debt service foregone; 
• The performance, other allocation parameters, and IDA assis-
tance terms of other IDA borrowers; 
• The overall size of the IDA replenishment;  
• The status within the IDA and transitioning into IBRD loans and 
credits;  
• Front loading;  
• Back loading; and 
• Annual reallocations. 
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The analysis shows that this assumes a more central role than the 
Bank possibly acknowledged. It is difficult to properly evidence this, as a 
host of intervening variables determine the annual allocations. However, 
the analysis suggests that the Country Performance Rating is not the 
main factor determining the IDA allocations. It also suggests that in the 
four case studies, it may be difficult for the CPIA to signal incentives 
through the PBA as a result of the manner in which IDA funds are de-
termined and allocated. Contrary to the dominant narrative that aid de-
pendency provides a lever for the World Bank to govern from a distance 
(Bo ̈rzel and Hackenesch 2013: 540), the analysis reveals that this sugges-
tion merits further consideration. For instance, it is important to consid-
er levels of economic development and national income, as these influ-
ence how much of the funds actually are governed by IDA’s 
performance-based allocation system (Ghana and Nigeria). A second 
consideration is highlighted for the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda, where 
relatively high Cluster D scores (respectively 3.5 and 3.6) are on the one 
hand indicative of the nature of the public management, and on the oth-
er hand also of the manner in which countries can absorb and manage 
public funds. This influences the ability of Ethiopia and Rwanda to man-
age IDA funds and to make use of the various flexibility arrangements.  
 
Indeed, similar to the case of Ethiopia, the analysis suggests that while 
the Bank generates knowledge on public sector management and institu-
tions in Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda, this does not necessarily translate 
into productive power over them. This is because the Bank does not 
make the appropriate link between norms, performance and punish-
ment/reward, limiting the ability of CPIA processes and outcomes to 
shape and guide the behaviour of aid recipients in adherence to its gov-
ernance standards (Lie 2015a: 242).  
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the application of 
the CPIA process in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it is possible to ex-
pand the theoretical propositions as follows: 
4a: The translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipient 
through the CPIA is ineffective, as the Bank does not make the ap-
propriate connection between norms, performance and punish-
ment/reward. This is because the CPIA score is only one of several 
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factors determining the final IDA country allocations,. As a result, the 
CPIA assessment is limited in disciplining Ghana, Nigeria and Rwan-
da to adhere to its policy standards.  
 
This apparent disjuncture between the design and process of the 
CPIA in light of their outcomes is quite telling. It also goes against the 
more conventional understandings of the Bank and CPIA. For instance, 
Van Waeyenberge (2009: 806) asserts that the Bank performs a “disci-
plining role” and that the CPIA is a strong disciplinary tool to influence 
the policy spaces of aid recipients. These dynamics inform the need to 
look beyond the role of CPIA as a mere technical tool of the Bank, to 
consider more broadly strategic functions guiding its use. 
 
6.3 The APRM applications in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana 
6.3.1 Main findings in the Ethiopia country case study 
The case study of Ethiopia showed that the APRM processes followed 
the technical procedures as laid out in the process documents, but that 
the application could be viewed as one of nominal adherence to the pro-
cess and outcome. The APRM process was less participatory and har-
monious and more government-controlled than envisioned in the APRM 
principles and strategic process documents. Despite this, the review re-
port was able to address critical aspects related to democracy and gov-
ernance. However, few outcomes followed the process, apart from the 
mere benefit of having undergone the process – the NGC was disman-
tled, no responsible office was tasked with implementing the NPoA, and 
civil society actors and peers had limited influence on the government 
due to the political environment of the country and the status of the 
APR Forum. As a result, the APRM has been limited in its ability to 
stimulate the government to adopt related governance standards.  
 
 The main finding and theme arising from the Ethiopia country case 
study is that the crux of the process, i.e. the implementation of the 
NPoA (which commits Ethiopia to the adoption of governance stand-
ards), is not taking place. According to the APRM logic, here peers (hor-
izontal pressures) and national actors (vertical pressures) play a role in 
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stimulating and holding governments to account regarding their com-
mitments. Ethiopia had the lowest score in the areas of voice and ac-
countability, and the outcomes of the APRM processes showed these 
dynamics in action. The government was very critical of the report con-
tent and defended its stance in the APR Forum, while the national dy-
namics are such that any meaningful way for civil society to hold the 
government to account is lacking.  
 
In this regard, the analysis replicates the following main theme and 
observation:  
• The APRM does not discipline governments to adhere to its pol-
icy standards, firstly due to weak horizontal pressures resulting 
from the possibility to provide resistance to the influence of 
peers, and secondly due to weak vertical pressures, as these oper-
ate within established state-society frameworks.   
 
In replicating this main theme, it was expected that similar dynamics 
are seen in Rwanda and Nigeria, which have low scores in the areas of 
voice and accountability that could influence their acceptance of external 
peer pressures, as well as the influence and scope of non-state actors in 
monitoring the NPoA. In the case of Ghana, which has the highest score 
in voice and accountability, it was expected that the country is more re-
ceptive to the influence of peers and provides more space for non-state 
actors to engage in the monitoring of the NPoA. In this regard, the anal-
ysis relies on the respective process descriptions in the Country Review 
Reports, progress reports (where available), as well as on external as-
sessments of the participatory dynamics of the reviews analysed by civil 
society organisations such as the Open Society Initiative.  
 
6.3.2 The APRM application in Rwanda 
The APRM process in Rwanda 
Rwanda was one of the APRM pioneer countries, having signed the 
MoU on 9 March 2003. Following its accession, the Rwandan govern-
ment established the national offices, such as the APR Focal Point and 
the NGC, and commenced work on the draft questionnaire. The first 
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stakeholder workshop was organised in March 2004 and was aimed at 
sensitising the 200 stakeholders present and launching the thematic 
groups that would work on the draft questionnaire. A second stakehold-
er workshop was organised in May 2004, aimed at integrating comments 
from the participants and launching the technical review teams. The 
support mission took place from 21-24 June 2004, reviewing the estab-
lishment of national structures and particularly advising on reducing the 
size of the Governing Commission to 8-10 members, of which one or 
two would be government officials. The support mission also reviewed 
background documents prepared by the team of the Focal Point, but 
noted that the APR technical teams had filled out the self-assessment 
questionnaire without the inclusion of inputs of national stakeholders. 
The support mission also raised concerns about the lack of institutional 
basis of the technical review team, which could hamper the self-
assessment methodology. Therefore, the recommendation was made that 
the continental strategic partner institutions should support the technical 
teams (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005a: 23-24). 
 
The NGC was inaugurated in the presence of the support mission on 
24 June 2004. The commission drew its members from the public, pri-
vate and civil society sectors in Rwanda and was chaired by the Minister 
of Finance. The commission and the technical review teams worked to-
gether to prepare the draft self-assessment, which was validated through 
a national stakeholder review meeting that subsequently informed the 
finalisation of the draft NPoA in March 2005. The Country Review Mis-
sion took place from 18-30 April 2005, conducting interviews with vari-
ous public, private and civil society stakeholders in Kigali. Thereafter, the 
Country Review Mission visited all the provinces and held consultations 
with key stakeholders (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005a: 25-27). 
The final report was presented during the fifth summit of the APR Fo-
rum and subsequently released in Kigali on 13 July 2006 (LDGL 2007: 
4). 
 
Horizontal and vertical pressure 
Similar to the Country Review Report of Ethiopia, the responses of the 
Rwandan government to the review findings were annexed to the report. 
However, unlike Ethiopia the government’s response seems to have 
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been more receptive to the review recommendations. In particular, the 
government provided an explanation for concerns raised in the review 
and agreed to address certain aspects in the NPoA. During the APR Fo-
rum meeting, the President did raise more critical concerns regarding the 
misrepresentation of the independence of the Judiciary, the Gacaca 
Court System, and the management of diversity and political pluralism. 
The Panel responded quite receptively to these concerns, and the tone of 
discussions (as captured in the minutes) was more constructive in com-
parison to those linked to the peer review of Ethiopia (APR Panel of 
Eminent Persons 2005a: 152-153). 
 
The participation of civil society actors in the APRM processes can be 
observed within the national processes, such as in participation in the 
NGC, in the consultation on the self-assessment, and in the engagement 
with the APRM Country Review Mission. In this regard, an external 
evaluation revealed that the review report included civil society perspec-
tives that collided with those of the government, particularly in the area 
of democracy and political governance (‘relating to the rights of the Bat-
wa minority, freedom of expression and the role of Gacaca’). This pro-
vided evidence of the open nature of the domestic processes (LDGL 
2007: 10). However, the external review also concludes that civil society 
participation overall was ‘belated and insufficient’ (LDGL 2007: 10). For 
instance, the discussions held in the framework of the APRM meetings 
were (according to interviews conducted for the report) relatively free 
and participatory, but belated, as civil society organisations came on 
board only at a later stage. In addition, the report asserts the civil society 
participation in APRM bodies and meetings was not “broadly repre-
sentative”. This was based on the low level of stakeholders present dur-
ing the various provincial consultations with the Country Support Mis-
sion. Then-Panel Chair also conceded to this, noting that ‘the 
contribution of Rwandan civil society was real but limited’. Certain criti-
cal civil society perspectives were only reflected in the Country Review 
Report following the visit of the country review team. This was mainly 
the result of low levels of representation in the Commission and in the 
self-assessment process (LDGL 2007: 10-12).  
 
The independent external evaluation report summates the review 
process as a government-dominated process. Government officials dom-
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inated the NGC, and the self-assessment relied predominantly on official 
data and documentation, rather than on citizen views. This also had the 
side-effect that the self-assessment report and NPoA did not stray far 
from national policies already implemented by the government (LDGL 
2007: 13-15). Since the release of the report in 2006, Rwanda has pre-
pared two progress reports in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Besides this, 
Rwanda initiated a joint governance assessment between the government 
and development partners. 
 
Analysis 
When regarding the case of Rwanda, it is possible to draw some conclu-
sions regarding the similarities to the process for Ethiopia, as for both 
the review was mostly a government-dominated process. This relates 
particularly to the participatory aspects of the review and less to the peer 
review process at the Forum meeting, which seemed to have taken place 
in a far more amicable environment. This could possibly be explained by 
the fact that Rwanda was one of the pioneer countries acceding to the 
mechanism in 2003, and by the peer review process taking place a few 
years later only, when all the “founding fathers” were still in office (i.e. 
the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal). This 
would have provided a sufficient moral block of persuasion, contrasting 
with the case of Ethiopia, which went through the process in 2011 and 
in the presence of none of the founding fathers due to leadership chang-
es in Nigeria and South Africa and the non-attendance of the other three 
countries. In addition, the position of Rwanda, which had emerged from 
a severe social and political crisis following the genocide, also possibly 
influenced the need to rebuild effectively its state institutions (APR Panel 
of Eminent Persons 2005a: 29).  
 
All of these factors could have played a role in the different nature of 
Rwanda’s peer review process. Related to this is the government’s prepa-
ration of two progress reports and its initiation of a joint governance as-
sessment with its development partners. Although no progress reports 
were submitted after this, the country is preparing itself to undertake the 
periodic review, which shows a stronger political commitment to the 
process in comparison with Ethiopia.  
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6.3.3 The APRM application in Nigeria 
The APRM process in Nigeria 
Nigeria was a key architect of NEPAD and acceded to the APRM on 9 
March 2003. From this moment onward, former president Olusegun 
Obasanjo chaired the APR Heads of State Forum until his departure 
from office in 2007. After its accession to the APRM, the government 
took the necessary steps to establish the national structures. In this re-
gard, Nigeria appointed the Secretary to the Government of the Federa-
tion and Chief and Commanders of the Order of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria as the national Focal Point. Following this, the country also es-
tablished a national steering group (composed of 22 members) and a na-
tional working group (composed of 31 members) to oversee the imple-
mentation of APRM processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 2). 
 
After setting up the national structures, a Country Support Mission 
took place from 21-24 March 2005. However, the country encountered 
some problems in relation to managing and financing the diverse and 
complex research institutions selected to undertake the national self-
assessment. A second support mission hence took place in October 
2006. The situation was finally resolved when five lead research organisa-
tions were commissioned in the third and fourth quarters of 2006 with 
accessing the perceptions of Nigerian citizens on the quality of govern-
ance. The respective research organisations domesticated and adopted 
the master questionnaire and used four instruments to undertake the na-
tional self-assessment: desktop research; a household survey; interviews 
with elites or decision-makers; and focus group discussions. By the end 
of 2006, the draft Country Self Assessment Report and the NPoA were 
finalised (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 2). 
 
Following the elections in April 2007, President Alhaji Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua took over office from President Olusegun Obasanjo. The new 
government adopted reforms in the APRM structures by appointing a 
new Focal Point and by expanding the national working group to 240 
members. With the new structures in place, the country embarked on a 
process of validating of the self-assessment by conducting stakeholder 
workshops and serialising the executive summary of the self-assessment 
report in national dailies and weeklies, as well as by using email and post-
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al addresses to receive feedback on the draft themes of the report. 
Moreover, the draft NPoA was validated through two-phased consulta-
tions. The first phase occurred in November 2007, in 14 centres cover-
ing the 36 states of the Federation. This culminated in a national dia-
logue on both the self-assessment and the NPoA, held on 11 December 
2007 under the chairmanship of President Yar’Adua. The national work-
ing group and the Federal Executive Council validated the self-
assessment and the NPoA accordingly. The final self-assessment report 
and the draft NPoA were submitted to the Panel in January 2008 (APR 
Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 2-3). 
 
Based on this, the Country Review Mission took place between Feb-
ruary and March 2008. The review mission commenced with a public 
launch attended by President Yar’Adua and continued its engagements 
with federal structures and non-state actors in Abuja. Thereafter the 
team split up and covered the country by visiting 16 centres in total, 
meeting with representatives of the 36 states and interacting with state 
and non-state actors, including civil society actors, non-governmental 
organisations, labour organisations, professional bodies, traditional rul-
ers, the media, academics, and private sector actors  (APR Panel of Emi-
nent Persons 2009: 3). 
 
Horizontal and vertical pressure 
Following the finalisation of the report, the country underwent a peer 
review during the Heads of State Forum meetings in June and October 
2008 (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 503). The peer review 
commenced with a summary of the report outcomes and commended 
the government for having drafted a NPoA with an annual committed 
budget of US$20 billion (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 506). 
Although a quite significant amount, this may be considered relatively 
small when considering the Gross Domestic Product of the country 
(Bing-Pappoe 2010: 9). Unlike the case of Rwanda and Ethiopia, the re-
port does not include a formal response to the report content, but cap-
tures the comments of the President during the peer review. The Peer 
Review Report shows that the President appreciated the thoroughness of 
the process and audit exercise. He highlighted the credibility and integrity 
of the process and reaffirmed his commitment to the NPoA by further 
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creating more ownership through social and political buy-in. This would 
also engender public trust in governance in Nigeria (APR Panel of Emi-
nent Persons 2009: 506-507).  
 
An independent external evaluation report of the APRM implementa-
tion process asserts that one of the critical aspects of the APRM, namely 
its participatory process, was also complicated in the case of Nigeria. The 
report asserts that, despite that a fairly wide range of organisations were 
included in the national working group, most of the self-assessment pro-
cesses took place under the guidance of a group of organisations selected 
by the government. It suggests that there was a lack of confidence in the 
autonomy of the self-assessment process and that organisations wanted 
to undertake their own shadow assessments. Furthermore, civil society 
organisations were under the impression that the Focal Point was less 
enthusiastic about the technical competence and the professionality with 
which the self-assessment was undertaken. These processes took place in 
the same period when national discussions on constitutional reform and 
the removal of constitutional limits for presidential elections took place 
(Jinadu 2008: 31). A sincere effort was made to sensitise the general pub-
lic to the APRM; however, during the validation of the self-assessment 
report it became evident that there was a very low level of awareness of 
NEPAD and the APRM, albeit alongside a very high level of awareness 
of key governance issues in the country. There was also scepticism re-
garding whether the process would really result in the inclusion of more 
critical observations in the review report (Jinadu 2008: 32-33). 
 
It is to be noted that Nigeria has since prepared two progress reports. 
However, the implementation of the NPoA has suffered from ‘structur-
al/technical challenges; and individual, social and political issues’ (Khalil-
Babatunde 2014: 2). Furthermore, one of the respondents knowledgea-
ble on the processes in Nigeria explained that the NEPAD office in Ni-
geria only has limited staff and experienced difficulty following up on the 
implementation of the NPoA. When the time had come to submit the 
progress report, a list of questions was sent to the 36 states, but some 
offices did not even know what the APRM entailed. Hence, the progress 
report became a collection of outcome statements of other reports (In-
terview with governance academic, 23 July 2015). However, it is promis-
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ing that the country is committed to undertaking the second periodic 
review.  
 
The country is also currently preparing a peer review exercise at the 
state level in Nigeria, focused on monitoring performance in service 
provision (Interview with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 
2015). This is further explained on the NEPAD Nigeria website, which 
explains the implementation activities following the report as follows: 
• ‘Periodic meetings with the State Coordinators and Focal Point 
Officers to brainstorm on their roles and responsibilities as par-
ticipatory model of development management geared towards 
their involvement in the process of implementation, the last 
which was held at Nicon Luxury on the 13th of April 2014’; 
• ‘Tracking of NPoA Programme/Projects in the Federal Minis-
tries, Departments and Agencies since 2008’; 
• ‘The peer review process has been adopted by State governments 
which the Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF) is conducting which 
are known as state-level peer assessments under the State Peer 
Review Mechanism (SPRM). This is a welcome development, 
which hopefully will be extended to the Local Government level 
in order to enhance the overall accountability within the federal 
structure’; and 
• ‘The observation of Elections in the country since the 2011 gen-
eral elections with the most recent being the Osun Gubernatorial 
election that was held on the 9th of August 2014’ (NEPAD 
Government Nigeria 2016). 
 
Analysis 
The participatory dynamics in Nigeria were quite similar to those ob-
served for the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda. For instance, the govern-
ment was formally committed to having a broad representation of stake-
holders, but most of the self-assessment process actually took place 
under the guidance of a group of organisations that the government se-
lected. However, in contrast to the case of Ethiopia, the leaders em-
braced the report outcomes with more interest (similar to the case of 
Rwanda). This political commitment to the process and outcome could 
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further be explained by the position of Nigeria within the APRM archi-
tecture. Based on this, it would be unlikely that President Yar’Adua 
would publicly dismiss the process outcomes, as his predecessor, Presi-
dent Obasanjo, had heavily promoted this mechanism. Although the 
country has not fulfilled the regular reporting requirements, it seems to 
have adopted the peer review model as part of the state peer review 
mechanism, and is currently in the process of preparing for its second 
review. This further shows the commitment to and confidence and stake 
the government has in the mechanism. It is also important to consider 
these ambitions in the context of the country’s longstanding commit-
ment to pan-African ideals and participatory processes within the broad-
er context of democratic governance struggles (Jinadu 2008: 35).   
 
6.3.4 The APRM application in Ghana 
The APRM process in Ghana 
Ghana, too, acceded to the APRM at the onset of the mechanism on 9 
March 2003. Subsequently, the country started to prepare for the review 
by creating a Ministry of Regional Cooperation, and NEPAD in May 
2003 assigned its head as the national Focal Point. Related to this was 
the setup of the national governing council, comprising qualified, es-
teemed professionals and public personalities who are independent from 
the government. The council appointed four national independent think 
tanks and research institutions for each of the APRM’s thematic areas 
and provided recommendations in drafting the NPoA. A Country Sup-
port Mission was organised in May 2004; during the visit the Minister of 
Regional Cooperation and NEPAD signed the MoU on the technical 
assessment. A national stakeholders forum and a three-day stakeholder 
workshop were organised during the visit, and a nationwide sensitisation 
campaign followed. The final consolidated self-assessment report and 
draft NPoA were submitted to the Secretariat in March 2005.  
 
In the thereupon-following months, the Country Review Mission was 
undertaken in Ghana, and extensive consultations were conducted with 
various actors, including state officials, parliamentarians, political parties, 
and civil society members, such as from academia and the media, as well 
as representatives of business, trade and professional bodies. The mis-
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sion concluded that there was a strong commitment to improving gov-
ernance and also that the country served as an example to other coun-
tries, as it granted the governing council autonomy in executing its man-
date. The self-assessment report drafted by the research institutions was 
also highly regarded (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005b: 5-10). The 
final Country Review Report and the NPoA were submitted to the 
APRM Secretariat in June 2005, and the peer review of Ghana took place 
in January 2006 (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 16).  
 
Horizontal and vertical pressure 
Regretfully, the peer review process is not summarised in the Country 
Review Report; however, the report does include the government’s re-
sponse to the final report, which mostly raised points for clarification 
(APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005b: 10). An independent external 
evaluation report assessed the stakeholder participation and problema-
tised it by showing that there were issues with balancing public aware-
ness-raising and meaningful consultation. For instance, three civil society 
consultations had taken place to consider or validate the self-assessment, 
but many participants believed that these were not sufficiently broad and 
deep (a similar observation was made for Rwanda). Also, no mechanism 
was in place to assess whether comments raised during those meetings 
would be reflected in the report. In addition, three out of the four re-
search institutions contracted to undertake the self-assessment were civil 
society organisations. Furthermore, concerns were raised regarding the 
inclusiveness of the council. In relation to monitoring the NPoA, inno-
vative arrangements were developed (as for the case of Nigeria) by build-
ing a strategic partnership between the governing council and the Na-
tional Commission on Civic Education, which together created a 
framework for the monitoring and evaluation of the NPoA. This pro-
gramme also included capacity building of civil society organisations in 
monitoring and evaluation activities, as well as the design of tools such as 
Citizen Report Cards (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 1, 17). 
 
Ghana’s commitment to the process is particularly evidenced, howev-
er, by the effort it made in regularly reporting on the implementation of 
the NPoA. It has presented nine progress reports on the APRM2, and 
like Rwanda and Nigeria, it is preparing for its second APRM review.   
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Analysis 
Ghana was the first country to complete the full process, and it has been 
able to set standards in many aspects. It has been lauded as a “shining 
example” in the APRM processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 
2005b: xi). This is evidenced, for example, in the way the governing 
council was innovatively set up by allowing for independence and auton-
omy. But possibly even more impressive is the seriousness with which 
the country reported on the NPoA, as this seems to be an issue for al-
most all peer-reviewed countries. Similar to Nigeria, it has extended the 
participatory dynamics of the APRM in the monitoring and evaluation of 
the Programme of Action. It is here where the stark contrast with the 
case of Ethiopia is most evident. Ghana’s commitment to the process 
and the outcomes could be explained by its long-standing devotion to 
pan-African ideals. It was one of the first African countries to gain inde-
pendence following the colonial era, and it played a pivotal role in the 
establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (APR Panel of Emi-
nent Persons 2005b: 129). 
 
6.3.5 Cross-case synthesis – the APRM application and 
developmentality 
The Ethiopia country case study suggests that the APRM does not disci-
pline adherence to its policy standards, firstly due to weak horizontal 
pressures resulting from the possibility to provide resistance to the influ-
ence of peers, and secondly due to weak vertical pressures, as these op-
erate within established state-society frameworks. In replicating this main 
theme, it was expected that Rwanda and Nigeria would have similar ob-
servations, and for Ghana to be more receptive to the influence of peers 
and to provide a larger space for non-state actors to monitor the NPoA. 
This was predominantly informed by the political commitment to partic-
ipatory frameworks of engagement in national processes. In each of the 
replication studies, the relevant chapter attempted to shed light on the 
respective process descriptions in the Country Review Reports and the 
availability of progress reports, as well as on external assessments of the 
participatory dynamics of the review and subsequent outcomes.  
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In replicating the findings to the cases of Rwanda, Nigeria and Gha-
na, it provided a first opportunity to further nuance and contextualise the 
observations raised for the case of Ethiopia. To be sure, all four coun-
tries acceded to the APRM in March 2003, but have had quite different 
trajectories. First, looking at the case of Rwanda, similar observations 
were to be made in relation to the participatory processes, which could 
be explained by the political environment in Rwanda that, similar to that 
of Ethiopia, allows for state-led development programmes (developmen-
tal states), with a strong role assigned to the government in steering na-
tional development. This strong government-led development approach 
did not result in a similar defensive approach in the peer review process, 
and Rwanda seemed to be more receptive and open to the mechanism, 
for instance evidenced by its failure to assume a defensive position (as 
Ethiopia did) during the peer review meeting, and by its willingness to 
undergo a second review process. This could be explained by the nature 
of the peer review meeting, which was quite different from that of Ethi-
opia. The peer review process was conducted in the time when the 
“founding fathers” were still present. In addition, Rwanda’s political 
“weight” also may have played a role in the need for it to be more recep-
tive to the observations of its peers. Hence, the case of Rwanda suggests 
that the domestic environment is critical in providing that conducive en-
vironment for the participatory framework of the APRM, but also that 
political commitment to the process is a critical indicator for embracing 
the APRM principles.  
 
The case of Nigeria was informative on participatory dynamics that 
merit further unpacking the indicator of voice and accountability as a 
variable to study different APRM processes and outcomes. Although 
Nigeria’s APRM process was not as open as, for instance, that of Ghana, 
it was more participatory than the government-dominated reviews of 
Ethiopia and Rwanda (in spite of having quite similar voice and account-
ability scores). Here, the more liberal nature of democracy and govern-
ance adopted could provide one concept to further consider in relation 
to participatory frameworks for voice and accountability. Participatory 
frameworks of governance as embraced in different political cultures, i.e. 
in liberal democracies or developmental states, influence the nature of 
these frameworks. It showed the importance of not just early accession, 
but also the role of Nigeria as a “founding father” of the mechanism. 
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Indeed, it is unlikely for any president that followed in the footsteps of 
President Obasanjo to go back on of the key achievements in the pan-
African narrative and, hence, the political commitment to the process 
and the approach to the peer review process was more open and recep-
tive (than for instance in Ethiopia, although they had similar low voice 
and accountability scores).  
 
Ghana, as expected, had one the most exemplary reviews on the con-
tinent (as compared to Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda), and with a quite 
open and participatory review process and having conducted regular 
progress reports, distinguishes itself from all other APRM countries. 
Here, the concept of voice and accountability within more liberal demo-
cratic settings could also explain the government’s stance toward the 
domestic processes (although many problems were also reported). De-
spite the fact that Ghana was not a “founding father”, it has played simi-
lar roles in continental pan-African architectures, which could also ex-
plain its political commitment toward the process and outcomes.  
 
Hence, the case studies further explain but also problematise the find-
ings observed in the case study of Ethiopia. Weak inter-state disciplining 
of governments, or in the case of the APRM weak horizontal pressures 
on states, can further be explained and problematised as follows: 
• Inter-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the rela-
tive political weight of a country in relation to that of others (i.e. 
the position of Rwanda in the Forum when compared to that of 
political heavyweights Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana); 
• Inter-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the pres-
ence of the “founding fathers” in the Forum (i.e. their presence 
in the Forum supported the legitimacy and seriousness of the 
peer review process); 
• Inter-state disciplining of governments is normatively influenced 
by the commitment to and importance given to the pan-African 
ideals (i.e. Ethiopia’s defence of pan-African concepts of democ-
racy and governance in the Forum and adherence to the princi-
ples of the APRM as representative of pan-African ideals; Rwan-
da’s use of the APRM as a way to further seek the legitimacy of 
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its democratic institutions; and Ghana and Nigeria as key advo-
cates of pan-African institutions); and 
• Inter-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the moti-
vation to further support political legitimacy; hence, a very criti-
cal report may fuel resistance (i.e. Ethiopia’s dismissing the find-
ings of the report; Rwanda’s defending some of the governance 
approaches; and Ghana’s and Nigeria’s openness to critique de-
spite possibly having less of a need to “prove” the state of de-
mocracy and political governance in their countries, which also 
could be indicative of their adherence to principles of liberal de-
mocracy). 
 
Weak intra-state disciplining of the government, or in the case of the 
APRM, weak vertical pressures on the state (as these operate within es-
tablished state-society engagements), can be further explained and prob-
lematised as follows: 
• Intra-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the gov-
ernance approach to national development, which influences the 
receptiveness of the government to external and more liberal 
narratives on democracy and political governance (Ethiopia’s and 
Rwanda’s adherence to developmental state models of govern-
ance in comparison to the more liberal democratic approaches 
embraced by Ghana and Nigeria, which differ in the importance 
and role assigned to non-state actors in national development 
processes).  
 
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the application of 
the APRM process in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it is possible to ex-
pand the theoretical propositions as follows: 
4b: The APRM process does not discipline African countries to 
adhere to its policy standards due to weak inter- and intra-state 
disciplining mechanisms; 
4c: Inter-state disciplining is weak, as the peer review process 
primarily functions to give internal and external political legiti-
macy to the review process and outcomes; and    
 CPIA and APRM Applications in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria 189 
4d: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM operates within 
the confines of established state-society structures and does not 
attempt to alter these by mandating a participatory approach and 
a monitoring role for non-state actors. 
 
These findings further contextualise the application and outcome of 
the APRM and, particularly, the reform logic it embraces. The APRM 
proposes a singular change process, which is applied in very different 
political contexts and could explain some of the different outcomes of 
the process. These political contexts influence the nature of the inter- 
and intra-state processes of disciplining governments, meriting further 
problematisation. Indeed, the different application and outcomes for the 
four case studies show the importance of looking more closely at the 
implicit assumptions that govern the mechanism, which also impact its 
outcomes. These implicit assumptions are based primarily on the idea 
that voluntary accession to the mechanism is an indicator of political 
commitment, and horizontal and vertical pressures operate within this 
similar context of political commitment to the process and outcomes. 
The four case studies show that these assumptions need to be unpacked 
further by paying attention to the different considerations in relation to 
inter-state discipline of government, namely political weight and the role 
of the “founding fathers” within the Forum, the normative principles of 
pan-Africanism, as well as the concept of political legitimacy, both inter-
nal and external. In relation to intra-state disciplining of government, it is 
important to further consider the nature of the political pact embraced 
between state and non-state actors, which is reflected in the approach to 
democracy and governance. 
 
These implicit assumptions explain the disjuncture between, on the 
one hand, the APRM design, content and process and, on the other 
hand, its outcomes. The core vehicle upon which the APRM rests is po-
litical commitment, and voluntary accession to the mechanism shows 
this commitment. The problem is that while political commitment may 
be derived from a genuine motivation to improve governance, the lim-
ited outcomes of the reviews suggest that other considerations may play 
a critical role. It is therefore pertinent to look beyond the role of APRM 
as a mere technical tool of the African Union to improve governance, to 
consider greater strategic functions guiding its use.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the overall application of the CPIA and APRM in 
different and similar governance contexts through an analysis of three 
country case studies of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. It focused on an-
swering the question: did similar or different dynamics influence the ap-
plication of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana? In the 
case of the CPIA, the findings suggest that for the four country case 
studies, the CPIA is not the main factor determining the allocation of 
IDA resources. The analysis suggests that internal and external IDA ad-
ministrative fund disbursement principles influence these processes. For 
all the country case studies, the partnership strategy described similar 
fund disbursement considerations. In the literal replication country case 
study of Rwanda, it was possible to see how both Rwanda and Ethiopia 
are able to effectively absorb and manage public funds (reflected in high 
Cluster D scores), which influences their ability to manage IDA funds 
and allows them to make use of the various flexibility arrangements with-
in their IDA allocation. The theoretical replication country case studies 
of Ghana and Nigeria furthermore show the importance of considering 
levels of economic development and national income, as these influence 
how much of the funds are actually governed by IDA’s performance-
based allocation system. These dynamics limit the ability of the CPIA to 
signal incentives through the performance-based allocation system of the 
IDA, as a result limiting the disciplining of Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda 
to adhere to its policy standards. 
 
In the case of APRM, the findings suggest that the nature of the driv-
ers of change within the mechanism, namely the horizontal and vertical 
pressures applied to member states, influence the application and out-
comes of the APRM. In the literal replication country case study of 
Rwanda, it was possible to note similar observations in relation to the 
participatory processes, which could be explained by the political envi-
ronment in Rwanda, which, similar to that of Ethiopia, embraces state-
led development programmes (developmental states), envisioning a 
strong role for the government in steering national development. The 
theoretical replication country case studies of Ghana and Nigeria further 
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show the importance of unpacking the indicator of voice and accounta-
bility and participatory frameworks as variables for studying different 
APRM processes and outcomes. Indeed, despite having quite similar 
voice and accountability scores, Nigeria’s APRM process was more par-
ticipatory than the government-dominated reviews of Ethiopia and 
Rwanda. Here, the more liberal nature of democracy and governance 
adopted could provide one concept to further consider in relation to 
voice and accountability. Ghana, as expected, received one the most fa-
vourable reviews on the continent (in comparison to Ethiopia, Rwanda 
and Ghana), and with a more participatory review process and the regu-
lar submission of progress reports on their NPoA implementation, dis-
tinguishes itself from all other APRM countries.  
 
The case studies inform that the APRM process does not discipline 
African countries to adhere to its policy standards due to the weaknesses 
of the inter-state (horizontal) and intra-state (vertical) disciplining mech-
anisms. This is because the peer review process primarily functions to 
give internal and external political legitimacy to the review process and 
outcomes, and the mandatory participatory approach of the review does 
not alter established state-society dynamics. The issue is that the core 
vehicle of change within the review rests on the notion that countries 
that voluntarily submit their country for review are politically committed 
to the process. The problem with this is that, while political commitment 
may be derived from genuine motivations to improve governance, the 
limited outcomes of the reviews suggest that other considerations, too, 
may play a critical role. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 ‘The ‘blend’ category is used to classify countries that are eligible for IDA re-
sources on the basis of per capita income but also have limited creditworthiness 
to borrow from IBRD. Generally, given the access to both sources of funds, 
blend countries are expected to limit IDA funding to social sector projects (and 
use IBRD resources for projects in the ‘harder’ sectors). Moreover, as their cre-
ditworthiness increases, such countries should be able to take on more IBRD 
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financing, which in turn allows their access to IDA financing to be gradually 
reduced. Over time, this results in a gradual hardening of the blend ratio, pre-
paring the country for the eventual graduation from IDA’ (IDA 2001: 1). 
2  a. ‘Annual Progress Report On The Implementation Of The Ghana Na-
tional Programme Of Action 2006 January – December, NAPRM-GC’ 
 b. ‘First Bi-Annual Progress Report Monitoring And Evaluation Report On 
The Implementation Of The Ghana National Programme Of Action 
For The Period January – June 2006, NAPRM-GC, 2006’ 
 c. ‘Fourth Bi-Annual Progress Report January - June 2009, NAPRM-GC, 
June 2009’ 
 d. ‘Ghana NGC 3rd Annual Progress Report, NAPRM-GC’ 
 e. ‘Implementation Of The National Programme Of Action Annual Pro-
gress Report 2006, NAPRM-GC, January 2007’ 
 f. Progress In Implementing The National Programme Of Action - Second 
Bi-Annual Progress Report For The Period January - June 2007, 
NAPRM-GC, June 2007’ 
 g. Second Annual Progress Report 2007 Progress In Implementation Of 
The National Programme Of Action, NAPRM-GC, December 2007 
 h. Third Annual Progress Report January - December 2008, NAPRM-GC, 
2008 (Bing-Pappoe 2010). 
 i. 4th Annual NPOA Progress Report (2009)   
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7 Strategic Functions of the CPIA and APRM  
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the strategic functions of the CPIA and APRM. It 
focuses on answering the following research question: which strategic 
considerations inform the functions that the CPIA and APRM perform 
for the World Bank and the African Union? The analysis focuses on the 
strategic considerations of the World Bank and the African Union that 
influence the application of the CPIA and APRM and aims to provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of their functions and operation. 
The analysis brings together observations of practitioners (10 respond-
ents) and academics (6) working in the areas of governance-promotion in 
Africa. Practitioners working at regional and research institutions such as 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Na-
tions Development Program, the African Union and at think tanks fo-
cusing on governance were interviewed, as well as academics in the field 
of political science. Based on the professional experience of the re-
spondents, the analysis presents evidence on the strategic considerations 
of the World Bank and the African Union that influence the overall ap-
plication of the CPIA and APRM. Evidence originating from a docu-
ment analysis of considerations influencing the CPIA and APRM appli-
cations further supports the analysis. These strategic considerations are 
examined through the analytical lens of developmentality (including rele-
vant concepts drawn from the governmentality framework), and the the-
oretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics fur-
ther support the analysis. 
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7.2 Strategic considerations informing the functions of the 
CPIA 
7.2.1 The formal function of the CPIA: increasing aid 
effectiveness   
The previous chapters have shed light on the content, process, and out-
comes of the CPIA. The CPIA formally serves to provide the Bank with, 
amongst others, critical input regarding the quality of public sector man-
agement and institutions in aid recipient countries. The IDA uses this 
information to inform decision-making on access to concessional lend-
ing and grants. This formal role builds on the thesis that aid is effective 
when provided in the presence of sound polices (Burnside and Dollar 
1997: 3-4). While the CPIA was already initiated in the late 1970s, it has 
been used more recently as a formal instrument to assess governance, 
thereby providing critical input to decision-making processes of the Bank 
on the allocation of aid. Thus, the CPIA on the one hand builds on the 
Bank’s wish to increase the effectiveness of aid, and on the other hand 
supports this by providing inputs that inform the ability of the Bank to 
be more selective in its aid allocation strategies. Although aid selectivity 
principles do not directly engage in incentivising the behaviour of aid 
recipients (Collier 2005: 115-116), they do so more implicitly through aid 
dependency dynamics, increasing the political incentives of aid recipients 
to adopt the principles of good governance agenda. In other words, the 
CPIA and the selectivity principle it guides on aim to increase the politi-
cal will to implement the appropriate governance frameworks.  
 
However, this link between aid effectiveness, aid selectivity and creat-
ing incentives for reform can be contested on various grounds (Inter-
views with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015; 11 August 2015; 26 
August 2015; 31 August 2015; 4 September 2015; and with governance 
academic, 21 July 2015; 5 August 2015; 25 August 2015). Countries with 
significant levels of dependency on aid could be persuaded to implement 
principles in line with the good governance tenets (Interviews with gov-
ernance practitioner, 20 July 2015; 9 August 2015; 8 September 2015; 
and with governance academic, 24 July 2015). Others on the other hand 
may conduct a cost-benefit analysis based on the implications of refusing 
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governance reforms for accessing development funds (Interview with 
governance practitioner, 11 August 2015). 
 
It remains problematic, however, for a government to be sincerely 
politically committed to an externally promoted governance agenda, par-
ticularly if initially it had not been convinced of its necessity. The as-
sumption is that the financial dependence of aid recipients on the Bank 
could generate enough political commitment to implement reforms, but 
it is unclear how such dependence on aid may create enough incentives 
to counter already-present contestations against implementing govern-
ance reforms (Interview with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015). 
This is further complicated by the increased role and importance of non-
traditional donors in development cooperation (Interview with govern-
ance practitioner, 11 August 2015): 
 
I do not think these assessments provide an incentive. They worked rea-
sonably well when foreign aid was a dominant capital inflow in Africa, but 
with investments taking on a larger role, they no longer have much influ-
ence on host governments in Africa. I do not think that the use of govern-
ance indicators ever was an incentive. They served more like sanctions 
when foreign aid mattered to these governments (Interview with govern-
ance academic, 21 July 2015). 
 
Moreover, there is also incoherence when considering the principles 
of the new aid architecture centring on the concepts of ownership, part-
nership, and participation. These principles create a moral dilemma in 
this regard: concessional lending is critical in supporting socio-economic 
development in developing countries, but aid selectivity might push it 
away from those countries needing it the most (Interviews with govern-
ance practitioner, 24 July 2015; 26 August 2015). Thus, the formal func-
tion of the CPIA is to support the Bank in signalling the importance of 
aid effectiveness and the role that good policies and institutions play in 
ensuring the effectiveness of aid. However, it is unclear how this may 
work effectively, considering the different levels of aid dependence, the 
inability to address possible domestic contestations against reforms, the 
availability of finances provided through non-traditional donors, and the 
moral dilemma of this approach’s possibly redirection of aid away from 
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countries that need it the most. This begs the question: why does the 
Bank continue to pursue these objectives with aid recipients? 
 
7.2.2 The informal function of the CPIA: increasing geo-political 
influence  
Viewing aid allocation processes less as technical and neutral exercises 
and more as a political exercise allows for further insights into more in-
formal functions of the CPIA. In particular, political considerations guid-
ing aid allocation processes are influenced by geo-political considerations 
(Interviews with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015; and with gov-
ernance academic, 21 July 2015; 5 August 2015; 5 August 2015): 
 
Conditionality and selectivity are part of a larger context of global political 
actors that control the Bretton Woods institutions … In this regard, an 
“undemocratic” government may still receive aid if this is of geo-strategic 
importance. Geo-politics override governance concerns. Ethiopia is a 
good example of this as a stabilising country in a turbulent region … Gov-
ernance assessments show a “surface level” of indicators, but there are 
subsets of geo-strategic considerations, which, if impacted, will override 
the first level of indicators (Interview with governance practitioner, 9 Au-
gust 2015). 
 
This suggests that it is impossible to understand the purpose of the 
motivation behind conducting the CPIA assessment without giving due 
consideration both to the identity and interests of those promoting it 
(Abrahamsen 1997: 145). Indeed, the political interests of the World 
Bank are intimately linked to the ‘global-institutional patterns of hegem-
ony’ (Doornbos 2001: 96) and, as such, they are linked to powerful polit-
ical interests within the international framework of the World Bank that 
influence its engagement with developing countries (Harrison 2005: 242). 
By bringing in these perspectives, it is possible to view development aid 
as a vehicle for the promotion of foreign policy objectives. These foreign 
policy objectives may override more formal aid selectivity criteria (Bo ̈rzel 
and Hackenesch 2013: 540, Alesina and Dollar 2000: 33).  
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In this regard, the relative weight of the United States of America 
(USA) within the Board of Governors of the Bank, and the fact that al-
most all of its presidents have been American nationals, is also indicative 
of the Bank as an extension of the foreign state interests of, amongst 
others, the USA. This is for instance evidenced by the fact that the USA 
controls over 10% of the voting power within the IDA – the highest of 
all member states. This could suggest that the foreign agenda of particu-
larly the USA may influence the Bank’s operations (Interview with gov-
ernance academic, 5 August 2015). A prominent example of this con-
cerns the manner in which the United States and its allies have used 
development aid as an instrument in the War on Terror (Frerks 2006: 7-
8). This was for instance the case in Ethiopia, where the USA maintained 
high levels of development aid following the aftermath of the 2005 elec-
tion, primarily due to the role Ethiopia had as a regional ally in the War 
on Terror (Borchgrevink 2008: 214-215, Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 18).  
 
In this regard, it could be suggested that the CPIA functions not with 
the aim of authoritatively signalling standards and incentives, but as an 
instrument that allows it to engage in policy dialogues with recipients. It 
allows the Bank to manage its political relations with aid recipients, all 
the while reflecting both the formal position of the Bank as a rule-based 
organisation and its political role as an organisation aiming to generate 
influence in domestic policy arenas (Sending and Lie 2015: 1004). This 
engagement with aid recipients is critical, as the Bank draws its level of 
influence based on the dominant power relations it represents (Jonathan 
2014: 12). The fate of these practices are ultimately decided by counter-
hegemony (geo-political considerations) rather than counter-
governmentality (good governance considerations) (Jonathan 2014:14). 
 
7.3 Strategic considerations informing the functions of the 
APRM 
7.3.1 The formal function of the APRM: increasing good 
governance  
The previous chapters have shed light on the content, process, and 
outcomes of the APRM. The APRM formally serves to ensure that pol-
icies and practices of participating states adhere to standards related to 
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democracy and political governance, economic governance manage-
ment, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. The 
mechanism operates based on the consideration that political commit-
ment is critical for the adoption and implementation of standards, and 
that this further can be harnessed by relying on vertical (societal) and 
horizontal (peer) pressures. These processes are extremely complicated 
for numerous reasons. The horizontal peer review process is highly de-
pendent on mutual trust between states, is grounded on a shared confi-
dence in the process, and is conducted on non-adversarial basis (Pagani 
2002: 4). However, the horizontal peer review process in the APRM 
has significant structural issues that influence the manner in which it is 
currently conducted (Interviews with governance practitioner, 20 July 
2015; 22 July 2015; 9 August 2015; 26 August 2015; 4 September 2015; 
and with governance academic 23 July 2015; 24 July 2015). Yet this has 
not always been the case, as initially peers really were reviewing the per-
formance of other states (Interview with governance practitioner, 20 
July 2015). A governance practitioner said that 
 
The peer review is at the heart of the APRM. It is the crux of the matter. 
It is about sharing lessons learned and best practices. The problem is that 
there is not much time allocated to the peer review process. A summary of 
the report findings is presented and then other presidents respond (Inter-
view with governance practitioner, 22 July 2015).  
 
The peer review process is framed within a context of comrades 
providing support to one other in the common pursuit of democracy 
and political governance, but it is problematic to view the peer review 
process as that of a meeting of equals based on egalitarian principles. In-
deed, all member states are equals and hence peers in the review process, 
but some are “more equal than others” (Interview with governance prac-
titioner, 11 August 2015). This means that in a space such as that of the 
Forum, it is difficult to ignore the “weight” of different states. This is 
particularly influenced by the sheer size of the country’s economy or po-
litical weight, which in turn influences the manner in which the different 
countries engage with one other.   
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The vertical pressures as applied by non-state actors in the review 
process and the subsequent monitoring of the NPoA are also problemat-
ic (Interviews with governance practitioner, 22 July 2015; 24 July 2015; 
26 August 2015; 4 September 2015; and with governance academic, 23 
July 2015; 24 July 2015). This is grounded in an implicit assumption that 
political commitment to the process would harness the engagement of 
non-state actors in the review process, but this is ultimately contingent 
on the democratic space provided within the state (Interviews with gov-
ernance practitioner, 24 July 2015; 4 September 2015).  
 
Oftentimes, civil society groups are demobilised as soon as the review is 
completed. This is in actuality the point where the real work starts. Even 
the governing council does not perform duties beyond supporting the de-
velopment of the NPoA. This is a pity – this is where a more lively contri-
bution from the NGC and civil society groups is needed to take the mech-
anism forward (Interview with governance practitioner, 26 August 2015). 
 
 This issue is further exaggerated, as there are concerns with the harmo-
nisation of the NPoA in the context of national development pro-
grammes, particularly related to its internalisation, absorption, and cost-
ing. This further hinders the ability of non-actors actors to fulfil their 
monitoring roles (Interview with governance practitioner, 24 July 2015). 
 
Hence, structural issues exist regarding the manner in which the driv-
ers of change within the APRM are operationalised, but the constrained 
application and outcome of the process do not necessarily reflect the 
non-authenticity of its governance agenda (Interviews with governance 
practitioner, 20 July 2015; 22 July 2015; 24 July 2015; 9 August 2015; 11 
August 2015; 26 August 2015; and with governance academic, 21 July 
2015; 23 July 2015). 
 
… Mutual respect comes from African dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Self-assessment comes from the idea not to critique. You are innocent un-
til proven guilty – a home-grown idea to address justice (Interview with 
governance practitioner, 11 August 2015). 
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While APRM accession has not resulted in increased aid flows to 
member states (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015), 
serious concerns remain regarding the manner in which the APRM is 
operationalised. Indeed, while the ideals are African, the operationalisa-
tion is donor-driven. This is for instance reflected in the manner in 
which NEPAD and the APRM are financed. Donor funding of NEPAD 
comprises a little less than 80% of the total NEPAD budget (NEPAD 
n.d.: 18), while for the APRM member states contribute almost 75% of 
the funds used for its operations (ISS 2017).  
 
The hand is that of Esau, but the voice that of Jacob (Interview with gov-
ernance practitioner, 9 August 2015).  
 
The APRM is African in theory and conceptualisation, but the implemen-
tation and sustainability is not (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 
August 2015).  
 
Thus, the formal function of the APRM is to support the African Un-
ion in achieving adherence to continentally-agreed governance objec-
tives. However, the vertical and horizontal pressures upon which the 
mechanism relies so heavily are ineffective. This begs the question: why 
does the African Union continue to pursue these objectives and mecha-
nisms within its member states?  
 
7.3.2 The informal function of the APRM: increasing political 
legitimacy 
The APRM continues to assume a prominent role in the African govern-
ance landscape and is intimately linked to “Agenda 2063”, reflecting the 
African Union’s most recent strategic blueprint for growth and sustaina-
ble transformation of the continent (African Union 2017). This may be 
surprising when considering the limited outcomes of the review, but less 
so if the issue of political legitimacy is brought in as important considera-
tion motivating the review exercise. The interconnectedness between 
African states and the political forces in the global discourse on govern-
ance (Abrahamsen 2000: 1) are particularly exemplified in the manner in 
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which the agenda of the international community and the APRM agenda 
interlock.   
 
Even as recently as 10 October 2016, United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the importance of partnerships with 
the continent. He urged the international community to support African 
countries and mechanisms including the APRM in order to improve 
good governance on the continent (United Nations 2016). During the 
Africa week, the current chair of the APRM Panel also presented the re-
view mechanism, sharing its achievements and highlighting the new 
APRM Strategic Plan for 2016-2020, which aims to strengthen the 
mechanism by adopting and adapting a ‘common tracking framework 
based on APRM tools for progress monitoring in respect of national 
programmes of action’. Furthermore, he explained that the current APR 
Forum Chairperson H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta – currently president of Ken-
ya – is addressing the issue of non-membership through the revitalisation 
process by calling for the universal accession of all member states. 
Moreover, the member countries also agreed to double their annual con-
tributions. Nevertheless, the mechanism ‘needs more funding to build 
more capacity to handle other emerging issues that need to be addressed. 
Some support will therefore be required for this noble cause … That is 
the contribution of APRM for Development, Peace and Security in Afri-
ca. We need your support’ (Mekideche 2006: 2-5).  
 
This connection between the donor agenda and APRM agenda sug-
gests that African countries are acting in a self-disciplined manner, exer-
cise agency responsibly in a way that is consistent with international 
norms on governance (Abrahamsen 2004: 1461-1462). It is deemed ap-
propriate, natural and necessary for African countries to commit to good 
governance, and this therefore also justifies and legitimises their respec-
tive governments.  
 
7.4 Strategic functions of the CPIA and APRM and 
developmentality   
The informal considerations that guide the use of the CPIA and APRM 
shed light on the discrepancy between the content, process and out-
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comes of the reviews or, in other words, the discrepancy between the 
discourse and practice that guide the assessments. One way to explain 
this is by ‘inverting the conventional relation between policy and prac-
tice’ (Mosse 2004). If we consider that practice produces policy (rather 
than the reverse), it would provide an explanation as to why develop-
ment actors aim to maintain ‘coherent representations regardless of 
events’ (Mosse 2004: 640 as cited in Lie 2015a: 2-3). Policies then serve 
to legitimise ‘existing dynamics, lopsided relations and practices and 
show the power that ‘established development discourses and structures 
might have’ (Lie 2015a: 3). It is therefore irrelevant whether the CPIA 
fulfils its formal objectives regarding increasing aid effectiveness or not. 
As policies aim to reinforce the practice of the Bank’s possessing the 
power to assert influence and control over aid recipients, it is irrelevant 
whether this influence is actually limited in practice.  
 
This analysis could also be applied to the APRM member states. Both 
donors and the African Union consider the APRM to be very important 
for the pursuit of democracy and political governance, but both the do-
nors and the African Union also understand that member states seem to 
just be going through the motions. This can be explained by viewing the 
APRM as a response to the normalisation of good governance and to the 
coercive formal and informal pressures that are exerted on the continent 
as a result of this. But possibly more accurate would be to view this as a 
form of collusion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150), not only on the part 
of the member states, but also on the side of the donors. Committing to 
and supporting a governance assessment instrument that lacks any hard 
compliance tools allows member states to keep up the appearance of 
nominally accepting the good governance discourse, and for donors to 
keep up the appearance of their discourse influencing the policies and 
practices of African countries. These dynamics represent a normalisation 
and reinforcement of existing dynamics, relations and structures between 
the West and the Bank, on the one hand, and the African Union and its 
member states, on the other hand. It legitimises the roles they perform in 
development cooperation, with the donor perpetuating its role as posses-
sor of wisdom regarding development that developing countries are “in 
need of”.   
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By way of summarising these reflections regarding the informal and 
formal functions of the CPIA and APRM, it is possible to expand theo-
retical propositions 5a and 5b as follows: 
 
5a: The CPIA formally aims to increase aid effectiveness, but infor-
mally serves as an instrument of the World Bank to increase its geo-
political influence. This discrepancy between the discourse and prac-
tice of the CPIA functions to normalise and reproduce already-
existing structures, practices and relations that define international 
development cooperation. 
5b: The APRM formally aims to increase good governance, but in-
formally serves as an instrument to increase the political legitimacy of 
the member states of the African Union. This discrepancy between 
the discourse and practice of the APRM functions to normalise and 
reproduce already-existing structures, practices and relations that de-
fine international development cooperation. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the strategic functions of the CPIA and APRM. It 
focused on answering the question: which strategic considerations in-
form the functions the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank 
and the African Union? It brought together observations of practitioners 
and academics working in the areas of governance-promotion in Africa 
and complemented these observations with evidence originating from a 
document analysis. In the case of the CPIA, the analysis suggests that 
while formally the CPIA functions to increase aid dependency, informal-
ly it aims to increase the geo-political influence of the Bank and the ac-
tors it represents. In the case of the APRM, the analysis suggests that, 
while formally the APRM functions to improve governance on the con-
tinent, informally it aims to increase the political legitimacy of African 
member states. This discrepancy between the content, process and out-
comes of the CPIA and APRM – the disjunction between discourse and 
practice – may be explained by the need of both the Bank and the Afri-
can Union to normalise and reproduce already-existing structures, prac-
tices and relations that define international development cooperation.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
 
 
8.1 Emerging findings  
This study aimed to critically examine the manner in which the CPIA 
and APRM discipline governance standards on the African continent. It 
sought to understand how the content, process and outcomes of the 
CPIA and APRM support or challenge the good governance agenda, the 
relation of these mechanisms to aid, and the implications for power rela-
tions between the World Bank and the African Union. It relied on the 
developmentality framework to provide insights into these particular dy-
namics, arguing that donors are exercising indirect control over aid recip-
ients,, governing at distance, and holding developing countries responsi-
ble for the conduct of their own affairs by inscribing in them a particular 
mentality of development leading to the exercise of self-control.  
 
The study showed that governance standards are given shape in the 
content and design of the CPIA and APRM. CPIA content comprises 
discursive frames on good governance that reflect the norm that (good) 
governance is central to sustainable development and aid effectiveness. 
CPIA content moreover represents a technology to advance the Bank’s 
framework of thinking on governance. The CPIA is designed as a form 
of indirect rule of the World Bank over aid recipients. This comprises a 
productive power, as the Bank generates knowledge on the performance 
of the aid recipient and uses the performance-based allocation system as 
a discursive practice to incentivise proper conduct. This approach aims 
to hold aid recipients responsible for achieving the appropriate conduct 
and to improve performance within the frames set forth by the CPIA 
assessment. Similarly, APRM content comprises African discursive 
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frames on good governance that considers a more political operationali-
sation of governance and incorporates African standards as reference. 
However, the APRM is designed as a form of counter-rule against exter-
nal influences on the African development agenda, reflecting a form of 
resistance as it uses similar language, frames, methods and discursive 
spaces to those of donors to present a counter-approach and -method to 
promoting governance. This also aims to counter the negative govern-
ance brand of the continent. 
 
The study firstly analysed the application of the CPIA and APRM as-
sessments by means of an in-depth country case study of Ethiopia. The 
analysis showed that donors use the CPIA as a technology of surveil-
lance to assess adherence to the good governance norm and to generate 
knowledge on the conduct of Ethiopia. This practice of surveillance 
standardises governance norms across aid recipient countries, and at the 
same time individualises these to specific country contexts, such as that 
of Ethiopia. The CPIA monitored the conduct of Ethiopia by assessing 
its adherence and deviance to its governance standards. This rating pro-
cess established norms in relation to public sector management and insti-
tutions. Furthermore, the knowledge generated from the assessment 
formally informed the IDA development finance allocation. However, 
the case study of Ethiopia shows that inter-state disciplining of the Ethi-
opian government is limited due to the absence of dialogue on the rating 
process, indicating a form of resistance on the side of the government. 
The analysis of the application of the APRM assessment in Ethiopia 
showed that the process monitored Ethiopia’s adherence to African gov-
ernance norms and generated knowledge on its policies and practices. 
However, the Ethiopian government controlled the assessment process 
and dismissed the findings of the report. Therefore, the analysis con-
cluded that the inter- and intra-state discipline mechanisms of the APRM 
were rather weak. Furthermore, the review process gave an initial indica-
tion that the process also reflected a response to the global normalisation 
of good governance and indicated a wish by the government to be 
“branded” as committed to good governance. 
 
The analysis also examined the outcomes of the CPIA and APRM as-
sessments in Ethiopia. In relation to the CPIA, the analysis showed that 
the translation of the Bank’s knowledge to power over the aid recipient 
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was ineffective, as the Bank did not make the appropriate connection 
between norms, performance and punishment/reward. In particular, the 
analysis showed that the CPIA is only one of several factors determining 
the final IDA country allocations. As a result of this, the CPIA process 
did not discipline the government to adhere to its policy standards by 
engendering self-optimisation. Another explanation for this limited result 
was proposed by focusing on Ethiopia’s relation with donors. In this re-
gard, the analysis suggested that Ethiopia is actually quite adept in “man-
aging” its engagements with donors and had been able to resist adopting 
governance standards it did not deem appropriate. Moreover, the pres-
ence of proper structures of financial management paradoxically also 
positively influenced the ability of Ethiopia to benefit from annual IDA 
reallocations. Similarly, outcomes in the case of the APRM also were lim-
ited and did not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its governance stand-
ards. The inter- and intra-state disciplining of the government was weak, 
as the horizontal peer pressures were limited in persuading the govern-
ment to accept the governance standards, and vertical societal pressures 
were limited due to the confines of restrictive state-society structures. 
The findings suggested that, rather than challenging external develop-
ment strategies and coercive financial pressures, the APRM process rep-
resented a form of institutional isomorphism and continental branding 
of African values on governance that internalised the normalisation of 
good governance. 
 
The study then used the salient observations from the case study in-
vestigation of Ethiopia and replicated this to three secondary country 
case study analyses of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. In relation to the 
CPIA, the analysis explained that, similar to the case of Ethiopia, the 
translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipients was ineffective 
for these countries, as the Bank did not make the appropriate connection 
between norms, performance and punishment/reward. This was because 
the CPIA score is only one factor of several determining the final IDA 
country allocations. Furthermore, the case studies showed that the dy-
namics regarding the ability to effectively absorb IDA finance and the 
relative level of economic development and national income also influ-
enced these processes; as a result, the CPIA assessment was also limited 
in disciplining Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy stand-
ards.  
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In relation to the APRM, the analysis showed that the process, similar 
to the case of Ethiopia, did not discipline Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to 
adhere to its policy standards due to weak inter- and intra-state disciplin-
ing mechanisms. Inter-state disciplining was weak, as the peer review 
process primarily functioned to give internal and external political legiti-
macy to the review process and outcomes. In particular, it was influ-
enced by dynamics related to the relative political and economic weight 
of a country, the presence of the “founding fathers” in the Forum, and 
the commitment and importance assigned to the pan-African ideals. In-
tra-state disciplining was weak, as the APRM domestic processes operat-
ed within the confines of established state-society structures and did not 
alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role 
for non-state actors. In particular, it was influenced by the governance 
approach to national development, which in turn was influenced by dy-
namics related to the receptiveness to external and more liberal narra-
tives on democracy and political governance. 
 
The discrepancy between the content, process and outcomes of the 
CPIA and APRM alluded to other strategic considerations that influ-
enced their application. The analysis showed that the CPIA functions 
formally to increase aid effectiveness, but informally operates as a tool of 
the Bank to increase its geo-political influence over aid recipients. In the 
case of the APRM, the analysis suggested that while the APRM formally 
functions to strengthen governance on the continent, it informally sup-
ports member states to increase their political legitimacy. This disjunc-
ture between the Bank’s discourse and practice, on the one hand, and 
that of the African Union, on the other hand, could be explained by un-
derstanding these assessments as instruments that serve to normalise and 
legitimise existing dynamics, structures and practices that govern the 
power relations between these actors.  
 
These overall findings of the research suggest that while the content 
of the CPIA and APRM support the good governance agenda, the pro-
cesses and outcomes are actually in disjunction to this discourse and do 
not influence aid allocation processes. This is because the processes and 
outcomes of the CPIA and APRM are used as instruments of the Bank 
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and the African Union to normalise, legitimise and reproduce develop-
ment structures that govern the power dynamics between the West and 
the Bank, on the one hand, and the African Union and its member 
states, on the other. By relying on the developmentality framework, it is 
possible to view this paradox as being logically connected. Moreover, it 
shows the importance of critically analysing past, present and future de-
velopment policies and instruments as representations of discourses that 
use truth and knowledge to legitimise power relations within the aid sys-
tem (Escobar 1984: 392). 
 
Table 8.1  
Propositions on the CPIA and APRM 
 
Propositions on the CPIA Propositions on the APRM 
Sub-question one: How are governance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and 
APRM? 
• 1a: CPIA content comprises discursive frames 
on good governance. These frames reflect the 
norm that (good) governance is central to sus-
tainable development and to aid effectiveness. 
CPIA content represents a technology to ad-
vance the Bank’s framework of thinking on gov-
ernance.   
• 1b: The CPIA is designed as a form of indirect 
rule of the World Bank over aid recipients (pro-
ductive power). This comprises a productive 
power, as the Bank generates knowledge on the 
performance of aid recipients (through the CPIA 
rating) and uses the performance-based alloca-
tion system as a discursive practice to incentivise 
“proper” conduct. This approach aims to hold 
aid recipients responsible for achieving appropri-
ate conduct (in the eyes of the Bank) and to im-
prove performance within the frames set forth 
by the CPIA assessment. 
 
• 1c: APRM content comprises African discursive 
frames on good governance that consider a more po-
litical operationalisation of governance and incorpo-
rates African standards as reference.  
• 1d: The APRM is designed as a form of counter-rule 
(resistance) against external influences on the African 
development agenda. This design reflects a form of 
resistance, as it uses similar language, frames, methods 
and discursive spaces as that of the donors to present 
a counter-approach and -method to promoting gov-
ernance. This also aims to counter the negative gov-
ernance brand of the continent. 
 
Sub-question two: How have the CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia? 
• 2a: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance 
(auditing/monitoring) that assesses adherence to 
• 2g: The APRM is a voluntary monitoring mechanism 
that assesses adherence to African governance norms 
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the good governance norm and generates 
knowledge on aid recipient conduct.  
• 2b: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance that 
standardises governance norms across aid recipi-
ent countries, but at the same time individualises 
these to respective country contexts.  
• 2c: The CPIA monitors the conduct of aid recip-
ients by assessing deviance from standards. 
• 2d: The CPIA rating process establishes norms 
in relation to public sector management and in-
stitutions.  
• 2e: CPIA knowledge on aid recipient conduct 
informs the IDA finance allocation. 
• 2f: The CPIA inter-state discipline between the 
Bank and Ethiopia is limited due to the absence 
of dialogue on the rating process, which indi-
cates a form of resistance on the side of the gov-
ernment (resistance). 
 
and generates knowledge on policies and practices of 
African countries. 
• 2h: Voluntary accession to the APRM is an indicator 
of political commitment to African governance norms. 
• 2i: The APRM process monitors adherence to African 
governance norms, but this does not necessarily trans-
late into adherence to the review’s principles (i.e. gov-
ernment control of the process); as a result, the intra-
state discipline of the mechanism could be considered 
weak. 
• 2j: The APRM review generates knowledge on policies 
and practices, but this does necessarily translate into 
the acceptance of its standards (i.e. resistance of the 
government by dismissing review findings); as a result, 
the inter-state discipline of the mechanism could be 
considered weak.  
• 2k: It could be suggested that the APRM process re-
sponds to the global normalisation of good govern-
ance, as indicated by a wish to “brand” and collective-
ly pursue democracy and political governance on the 
continent. 
 
Sub-question three: How have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related govern-
ance standards in Ethiopia? 
• 3a: The translation of knowledge to power over 
the aid recipient is ineffective, as the Bank does 
not make the appropriate connection between 
norms, performance and punishment/reward. 
The CPIA is only one of several factors deter-
mining the final IDA country allocations. As a 
result, the CPIA process does not discipline 
Ethiopia to adhere to its policy standards by en-
gendering self-optimisation.   
• 3b: Ethiopia is adept in “managing” its engage-
ments with donors and has been able to resist 
adopting governance standards it does not deem 
appropriate. This level of autonomy is also 
grounded in the presence of proper structures of 
financial management, which paradoxically posi-
tively influence the ability of Ethiopia to benefit 
from annual IDA reallocations. 
 
• 3c: The APRM process does not discipline African 
countries to adhere to its policy framework. 
• 3d: Inter-state disciplining of the government is weak, 
as the Forum can be a space for openly dismissing re-
port outcomes or indirectly retaining legitimacy by 
nominal compliance, reflected in subjection to the re-
view process without strong compliance regarding 
progress reports.  
• 3e: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM oper-
ates within the confines of established state-society 
structures and does not alter these by mandating a par-
ticipatory approach and a monitoring role for non-
state actors. 
• 3f: Rather than challenging external development 
strategies and coercive financial pressures exerted by 
donors, the APRM seems to have internalised the 
good governance agenda. The APRM is an example of 
institutional isomorphism and continental branding of 
African values on governance that internalise the 
normalisation of good governance. 
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Sub-question four: Did similar or different dynamics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in 
Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria? 
• 4a: The translation of knowledge to power over 
the aid recipient is ineffective, as the Bank does 
not make the appropriate connection between 
norms, performance and punishment/reward. 
This is because the CPIA score is only one of 
several factors determining the final IDA coun-
try allocations. As a result, the CPIA assessment 
is limited in disciplining Ghana, Nigeria and 
Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards. 
• 4b: The APRM process does not discipline African 
countries to adhere to its policy standards due to weak 
inter- and intra-state disciplining mechanisms. 
• 4c: Inter-state disciplining is weak, as the peer review 
process primarily functions to give internal and exter-
nal political legitimacy to the review process and out-
comes.   
• 4d: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM oper-
ates within the confines of established state-society 
structures and does not alter these by mandating a par-
ticipatory approach and a monitoring role for non-
state actors. 
 
Sub-question five: Which strategic considerations inform the functions that the CPIA and APRM perform 
for the World Bank and the African Union?  
• 5a: The CPIA formally aims to increase aid effec-
tiveness, but informally serves as an instrument 
of the World Bank to increase its geo-political in-
fluence. This discrepancy between the discourse 
and practice of CPIA functions to normalise and 
reproduce already-existing structures, practices 
and relations that define international develop-
ment cooperation. 
• 5b: The APRM formally aims to increase good gov-
ernance, but informally serves as an instrument to in-
crease the political legitimacy of the member states of 
the African Union. This discrepancy between the dis-
course and practice of the APRM functions to nor-
malise and reproduce already-existing structures, prac-
tices and relations that define international 
development cooperation. 
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 Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
List of interviewees  
 
Interviews on CPIA with: 
• World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 16 July 2015 in Addis Ab-
aba, Ethiopia; 
• World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 21 July 2015 in Addis Ab-
aba, Ethiopia; 
• World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 21 July 2015 in Addis Ab-
aba, Ethiopia; 
• World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 4 August 2015 in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia; and 
• World Bank, Washington D.C. Head Quarter Officer on 17 Septem-
ber 2015 via Skype. 
 
Interviews on APRM with: 
• Ethiopia Government representative on 11 September 2015 in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• Ethiopia National Governing Council Member on 29 July 2015 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• APRM Country Review Mission Member on 23 July 2015 via Skype; 
• APRM Country Review Mission Member on 30 July 2015 via tele-
phone; 
• APRM Country Review Mission Member on 31 July 2015 via email; 
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• APRM Country Review Mission Member on 2 October 2015 via 
email; 
• APRM Continental Secretariat Member on 28 July 2015 via Skype; 
• APRM Continental expert on 21 July 2015 via Skype; 
• APRM Continental expert on 30 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• APRM Continental expert on 31 July 2015 via Skype; 
• APRM National expert on 29 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• APRM National expert on 16 September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethi-
opia; and 
• Civil society actor on 1 September 2015. 
 
Interviews on Governance Assessments with Practitioners 
• United Nations Development Program, Regional Service Center for 
Africa on 22 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• United Nations Office to the African Union on 16 September 2015 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on 24 July 2015 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• The African Capacity Building Foundation on 20 July 2015 in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance on 9 
August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• African Union Commission, African Governance Architecture Platform 
on 11 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• African Union Commission, African Governance Architecture Platform 
on 4 September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• African Union Commission, Department of Political Affairs on 26 Au-
gust 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
• World Bank, Public Sector and Governance Group (former member) 
on 2 September 2015 via Skype; and 
• World Bank, Global Governance Practice, on 8 September 2015 via 
Skype. 
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Interviews on Governance Assessments with Academics: 
• Nigerian Turkish Nile University, Nigeria on 23 July 2015 via Skype; 
• University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa on 24 July 2015 via 
Skype; 
• Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia on 5 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia; 
• Cornell University, United States of America on 25 August 2015 via 
Skype; 
• Overseas Development Institute, United Kingdom on 31 August 2015 
via email; and 
• University of Florida, United States of America on 21 July 2015 via 
email. 
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Appendix 2 
Interview Questions  
 
Interview Questions on the CPIA in Ethiopia: 
a. As you know, the first part of the process of preparing the CPIA 
concerns a benchmarking phase in which a representation of coun-
tries is drawn from all regions and rated accordingly. Could you 
provide more information on the process through which the 
benchmarking countries are selected? Has Ethiopia been a bench-
mark country, and was this Bank office involved in the ratings for 
each criterion and written justifications? 
 
b. The second process concerns the rating of the remaining countries, 
in which the benchmarked countries and their respective countries 
are used as guideposts (including both as sources of information 
and as guiding indicators). Could you elaborate on the process 
through which the Bank office prepares the annual CPIA score for 
Ethiopia? Which offices are involved? Which sources are used? 
Who in the office has the final say in the rating? 
 
c. The guideposts (suggested indicators) present an anchor in the rat-
ings; however, there also other considerations to take into account 
in the rating process: the level of performance against certain crite-
ria, not the degree of improvement against the same criteria; policy 
actions and implementation (including relevance and the manner in 
which policies are implemented and their institutions), in contrast 
to intentions or commitments; and, finally, the size of the econo-
my. This seems like a very difficult undertaking, as government ac-
tion does not take place within a vacuum. Could you explain how 
the Bank staff may objectively assess Cluster D for Ethiopia, while 
taking into considerations all these difficult contexts? 
 
d. Interestingly, there may be an incentive for staff to increase the rat-
ing, as this may lead to increased funding for projects supported in 
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Ethiopia. Therefore, how is the objectivity of the rating guaranteed 
(in spite of the officer making the rating)? 
 
e. Some of the final steps include the presentation of the draft ratings 
to the government. How does this process take shape, and has this 
in some cases provided supplementary information to modify the 
rating accordingly? Does the government accept the various critical 
ratings? 
 
f. The final ratings are again presented to the government. Could you 
elaborate on how the annual ratings are translated into the Bank’s 
programme for Ethiopia? Are specific concerns addressed in sepa-
rate, specific strategies? The Country Strategy Paper is a multi-year 
paper – how may annual ratings of the CPIA affect this? 
 
g. Cluster D focuses on Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; 
Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; Efficiency of 
Revenue Mobilization; Quality of Public Administration; and, last-
ly, Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sec-
tor. Some critics may say that this is a somewhat narrow perspec-
tive on governance that leaves out political dimensions regarding 
the way countries are governed. Do you think that such other as-
pects, i.e. those related to democracy, should be included in the re-
view? 
 
h. As annual ratings cannot be compared (due to the changing under-
lying guideposts), and because governments cannot firmly see the 
direct connection between CPIA scores and access to credit, do 
you believe then that this may still provide a sufficient incentive for 
Ethiopia to improve its governance environment? 
 
i. How could the CPIA be further strengthened to better achieve its 
objectives regarding the promotion of governance in Ethiopia? 
Which other factors should be taken into consideration? 
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j. Do you feel that African governance assessments such as the 
APRM may provide an example to the CPIA, as they focuses more 
on structural deficiencies and on contextual factors, in addition to 
placing the government in the driver seat of governance reform 
and ownership? 
 
Interview Questions on the APRM in Ethiopia: 
a. As you may know, Ethiopia acceded in 2003, but the process did 
not get off the ground until 2008. The government was designated 
as the Focal Point for NEPAD/APRM activities, and a special ad-
visor to the Prime Minister was appointed as the APRM National 
Focal Point. Moreover, a council of ministers Regulation No. 142 
was formed to guide the implementation of the APRM processes 
in Ethiopia. Can you provide insights into the motivations for the 
Ethiopian government to join the APRM and its dedication to the 
spirit of the process? 
 
b. A National Governing Council was established and was led by 
then-Minister of Capacity Building. As the report notes, it was 
composed of representatives from the government, the opposition, 
civil society, and the private sector. Do you feel that the council 
operated autonomously, inclusively (diversity of stakeholders), and 
representatively, encouraging broad-based participation as theoreti-
cally intended? 
 
c. The self-assessment was undertaken by the African Institute of 
Management Development and Governance, which engaged with 
six research instruments including 4,620 household surveys and 
expert opinion surveys, and organised consultative forums across 
regions. Do you feel that the draft report provided an adequate 
representation of the democratic and political landscape of Ethio-
pia? What could have been improved regarding the process or con-
tent? 
 
d. This self-assessment report and draft National Plan of Action were 
handed over to the external Country Review Mission team, which 
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also interacted with a wide array of actors according to the report. 
What is your opinion on the level of participation and interaction? 
Was there a broad level of participation, and could a wide array of 
actors contribute to the content? If not, which elements should 
have been included or addressed? 
 
e. The final report was tabled during the 14th session of the APR Fo-
rum of Heads of State in January 2011. Do you believe that the 
content on “Democracy and Political Governance” reflects an ad-
equate description of the state of affairs, or have key issues been 
excluded? 
 
f. Do you think that the National Plan of Action related to democra-
cy and political governance presents an adequate policy strategy for 
concerns addressed in the report? If not, what would have been 
matters that should have been addressed? 
 
g. As you may know, the report became only available to the public 
in January 2013, and the government of Ethiopia has since not 
presented any mandatory progress report. Why do you think this 
was the case? 
 
h. As the APRM process hinges on the application of vertical pres-
sure (from civil society) and horizontal pressure (from other partic-
ipating states), how would you assess the ability/possibility of 
Ethiopian non-state actors to monitor the implementation of gov-
ernance commitments set forth in National Plan of Action? Which 
barriers to their monitoring capacity exist? How could these be cir-
cumvented? Did the UNECA Secretariat provide support or train-
ing? What other role could the APRM play in increasing the partic-
ipation of non-state actors? 
 
i. Do you think that other African countries (peers) can pressure the 
government of Ethiopia to implement commitments set forth in 
the National Plan of Action? What would be the main obstacles or 
concerns? 
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j. Do you feel that democracy and political governance in Ethiopia 
have been strengthened because of the APRM process? Which 
other factors/incentives can further strengthen this process? 
 
k. Some critics believe that the APRM is simply a tool for African 
governments to appease Western governments and financial insti-
tutions, as the initiative lacks the necessary teeth to enforce change. 
What are your thoughts on this characterisation? Or, relatedly, how 
African is the African Peer Review Mechanism? 
 
l. What is your opinion on external governance reviews, for instance 
of the World Bank, that aim to influence governance in Ethiopia 
by making aid conditional to having a strong good governance ar-
rangement in the country? Would such a financial incentive be a 
more appropriate tool to stimulate governance reform? 
 
Interview Questions on Governance Assessments in Africa: 
a. Could you elaborate on your experience with and/or knowledge of 
governance assessments in Africa? 
 
b. As you may know, governance assessments are important for do-
nors to assess the improvement of aid recipients in the area of 
good governance. Interestingly, the World Bank and other major 
donors are using these assessments scores (such as the CPIA) as 
the basis for decision-making on aid. Do you feel that this type of 
aid selectivity provides the necessary incentives for African gov-
ernments to further strengthen their governance frameworks? Can 
you elaborate with examples? 
 
c. How may this incentive, which is primarily based on access to fi-
nance, stimulate the development of sincere improvements of gov-
ernance in a country?  In other words, can financial motivations 
create sufficient grounds for governments to sincerely address 
governance deficiencies? Can you also elaborate with examples? 
Are there further examples of the impact of the process you may 
know? 
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d. Alternatively, the African Peer Review Mechanism, with its focus 
on horizontal and vertical pressures and government-owned plans 
of action, may provide a more comprehensive and holistic ap-
proach to governance. Do you believe that the peer review pro-
vides the necessary pressures on African governments to further 
strengthen their governance framework? If yes/no, why? 
 
e. Do you believe that non-state actors can participate and monitor 
the agreed National Plan of Action? If yes/no, why? Can you also 
elaborate by providing some examples? Are there further examples 
of the impact of the process you may know? 
 
f. Some critics argue that the APRM, although according to NEPAD 
rooted in African Renaissance ideas, is merely a framework to ap-
pease Western governments and interests in promoting govern-
ance. A striking example concerns the accession of blatantly un-
democratic regimes. How would you assess the purpose of the 
APRM and the reason why states voluntarily accede? How “Afri-
can” is the African Peer Review Mechanism? 
 
g. How can governance assessments stimulate appropriate govern-
ance reform and the institutionalisation of good governance? 
Which actors should be involved? What specific roles can external 
actors, i.e. Western donors or the African Union, play in this re-
gard? 
 
h. Which other factors influence the adoption of governance policy 
reforms? 
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